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Thesis Summary 
The present thesis focuses on two main areas of deception research. The first of these 
examines the cognitive processes involved in telling a lie and the second examines human 
ability to detect deception. Since deception research has historically lacked a solid 
theoretical basis, this work extends previous research by providing a greater theoretical 
understanding of both the processes involved in telling lies, and also those involved in 
successfully discriminating truthful messages from deceptive ones. In the first section, a 
simple response time paradigm is used to examine how cognitive processes differ when 
individuals lie compared to when they tell the truth. This paradigm is manipulated to 
examine the effect of a variety of different factors on potential processing differences, 
such as the number of lie response options available and the order of lie and truth 
responses. Overall, the contention that telling a lie is more cognitively demanding than 
telling the truth was supported. This additional cognitive load should aid in the 
discrimination of false and truthful messages by human observers. The second section of 
the thesis therefore examines individual differences in human ability to detect deception. 
A number of individual difference variables were examined, including extraversion and 
autism spectrum characteristics, allowing for the exploration of the potential relationship 
of these measures with both deception detection accuracy and degree of truth bias when 
judging the messages of individuals from different cultural backgrounds. Overall, reliable 
individual differences in ability levels were not found. A positive relationship between 
extraversion and degree of truth bias, however, was demonstrated when participants 
judged individuals from the same cultural background as themselves compared to a 
different cultural background.  
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CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction and Thesis Overview 
Overview of Deception Research 
It is a common belief of lay people that liars behave differently to truth tellers, with the 
Global Deception Team (2006) highlighting gaze aversion as the most commonly cited 
cue to deception internationally. Such beliefs are, however, in sharp contrast to the 
research literature, which has highlighted only a limited number of cues that may show 
promise as indictors of deception. For example, a comprehensive meta-analysis 
conducted by DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton and Cooper (2003) 
examined 158 behavioural cues from the deception literature and failed to support the 
existence of the majority of these as cues to deceit. Since limited support was shown for a 
small number of these cues, such as increases in pitch, pupil dilation and fidgeting when 
individuals tell a lie, this suggests that certain behavioural differences between liars and 
truth tellers may be present in particular situations. Despite a lack of empirical support for 
the majority of ‘cues’ to deception, the search for reliable indicators to detect liars has 
historically been the focus of deception research for a number of years, driven mainly by 
demand from the defence and security sector (Meijer, Verschuere, Vrij, Merckelbach, 
Smulders, Leal, et al., 2009). Such a research agenda has resulted in a neglect of 
theoretical development in the field (McCornack, 1997; Wolpe, Foster & Langleben, 
2005), with much work still required to understand why, when and how behavioural 
differences between liars and truth tellers may occur.  
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Although research continues to try and identify behavioural patterns that can be 
used in practical contexts to detect deception through a variety of means (Caso, 
Maricchiolo, Bonaiuto, Vrij & Mann, 2006; Porter, Doucette, Woodworth, Earle & 
MacNeil, 2008; Tsiamyrtzis, Dowdall, Shastri, Pavlidis, Frank & Ekman, 2007), a second 
strand of deception research focuses on the examination of human ability to detect lies 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Bond & Uysal, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2007). Overall, human ability 
to detect deceit has been shown to be poor, with an average detection rate of 54% shown 
in experimental studies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). A lack of association between the 
stereotypes people hold regarding deceptive behaviour and how liars have actually been 
shown to behave may contribute to individuals’ poor ability to detect deceit (Global 
Deception Team, 2006). A recent study by Hartwig and Bond (2011), however, has 
demonstrated that this poor detection ability is more likely linked to a lack of observable 
behaviours in the messages that people are judging. 
Individual variation in the ability to detect deception remains a contentious issue, 
with some researchers claiming that variation in human accuracy rates indicate the 
presence of individual differences in ability levels, whereas others challenge this 
suggestion (Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Bond & Uysal, 2007; Levine, Kin, Park & Hughes, 
2006; O’Sullivan, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2008). The current lack of research regarding 
individual differences and the ability to detect deceit unfortunately makes it difficult to 
draw any firm conclusions in this area (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2008).  
Aims of the Present Thesis 
The aims of the present thesis are twofold. Firstly, to examine the particular cognitive 
processes that are involved in telling lies, and how they differ from those involved in 
telling the truth, in a variety of different circumstances. Secondly, to examine the 
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different factors that affect human ability to detect deception, with a particular focus on 
individual and cultural differences in both detection accuracy and response bias.  
In relation to the first aim, a minimalist approach was taken, which allowed us to 
examine the contribution of individual cognitive processes to telling a lie. A simple 
computer task was developed, whereby participants lied and told the truth regarding the 
colour of a square and their vocal response times recorded. Response times have been 
shown to be greater when individuals lie compared to when they tell the truth, which 
supports the idea that additional processes are required in order to tell a lie. The relative 
contribution of these processes, and the factors that may affect this, remain unknown. Our 
experiments allow for an extension of previous work regarding the theoretical 
understanding of why telling a lie is more difficult than telling the truth, as well as the 
factors that may decrease or increase this difference. Since our experiments demonstrated 
that telling a lie does involve additional processes compared to telling the truth, and that 
this is reflected in measurable behavioural differences, our second aim was to examine 
the judgement factors that may affect the ability to identify this enhanced difficulty and 
accurately detect deception.  
In relation to the second aim, human ability to detect deception was examined 
through the creation of video statements of individuals both truthfully and falsely 
describing an image they had previously viewed on a computer screen. Some of these 
statements were provided by individuals of the same cultural background as the judge, 
whilst others were provided by individuals of a different cultural background to the judge. 
Judges viewed these statements and evaluated whether they thought each one was truthful 
or a lie, as well as completing a variety of individual difference measures related to the 
ability to correctly interpret the behaviour and mental states of others. These experiments 
allowed us to examine possible relationships between both individual difference measures 
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and cultural background, on response bias and judgement accuracy, thus extending 
previous judgement studies. 
Structure of the Present Thesis 
The present thesis is divided into 3 main sections. The first section provides an 
introduction to deception research and critically reviews previous work relating to 
deception detection. The second section consists of our experimental work and is divided 
into two subsections. The first of these subsections incorporates chapters 2, 3 and 4 and 
presents work addressing the first of our above-stated aims; an investigation of the 
cognitive processes involved in telling a lie. The second subsection incorporates chapter 
5, which addresses the second of our aims; the influence of individual differences on the 
ability to detect deception both within and across cultures. The third and final section of 
the thesis provides a general discussion of our work, and considers our findings in 
relation to the wider deception field. A more detailed consideration of each chapter is 
provided below. 
Chapter 1 provides a comprehensive review of previous literature in the deception 
field. This focuses on the examination of potential behavioural differences when people 
lie compared to when they tell the truth, and the theoretical considerations of why such 
differences may occur. Criticisms regarding the lack of theoretical development 
previously inherent in the deception field (McCornack, 1997) provide a context for our 
experiments, with a consideration of the factors that are likely to impact on deceptive 
cognition and behaviour, and the detection of it. Extraneous to this are wider factors that 
may impact on the accurate identification of such deception by human judges, with a 
consideration of current thinking regarding deception judgements providing the context 
for our work on human ability to detect deception.     
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Chapter 2 investigates two processes suggested to increase response times when 
individuals tell a lie, namely the decision to lie and the construction of a lie response 
(Walczyk, Roper, Seemann & Humphrey, 2003). In our first experiment, we found that 
response times were longer when participants chose, compared to when they were 
directed, to lie. In Experiments 3 and 4, we compared response times when participants 
had only one possible lie option to a choice of two or three possible options. There was a 
greater lying latency effect when questions involved more than one possible lie response. 
Experiment 5 extended this consideration of response choice mechanisms through the 
manipulation of lie plausibility. Overall, results highlight several distinct mechanisms that 
contribute to additional processing requirements when individuals tell a lie. 
Chapter 3 examines whether switching between telling a lie and telling the truth 
incurs a response time cost compared to consistently responding in one manner 
(Experiment 6). Overall, we found that switching between these two processes increased 
response times compared to trials where no switch was required, indicating that the two 
response types involve the use of different task-sets. Furthermore, this difference was 
greater when participants switched from telling a lie to telling the truth rather than vice 
versa. In accordance with previous theories (i.e., Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994), this 
suggests that telling the truth is a more dominant cognitive task than telling a lie.  
Chapter 4 examines whether it is possible to influence the lie response that is 
chosen through the use of priming techniques. On certain trials, participants were primed 
with a potential lie response. The results of Experiment 7 demonstrate that participants do 
not use these primes as their lie response any more than would be expected by chance. 
Experiment 8 increased the number of lie response options, which resulted in participants 
using the same response as the prime more than would be expected by chance, suggesting 
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that the correct prime is influencing the lie response chosen. Response times were also 
shown to be faster when participants used the prime as their lie response. 
Chapter 5 examines the relationship between lie detection ability, bias and 
personality characteristics when judging individuals from the same vs. a different cultural 
background to the judge.  In Experiment 9, participants judged messages of individuals 
from the same cultural background as themselves (UK). Significant correlations were 
found between accuracy and extraversion scores on the EPQ-SF, such that high scores on 
the extraversion subscale of the EPQ-SF were correlated with high lie detection accuracy. 
Individuals higher in extraversion also demonstrated a truth bias, judging more statements 
as truths than as lies. In Experiment 10, participants judged messages of individuals from 
both the same cultural background (UK) and a different background to themselves (South 
East Asian). A significant positive correlation was found between truth bias for UK 
statements and extraversion scores on the EPQ-SF, but not between extraversion and 
truth bias for South East Asian statements. This suggests that extraverts lose their truth 
bias when judging individuals from a different culture to their own.  
Chapter 6 brings the findings of our experimental chapters together in the form of a 
general discussion. This evaluates our findings in relation to previously discussed 
research, and the overall contribution of the thesis to the deception field. The limitations 
of the thesis are considered, in addition to future research directions that would further 
extend our findings and continue to benefit the research field as a whole. 
General Introduction 
Although a number of definitions for deception have been debated over the years (Masip, 
Garrido & Herrero, 2004), Vrij (2008) recently defined deception as ‘a successful or 
unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief which 
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the communicator considers to be untrue’ (Vrij, 2008, p.15). There are many ways in 
which an individual can effectively deceive another, including exaggeration (Tyler, 
Feldman & Reichert, 2006), presenting truthful information in a misleading manner (Vrij, 
2008), concealing information (Metts, 1989) and outright falsifications (DePaulo, Kashy, 
Kirkendol, Wyer & Epstein, 1996; Ekman, 1997). The process of outright falsification, 
i.e., when an individual lies by knowingly providing false information, is the focus of 
investigation in the present thesis. 
People lie surprisingly often. Indeed, Serota, Levine and Boster (2010) found that 
40% of 1,000 American adults reported telling at least one lie in a 24-hour period. Such 
lies usually concern minor issues and serve a communicative function, namely to prevent 
us from continually offending each other (DePaulo et al., 1996), but lies can also be 
uttered with more criminal intent and damaging consequences. Evolutionary psychology 
suggests that humans have an innate, ‘hard-wired’ ability to deceive others, in order to 
ensure survival and reproductive success (Bond & Robinson, 1988; Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978; Whiten & Byrne, 1997). Understanding how people lie, and the 
behavioural differences that this may create, is therefore important both for cognition in 
general, and also in a wide variety of practical contexts such as law enforcement, 
occupational selection and fraudulent claims. This latter reason has prompted a large 
body of research into identifying cues to detect deception (see DePaulo et al., 2003), so 
that liars may be more easily differentiated from truth tellers in a variety of settings. 
There are many practical situations in which lying is problematic, causing serious 
costs and consequences. These include a range of contexts in which applied psychologists 
may be involved. Evaluating the truthfulness of presented information is crucial in 
forensic settings, where witness statements may be false (Appelbaum, 2007; Raskin & 
Esplin, 1991). For instance, several judicial cases have highlighted the importance of 
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accurately assessing witness credibility (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009), since failure to do so 
may lead to wrongful conviction (Wilson, 2003). In occupational settings, deception has 
been shown to commonly occur during selection processes, where individuals may fake 
responses on personality measures (Holden, 1998) or lie about previous experience / 
credentials (Ollian, 2003). For example, Robinson, Shepherd and Heywood (1998) 
demonstrated that 83% of undergraduate students interviewed would be willing to lie in 
order to be considered for a job. The importance of deception detection in law 
enforcement and security settings is also highlighted by the inclusion of information 
regarding deception in police interview training manuals (Inbau, Reid, Buckley & Jayne, 
2001; Vrij, 2008), and the focus of security policy on potential lie detection technologies 
(Meijer et al., 2009). In addition, individuals may fake medical symptoms in order to 
fraudulently claim compensation (Frueh, Elhai, Grubaugh, Monnier, Kasdan, Sauvageot 
et al., 2005) or to avoid responsibility for a crime that has been committed (Oorsouw & 
Merckelbach, 2010). For example, the Croatian National Referral Centre found that only 
37% of veterans who reported PTSD symptoms were actually suffering from PTSD 
(Kozaric-Kovacic, Bajs, Vidosic, Matic, Alegic & Peraica, 2004), a finding likely to be 
linked to compensation-seeking motives (Geraerts, Kozaric-Kovacic, Merckelbach, 
Peraica, Jelicic & Candel, 2009). In all of the above situations, it is important to be able 
to differentiate when an individual is lying from when they are telling the truth.  
Despite significant technological advances in the non-intrusive measurement and 
identification of behavioural markers (e.g., Rothwell, Bandar, O’Shea & McLean, 2006), 
a reliable cue to deception that can be used in practical settings has yet to be found. This 
has resulted in a research agenda that has previously focused on the identification and 
discovery of lie detection techniques, rather than on the development of adequate 
theoretical models regarding deceptive behaviour. This historic lack of theoretical 
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understanding regarding when, why and how we could expect behavioural differences 
between liars and truth tellers to manifest themselves, has led to the collection of vast 
amounts of conflicting behavioural data that have yet to be comprehensively interpreted 
or explained.  
In this chapter, we first consider how deception research is typically conducted and 
the criticisms associated with such methodologies. Following on from this, we discuss the 
theoretical rationale of deception research and its development, before focusing 
specifically on research regarding the cognitive processes involved in telling a lie. 
Finally, we focus on techniques to detect deception. We do this by initially providing an 
overview of interview techniques designed to identify liars, before reviewing the 
literature on behavioural cues to deception and the ability to detect deceit.    
Methodology of deception research 
The majority of research conducted in the deception field consists of laboratory 
studies, whereby participants are instructed to lie and/or tell the truth in a particular 
situation. For example, participants may be asked to lie or tell the truth regarding their 
attitudes on a current issue, or regarding someone they know (Cheng & Broadhurst, 
2005). Alternatively, participants may be asked to lie about objective statements, such as 
certain autobiographical information (Gregg, 2007), an image or film they have viewed 
(Ekman, Davidson & Friesen, 1990), or their possession of a particular object (Akehurst 
& Vrij, 1999). A further paradigm that has proved popular in deception research is that 
relating to the creation of a mock crime situation, whereby participants are instructed to 
take part in a mock criminal offence, such as removing a specific object from a lecturer’s 
office, and then denying involvement when subsequently questioned (Gronau, Ben-
Shakhar & Cohen, 2005; Verschuere, Crombez, De Clercq & Koster, 2004). Using such 
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paradigms, behavioural data (e.g., body movements, gaze aversion) can be recorded, 
either visually or orally, while individuals provide free narrative statements, or are 
specifically questioned on particular topics. Both non-verbal and verbal behaviours can 
then be examined at a later date, and coded according to relative frequency by human 
coders or automated devices.  
Alternatively, certain behaviours can be measured using specialist devices, such as 
a polygraph, which measures skin conductance levels (Bull, 1988); or a functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) scanner, which provides a measurement of BOLD 
responses in the brain (Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003). 
Where specialist neuroimaging equipment is used, it is common for participants to lie in 
response to computer-generated questions and stimuli, rather than to another individual. 
Such computer tasks often contain images of particular objects, or questions regarding the 
information that is being probed, and the participant is then instructed to lie or tell the 
truth on particular trials by pressing particular response buttons.  
The above described computer tasks often use a design that relates to the Concealed 
Information Test (CIT; Lykken, 1959). CIT protocols are an increasingly popular lie 
detection technique, whereby individuals are asked specific questions related to the topic 
under investigation, such as ‘how much money was stolen?’ and are then presented with a 
variety of response options, one of which is the truthful answer. The assumption is that 
individuals with knowledge of the crime will recognise this truthful information, and that 
this recognition will be shown in differential behavioural and brain responses to the 
stimulus (Verschuere, Meijer & DeClerq, 2011). It has been proposed that physiological 
responding in the CIT for liars can be explained by orienting response (OR) theory 
(Lykken, 1974). This suggests that when we are presented with external information that 
is either significant or novel, the OR directs our attention to this information in order to 
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further investigate the stimulus and respond to the information appropriately (Sokolov, 
1963). When individuals are presented with information, such as that regarding a crime, 
that is salient to them, they will have a stronger orienting response than individuals who 
have no knowledge of the topic under investigation.   
Criticisms of deception research 
Unsurprisingly, given the nature of deception and the difficulty involved in 
experimentally examining the subject, a frequent criticism of deception research is a lack 
of ecological validity (O’Sullivan, 2008). This predominantly revolves around the 
following three main facets: the motivation of participants; the sanctioning of the lie 
response; and the participants sample that is used. 
When individuals lie in a practical context, they are likely to receive significant 
penalties if discovered, such as criminal punishment, loss of reputation, or the alienation 
of a significant other (Vrij, 2008). For ethical reasons, this significant threat of 
punishment is not present in deception studies. In an attempt to negate this problem, some 
researchers have provided participants with financial or behavioural incentives to deceive 
effectively, for example, providing a monetary bonus to participants who are able to 
convince the interviewer they are telling the truth or informing participants that if their lie 
is discovered, they will be required to complete a large number of questionnaires (Leal & 
Vrij, 2008). DePaulo et al (2003) suggest that providing participants with an external 
incentive to deceive, however, does not enhance the presence of behavioural cues to 
deception, and that internal self-presentational motivations, such as informing individuals 
that effective liars have greater job success, is a more effective technique. 
The motivation to deceive also relates to the second facet, which involves the 
sanctioning of the lie response. When individuals lie in practical settings, they have not 
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been instructed to do so. In this situation, if their lie is discovered, they must take full 
responsibility for any punishment or sanction that they receive regarding this. This 
serious threat of punishment is absent in experimental studies, thereby reducing the likely 
emotional response that an individual may have. Since the majority of participants in 
experimental studies are typically instructed when to lie, this also negates the necessity to 
choose how to respond in a particular situation, possibly reducing the cognitive processes 
required. Although Spence, Kaylor-Hughes, Farrow and Wilkinson (2008) and Walczyk 
et al (2003) have attempted to provide paradigms whereby individuals choose whether to 
lie or tell the truth, difficulties in data analysis and interpretation mean that the majority 
of deception research still instructs participants how to respond on particular trials.  
The third facet concerns the participant sample that is used. The majority of studies 
have been conducted in western universities using student samples, resulting in a 
considerable lack of research regarding individuals from different cultural, occupational 
or social groups. A small number of researchers have been able to access recordings of 
genuine police interviews, which provide an ecologically valid dataset for analysing the 
behaviours displayed by suspects in investigative interviews (e.g., Mann, Vrij & Bull, 
2002; Vrij & Mann, 2001). Alternatively, researchers such as Rossini (2010) have 
examined potential non verbal and verbal cues in videotapes of political speeches. Such 
work is incredibly rare, however, since it is both incredibly time-consuming to conduct 
and also fails to provide any degree of experimental control over the factors involved. 
The complexity of any deceptive interaction means that it currently remains difficult to 
disentangle which of a myriad of factors are responsible for any behavioural differences.  
Methodological differences in the factors discussed above likely account for the 
multitude of conflicting findings in the field (Porter et al, 2008; Vrij & Mann, 2001; Vrij 
& Winkel, 1991). Different sample populations, rating procedures, situational contexts 
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and motivations may all impact on the behaviours that are shown by both liars and truth 
tellers, and hence any differences between the two. For example, Stromwall, Hartwig and 
Granhag (2006) failed to support previous findings of an increase in speech cues when 
individuals told a lie. In their study, trainee police investigators interviewed participants 
regarding their involvement in a mock crime. Although liars reported being significantly 
more nervous than truth tellers and found the task more strenuous, no differences in 
speech cues were demonstrated. In their study, participants were provided with 
approximately 2 hours to prepare for the interview, which may have reduced the 
propensity of behavioural cues shown in other studies (DePaulo et al, 2003). Since 
interrogators were allowed to use any interview strategy they chose, it is also possible 
that variations in interviewer and interview characteristics influenced the results 
(Akehurst & Vrij, 1999; Vrij, 2006). Similar conflicting findings have also been shown at 
the individual participant level. For instance, in their analysis of police suspect 
interviews, Mann, Vrij and Bull (2002) found that approximately half of the subjects 
studied showed an increase in speech disturbances when lying, whereas others showed a 
decrease in such disturbances, highlighting that even the direction of any effects remains 
unclear.  
Although deception research conducted in experimental environments has been 
criticised for a lack of ecological validity, such an approach allows for the isolation of 
different factors, such as the subject that an individual lies about and the particular 
questions asked. This increases our understanding of the different elements of the 
deception process, and their relative contribution to potential behavioural differences. It is 
appreciated that such studies have only a limited ecological validity, but this does not 
negate their necessity. Although applied work is extremely important in highlighting 
predominant issues of concern and discrepancies between the laboratory and the 
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interview room, the lack of experimental control in such work can make it difficult to 
interpret results, since behavioural differences may be due to extraneous factors such as 
the behaviour of the interviewer or the characteristics of the case. Thus, observing 
behavioural differences without adequately considering the large variety of possible 
moderating factors is not sufficient to enable the prediction and explanation of behaviour 
in different environments. This means that highly controlled experimental work is 
required to develop adequate models of deception, which can then be tested and modified 
in practical environments. 
Theoretical development in deception research 
If behavioural indicators could be shown that reliably distinguish between truth 
tellers and liars, the real world applications of these findings would be profound. 
Unfortunately, as a result of this somewhat relentless pursuance of an all encompassing 
cue to deception, the field has suffered from a lack of theoretical focus and direction in 
the past. Critics such as McCornack (1997) have challenged the assumptions inherent in 
the deception field, highlighting that although it is commonly believed that lies are 
distinct from truths because of their nature, this may not necessarily be the case: 
‘… the claim that deceptive messages are distinct because they must be ‘internally 
consistent and compatible with what the recipient already knows’ suggests that truthful 
messages are constructed without regard to internal consistency and recipient 
knowledge, a claim equally at odds with extant literature.’ (McCornack, 1997; p.106) 
 
The demand for psychological techniques to detect deception has continued to 
grow, with research and commercial efforts ranging from the automated detection of 
visual behaviours in airport settings (Weinberger, 2010), to the use of functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging when individuals respond to questions (Langleben, 2008). 
There is widespread public interest in these techniques (Spinney, 2011), with companies 
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such as No Lie MRI commercially advertising their lie detection services 
(www.noliemri.com). This commercial demand has been criticised for subverting “the 
evolutionary process of scientific development” (Saxe, 1994; p. 72). Such a  shortcoming 
has also been more recently expressed by Wolpe et al (2005), who claim that “premature 
commercialization [of certain lie detection technologies] will bias and stifle the extensive 
basic research that still remains to be done” (p.47). Yet if a lie detection technique is to 
become practically viable and usable in a legal judicial setting, it must meet stringent 
research criteria. For example, in the US, the ‘Daubert’ guidelines (Daubert v. Merrel 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 1993) present 5 criteria for evaluating ‘expert’ evidence, and 
therefore the admissibility of deception detection technologies, in court. These are:  
• Is the scientific hypothesis testable? 
• Has the proposition been tested? 
• Is there a known error rate? 
• Has the hypothesis/technique been subjected to peer review and publication? 
• Is the theory behind the hypothesis/technique generally accepted in the 
appropriate scientific community? 
Therefore, if any lie detection test is to be used in a judicial setting, an appropriate 
theoretical understanding of why such differences occur must be developed and accepted 
in the scientific community. In line with such requirements, researchers are becoming 
increasingly focused on examining the particular cognitive processes that may 
differentiate truthful from deceptive communication (Spence, Farrow, Herford, 
Wilkinson, Zheng & Woodruff, 2001), in an attempt to theoretically understand the 
mechanisms involved in deceptive communication.  
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In 1987, Hewes and Planalp claimed that “an understanding of the individual’s 
knowledge, cognitive capacities and emotion is the necessary point of departure for 
building adequate theories of communication” (p.172). Given that deception represents a 
field of communication, it is important that all of these factors are considered when trying 
to model deceptive behaviour. Such a task is a huge feat, however, and theorists may 
progress further by initially focusing on the explanation of individual facets of the 
deception process. One particular area of recent interest relates to the cognitive processes 
involved in telling lies, with McCornack (1997) suggesting that the most challenging 
issues relating to deception research are cognitive in nature and must be addressed as 
such, since attempting to account for all aspects of interpersonal deception will inevitably 
explain very little. In accordance with this, McCornack highlighted a number of so-called 
myths of deception research requiring further examination, with a number of these 
directly relating to the cognitive processes involved in telling a lie. These were as 
follows: that the encoding of deceptive messages involves more active, strategic and 
detailed cognitive processing compared to telling the truth; that encoding deceptive 
messages requires greater cognitive load compared to truthful messages; and that 
deceptive messages have particular characteristics that differentiate them from truthful 
messages. The increased focus in recent years on the cognitive processes involved in 
telling lies will allow for such assumptions to be challenged experimentally. For such 
views to be understood however, it is important to consider theoretical development 
within deception research. This is discussed in more detail below. 
Current theoretical consideration of possible differences in behaviour when 
individuals lie compared to when they tell the truth revolve around two main ideas: 
increased cognitive load and increased emotional arousal. In their review of the literature, 
Zuckerman, DePaulo and Rosenthal (1981) highlighted that when individuals tell a lie 
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they engage in additional cognitive processes compared to when they tell the truth. These 
processes include the monitoring of nonverbal behaviour, suppression of truthful 
information and the production of a lie response (Seymour, Seifert, Shafto & Mossman, 
2000; Walczyk et al, 2003). In support of this idea, studies investigating the effects of 
making lies more complex have found that they are easier to detect. For example, asking 
participants to recall an event in reverse order (Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne & Bull, 
2008) or using interview techniques that require longer answers to questions (Vrij, Mann, 
Kristen & Fisher, 2007), have been shown to increase discrimination ability between liars 
and truth tellers. Although intuitive, less evidence exists in relation to the second 
consideration, that liars experience enhanced emotional arousal. This is mainly due to 
difficulties instilling adequate levels of arousal in the laboratory. Both Zuckerman et al 
(1981) and Ekman (1988), however, suggest that liars are more likely to experience 
increased levels of emotion, such as guilt, fear and excitement, when deceiving others, 
than individuals who are telling the truth. 
Although such suggestions provide a basis for current theoretical considerations of 
deception, they do not adequately explain the underlying mechanisms and processes 
involved in deceptive communication. For example, the cognitive load approach suggests 
that telling a lie is cognitively more complex than telling the truth and will result in 
behaviour that highlights this additional mental effort, such as a decrease in body 
movements and an increase in response time. However, there is no in-depth explanation 
of precisely why deception is more cognitively challenging, or the particular processes 
involved in any deceptive encounter.  
CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction & Thesis Overview 
 
 
 
21 
Cognitive processes and deception 
A number of studies have found that people report lying to be more difficult than 
telling the truth (Caso, Gnisci, Vrij & Mann, 2005; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007; Vrij, 
Ennis, Farman & Mann, 2010). The heightened interest in the cognitive processes 
involved in telling a lie, combined with the recent advancement in brain imaging 
technologies such as fMRI, has provided the impetus for the cognitive mechanisms of 
deception to be considered experimentally. This has led to the recent development of 
preliminary models of deceptive cognition, such as the Activation-Decision-Construction 
Model (ADCM; Walczyk et al, 2003) and the Working Model of Deception (WMD; 
Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green & Meek, 2009). We now present these cognitive 
models and examine the evidence relating to them. 
 The Activation Decision Construction Model (ADCM; Walczyk et al, 2003) 
The ADCM provides a theoretical cognitive framework which can be used to 
examine the processes related to deception. The model suggests that additional processes 
are involved in telling an unrehearsed lie compared to telling the truth. These additional 
processes should lead to liars taking longer to respond to questions than truth tellers. The 
model proposes that three components are involved in telling a lie: activation of the truth; 
the decision to lie; and construction of the lie response. The processes proposed in the 
model provide the basis for our experimental work in Chapters 2-4.  
On initially hearing a question, the model claims that relevant information (in 
particular, the truth) is automatically activated in long-term memory (e.g., Kintsch, 1998). 
This information is then transferred to working memory (Ericson and Kintsch, 1995) and 
becomes consciously available to the individual. If the individual has not previously 
decided to respond honestly to all questions in advance, they must then consciously 
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decide whether to lie or tell the truth in response. If divulging the truth is deemed to act 
against self-interest, then individuals are likely to lie to the question asked, leading to an 
increase in response time. If individuals have already decided to lie to a question and 
have rehearsed an answer, then they must remind themselves of their decision to lie on 
hearing that particular question, again adding to response time. Finally, if the individual 
has decided to lie, then the truthful response must be suppressed and an appropriate, 
alternative answer constructed according to the situational context. The model claims that 
implausible or inappropriate lies (e.g., lies that are inconsistent with other statements, see 
Depaulo and Bell, 1996) are inhibited in long-term memory and the most active lie 
following this process is transferred to working memory to be used in response to the 
question (see Kintsch, 1998).  
Walczyk et al (2003) and Walczyk, Schwartz, Clifton, Adams, Wei and Zha (2005) 
supported their model in a series of experiments that showed an increase in response time 
of up to 230ms when individuals lied to both computer-presented and examiner-read 
questions, such as ‘Are you Catholic?’ In one of these experiments, participants were 
presented with a selection of neutral questions and questions probing embarrassing 
information. In one condition, participants were instructed whether to lie or tell the truth 
randomly on a trial by trial basis. In the other condition, participants answered truthfully 
unless a question probed embarrassing information which they would normally lie to a 
stranger about, in which case they were asked to lie. In this condition, participants needed 
to decide themselves when to lie and when to tell the truth. The experiment demonstrated 
that more time was needed to respond when individuals chose to lie compared with when 
they had been instructed, consistent with the decision component of the ADCM. An 
alternative explanation for this finding, however, is that the elevated response times are 
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due to the evaluation of whether the question is embarrassing, rather than the actual 
decision to lie. 
The Working Model of Deception (WMD; Vendemia et al, 2009) 
The WMD highlights a number of cognitive processes involved in deceptive 
communication. Although the model is still in the development stage, it aims to examine 
the time course and cognitive aspects of deception. It proposes that deceptive behaviour is 
affected by attentional processes related to both internal stimuli (such as the inhibition of 
potential responses, decision-making and the retrieval of information from long-term 
memory) and external stimuli (such as the intensity of the question asked). It is claimed 
that executive control processes continuously monitor ongoing dialogue with another 
individual and, in accordance with the ADCM, when a particular question is heard, 
relevant information (most notably, the truth) becomes active in working memory. This 
truthful information interferes with the production of a deceptive response. A decision 
must then be made as to whether to respond truthfully or deceptively according to the 
risks and benefits associated with each response. Information retrieved from long-term 
memory is used to create a suitable lie. The authors claim that such processes require the 
contribution of both endogenous and exogenous attentional systems. 
The idea that the truth interferes with the ability to respond deceptively, either 
through the necessity to suppress the truthful response or to increase the relative 
activation of the deceptive response (Osman, Channon & Fitzpatrick, 2009), has been 
demonstrated recently using a number of innovative paradigms. For instance, Duran, Dale 
and McNamara (2010) instructed participants to respond truthfully or falsely to 
autobiographical information on a large projector screen using a Nintendo Wii remote to 
select yes or no responses presented in either corner of the screen. In addition to findings 
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of longer response times for lie responses, response trajectory analysis also demonstrated 
a dynamic curve toward the true response when participants had to lie, whereas no curve 
was present when participants responded truthfully. This was taken to suggest that 
truthful information interfered with the production of a deceptive response. Ikehara and 
Crosby (2009) similarly suggested that findings of an increase in pressure on a mouse 
button when participants intentionally chose an incorrect answer on a multiple-choice 
question, was indicative of increased cognitive load and interference when responding 
falsely.  
Deceptive cognition and response time 
The additional processes required when individuals lie will take time to compute, 
resulting in longer response times to questions (Seymour & Kerlin, 2008; Vendemia, 
Buzan & Simon-Dack, 2005; Walczyk et al, 2003). Differences in response time when 
people lie compared to when they tell the truth began to be seriously investigated in the 
1920s, when William Marston (1920) claimed that deceptive subjects may show either an 
increase or a decrease in response times when they lied compared with when subjects told 
the truth. Other researchers of the era, primarily Goldstein (1923), argued that Marston’s 
methods did not correctly distinguish between whether subjects were aware of their 
deception. Although Marston refuted this in 1925, more recent research has supported an 
increase rather than a decrease in response times when participants lie versus when they 
tell the truth. However, the extent that this effect is determined by situational variables is 
yet to be thoroughly investigated.  
Although interest in response time as a symptom of deception waned after the 
1930s, there has been a resurgence of research by cognitive psychologists and 
neuroscientists in recent years, which has corresponded with the increased desire in 
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psychology to understand the underlying processes related to deceptive communication. 
Current research generally studies response time in relation to computer tasks using 
simple paradigms, whereby participants respond either vocally or through a keyboard to 
questions such as ‘do you have brown hair?’. Despite the apparent simplicity of such 
paradigms, longer response times for liars have generally been supported (Gregg, 2007; 
Seymour, Seifert, Shafto & Mossman, 2000; Vendemia et al, 2005; Walczyk et al, 2003; 
Walczyk et al, 2005). Research has also demonstrated that such response time differences 
are not shown between individuals who tell the truth and those who experience a false 
memory, suggesting that the additional cognitive processing is unique to the active 
deception process itself (Abe, Okuda, Suzuki, Sasaki, Matsuda, Mori, et al., 2008).  
There is still debate regarding response time as an indicator of deception, since a 
number of researchers have failed to support the positive findings cited above (e.g., 
Buller, Comstock, Aune & Strzyzewskui, 1989; Greene, O’Hair, Cody & Yen, 1985; 
Gronau et al, 2005) and others have shown an opposite effect (Hsu, Santelli & Hsu, 1989; 
Klaver, Lee & Hart, 2007). It is possible that these conflicting findings are due to the 
different methods used by the researchers, since it seems likely that the accessibility of 
the answer and its ease of retrieval from memory present one possible moderator. For 
example, Greene et al (1985) asked participants to both lie and tell the truth to 
spontaneous questions about a holiday they had been on. Although the findings were in 
the predicted direction they were not significant and it is possible that this was a result of 
truth tellers needing longer to retrieve detailed (and possibly fairly inaccessible) 
information from long-term memory than in paradigms probing more accessible 
information.   
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Moderator variables and response time 
Although response times have shown themselves to be a fairly robust indicator of 
deception, there are still areas that require further investigation. Like many cues to 
deception, they are likely to be affected by a number of moderator variables, such as the 
accessibility of truthful information in memory (Greene et al, 1985), the complexity of 
the question (Vrij et al, 2007), individual differences in working memory capacity / 
verbal efficiency (Walczyk et al, 2003), the degree of preparation (DePaulo et al, 2003) 
and intoxication with alcohol (Kireev, 2008). There has only been limited work 
conducted relating to particular moderator variables, with preparation and coaching 
examined in recent years, but these studies have resulted in conflicting results. For 
example, Seymour et al (2000) demonstrated with a CIT paradigm that neither informing 
nor advising participants about longer response times when lying moderated the response 
time effect, whereas Robie, Curtin, Foster, Phillips, Zbylut and Tetrick (2000) showed 
that coaching participants extinguished the response time difference between liars and 
truth tellers who were completing personality measures. In the latter study, however, the 
coached liars were unable to successfully increase their scores on the questionnaire 
measures that they were completing, suggesting that quicker responses in liars is 
detrimental to their success when responding falsely.  
The idea that preparing a lie response reduces the response time difference between 
lies and truths has been suggested in the research literature (DePaulo et al, 2003; Gronau 
et al, 2005), likely through a reduction in the lie construction processes that are required 
when responding to a question. However, Vendemia et al (2005) failed to show an effect 
of practice on the lie-truth response time difference in their study. Participants were 
presented with autobiographical questions and were instructed to respond to some 
questions truthfully and others falsely using a button press. They found that lie response 
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times remained significantly longer than truth response times when participants 
completed the same task over a two week period of multiple testing sessions. Although 
this could be attributed to a lack of motivation by participants to improve, the additional 
finding of a reduction in error rates over the two week period suggests against this.  
The effect that the subject of the lie has on the lie-truth response time difference has 
also been examined. In 2005, Gronau et al. examined both response time and skin 
conductance responses when participants completed a deceptive Stroop task. Similar to 
the concept of the CIT, it was considered that if information salient to the participant was 
presented within the Stroop task, this would interfere with accurate and timely 
completion of the task. A significant increase in response time was only shown when this 
information was personally relevant to the participant however, and not when it related to 
a mock-crime scenario. Similar findings were also put forward by Verschuere et al (2004) 
when they examined response time and physiological responses in a CIT, whereby 
participants completed a mock crime and were shown both control and crime-related 
pictures while attached to a polygraph. Throughout the task, participants were also 
exposed to auditory probes and had to respond to these using a computer input button as 
quickly as possible. Although findings demonstrated increased electrodermal responding 
for crime-related pictures, they failed to find a significant increase in response time to the 
auditory probes when crime-related pictures were displayed, suggesting that such 
information did not interfere with cognitive processing time.  
A further possibility is that reaction times only show an effect for information that 
is more salient in memory, whereas skin conductance measures may require this to a 
lesser degree (Johnson, Henkell, Simon & Zhu, 2008; Nunez, Casey, Egner, Hare & 
Hirsch, 2005). Since response times relate specifically to the cognitive aspects of lying 
and denial, whereas skin conductance provides a measure of physiological arousal, the 
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mechanisms for these indicators are likely to involve different processes. For example, 
Gamer, Bauermann, Stoeter and Vossel (2007) highlighted different brain activity 
associated with both reaction times and skin conductance when participants had to lie 
regarding an item in their possession. Therefore, it is possible that the mock crime 
paradigm does not provide enough interference in relation to cognitive effects, but does 
so in relation to physiological effects.  
The relative strength of the truthful response may also influence any response time 
difference between liars and truth tellers. Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer and Otgaar (2011) 
allocated participants into a frequent truth, frequent lie, or control condition. Participants 
in each condition answered 36 yes-no questions on daily activities presented twice and 
had to both lie and tell the truth in response to each question. Participants also answered a 
further 36 questions that were also presented twice. Those in the frequent truth condition 
were required to respond to all questions truthfully, those in the frequent lie condition 
were required to respond to all questions falsely, and those in the control condition were 
required to respond to the questions both truthfully and falsely an equal number of times. 
The response time difference between truths and lies was found to be greatest in the 
frequent truth condition, and smallest in the frequent lie condition, with no lie effect at all 
demonstrated when participants had to lie more often than tell the truth.  
Deceptive cognition and brain activity 
The suggestion that additional processes are involved in telling a lie compared to 
telling the truth has led to a surge of research using brain imaging techniques, particularly 
fMRI, to examine potential differences in brain activity between lies and truths (Christ, 
Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker & McDermott, 2009). Such work has not only supported 
findings of longer response times in liars, but has also highlighted the additional 
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activation of certain brain regions during lie responses (Abe, Suzuki, Tsukiura, Mori, 
Yamaguchi, Itoh & Fujii, 2006; Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson & Yurgelum-Todd, 
2003; Greene & Paxton, 2009; Johnson, Barnhardt & Zhu, 2004; Spence et al, 2001). The 
particular brain regions consistently implicated in deception thus far include the 
dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices (DLPFC; VLPFC) and the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC). These brain regions have been associated with working memory, 
task switching and response inhibition processes (Christ et al, 2009). Impairments in 
these regions have also been shown to affect deceptive responding. For example, the 
dysfunction in the prefrontal cortex shown in Parkinson patients has been linked with an 
inability to inhibit true responses and produce deceptive responses (Abe, Fujii, Hirayama, 
Takeda, Hosokai, Ishioka, et al., 2009). Similarly, Karim, Schneider, Lotze, Veit, 
Sauseng, Braun and Birbaumer (2010) demonstrated that the speed of deceptive 
responses could be influenced by using transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS) to 
inhibit activity in the anterior prefrontal cortex. When such brain activity was inhibited, 
this actually led to faster response times for lies during a CIT mock crime paradigm.  
Differences in brain activation patterns have also been shown according to the 
different aspects of a deceptive response. Abe, Suzuki, Mori, Itoh and Fujii (2007) 
undertook PET scans of 16 male participants answering 48 yes-no questions relating to 
autobiographical semantic memory. Participants were divided into one of four conditions. 
In the honest truth condition, participants were instructed to tell the truth about a past 
memory; in the honest lie condition, participants had to lie about a past memory; in the 
dishonest truth condition, participants were originally asked to lie, but were then secretly 
requested to tell the truth by a different experimenter immediately prior to the task; in the 
dishonest lie condition, participants were originally asked to tell the truth, but were then 
secretly requested to lie by a different experimenter. Interestingly, different brain regions 
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were associated with the different tasks given in each condition. In particular, it was 
shown that the left dorsolateral and right anterior prefrontal cortices were associated with 
the act of falsifying a response, whereas the left ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the 
amygdala were associated with deceiving the experimenter. 
Sip, Lynge, Wallentin, McGregor, Frith and Roepstorff (2010) examined active 
deception strategies using a laboratory version of the deceptive dice game Meyer. Two 
participants took turns to throw a dice and had to decide whether to deceive the other 
player regarding their throw result. In addition to directly falsifying a lie response, 
participants could also deceive by telling the truth with deceptive intent. The authors 
suggested that when making a false claim, additional processes would be engaged 
concerned with selecting responses from among competing alternatives. It was found that 
claiming truthfully with deceptive intent activated similar areas to claiming falsely, which 
is in accordance with findings of Carrión, Keenan and Sebanz (2010) of similar response 
times for both false responses and truthful responses intended to deceive. 
How an individual deceives, i.e., whether they are denying knowledge compared to 
falsifying information, has also been suggested to involve differential cognitive 
processing. For example, Priori, Mameli, Cogiamanian, Marceglia, Tiriticco, Mrakic-
Sposta, et al. (2008) demonstrated differential response times when people denied or 
falsely admitted having a picture. When neuronal excitability was then increased using 
anodal transcranial direct-current stimulation, response time significantly increased when 
participants falsely denied knowledge, but not when they falsely admitted possession of a 
picture. Nunez et al (2005) similarly highlighted potential processing differences 
according to the subject of the lie, claiming that behavioural and neural effects are more 
robust when the information being falsified is autobiographical rather than non-
autobiographical in nature. Contrasting findings have been shown by other researchers, 
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however, with Johnson et al (2004) showing consistently slower responses when people 
lie than when they tell the truth regardless of whether the lie is based on denying or 
falsifying a response. This led the authors to claim that the executive control processes 
used to make deceptive responses may be general purpose in nature. Given such varied 
findings, a wide variety of situational variables should be explored and considered when 
examining both the factors that affect the behavioural cues displayed by liars and also the 
inherent cognitive processes that may be responsible for these differences.  
Interview techniques to detect deception 
 In the following sub-sections we now consider interview techniques that have 
been developed to aid in the differentiation of liars and truth tellers; namely, cognitive 
load techniques (Vrij, Granhag, Mann & Leal, 2011), the Strategic Use of Evidence 
technique (SUE; Granhag & Strömwall, 2002), the Behavioural Analysis Interview (BAI; 
refs) and concealed information tests (CITs; Lykken, 1959). 
Deceptive cognition as an interview strategy 
The finding that telling a lie involves additional processes, and hence is more 
difficult, than telling the truth has provided a new range of techniques to aid in the 
detection of deception. Although traditional lie detection tools, such as the polygraph, 
have been based on arousal approaches to deception, the effectiveness of such techniques 
has been seriously questioned (National Research Council, 2003). This has resulted in a 
resurgence of interest in other approaches that may aid lie detection in practical 
situations. Vrij and colleagues have recently demonstrated a lie detection technique based 
on the cognitive load approach, which involves using a series of strategies designed to 
increase the cognitive load of interviewees. Since liars are already experiencing more 
cognitive demand than truth tellers, they should have fewer attentional resources 
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available to them to cope with any additional demands (Vrij & Granhag, in press). It is 
proposed that such a strategy will result in liars demonstrating behaviour that highlights 
this increased mental effort. For example, asking liars to recount their story in reverse 
order has been shown to result in an increase in so-called ‘cognitive cues’ such as 
blinking, speech errors and hesitations (Vrij et al, 2008).  
Vrij and his colleagues have also investigated other methods for increasing 
cognitive load in liars, such as asking temporal related questions such as ‘what was the 
weather like when you visited the house?’(Vrij, 2008) and asking individuals to draw the 
restaurant that they ‘supposedly’ visited (Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal & Mann, 2011; Vrij, 
Leal, Granhag, Mann, Fisher, Hillman & Sperry, 2009). 
The strategic use of evidence 
Granhag and Hartwig (2008) highlighted that liars and truth tellers typically employ 
different strategies when entering an interview situation. Namely, liars attempt to avoid 
and deny incriminating information, whereas truth tellers are much more forthcoming 
with the information that they provide. These different strategies form the basis of the 
Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Hartwig, 
Granhag, Stromwall & Kronkvist, 2006). This involves a strategic use of the evidence 
available in order to identify these differential strategies. The technique suggests that 
during interviews, both open and specific questions are asked, without revealing the 
evidence that the interviewer has access to. It is suggested that truth tellers are more 
likely to mention the relevant information spontaneously, whereas liars are not. Instead, 
liars are more likely to deny any knowledge of the incident, and thus are more likely to 
contradict the evidence. This approach is also related to the claims of the ADCM, since 
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the model suggests that liars will consider the knowledge of the interviewer and adjust 
their lie accordingly during lie construction (Walczyk et al, 2003).  
The promise of the SUE technique as a lie detection strategy has been highlighted 
by multiple researchers (Clemens, Granhag & Strömwall, 2011; Hartwig et al, 2006). 
Hartwig et al (2006) trained half of their interviewers in the SUE technique and compared 
their lie detection accuracy to a cohort of untrained interviewers using a style of their 
choice. It was found that guilty participants contradicted the evidence more often than 
truth tellers, particularly when interviewed by the SUE trained interviewees. Deception 
detection accuracy was also shown to be higher in the SUE trained group, with these 
interviewers showing an average detection rate of 85.4% compared to 56.1% for the 
untrained interviewers. 
The behaviour analysis interview 
The Behaviour Analysis Interview (BAI) was developed by John E Reid & 
Associates, Inc, following research conducted by Frank Horvath into the nonverbal and 
verbal responses of suspects when asked particular questions (Horvath, 1973). The 
technique provides a framework of interview questions divided into 3 main types. 
Namely, biographical questions, which relate to personal information regarding the 
suspect, such as their age; investigative questions, which relate to details of the incident 
under investigation, such as where an individual was when the crime was committed; and 
behaviour provoking questions, which are designed to elicit different behavioural 
responses from truth tellers and liars, such as ‘why would someone ...?’ The initial 
biographical phase is used to provide a baseline of truthful behaviour. This is then 
compared to the behaviour that individuals show during behaviour provoking questions, 
with behavioural differences between the two being used to differentiate honest from 
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dishonest responses. The technique has remained popular in applied settings, particularly 
in US law enforcement agencies, and is described in more detail in the interview training 
manual of Inbau et al (2001). 
The BAI technique remains the subject of debate, with research conducted by its 
developers demonstrating that the technique increases deception detection accuracy 
(Horvath, Jayne & Buckley, 1994). Unfortunately, other researchers have failed to 
support the majority of the assumptions of the BAI (Kassin & Fong, 1999; Vrij, Mann & 
Fisher, 2006). The design of these studies has, however, been criticised by Horvath, Blair 
and Buckley (2008) for failing to understand the correct implementation of the BAI. 
Concealed information tests 
The polygraph has traditionally been used in accordance with particular questioning 
techniques, such as the Comparison Question Test (CQT; Reid, 1947). Such techniques 
remain controversial (Vrij, 2008), since they lack an adequate theoretical foundation and 
rigorous scientific testing (Iacono, 2000). Since such polygraph tests are regularly used in 
a number of countries, including the US, Japan, Canada and Pakistan to differentiate liars 
from truth tellers (British Psychological Society, 2004; Honts, 2004; Krapohl, 2002; Vrij, 
2008), the need for reliable questioning techniques has contributed to the development of 
the Concealed Information Test (CITs). CITs, also referred to as guilty knowledge tests, 
involve the presentation of sets of stimuli (such as weapons) to an individual, with one of 
these items relating to the crime under investigation (such as a murder weapon) and the 
other objects being unrelated to the crime. Individuals are asked whether the murder 
weapon was one of the following objects and are instructed to answer ‘no’ to all items. 
Individuals who are lying (because they have specific knowledge of the crime) are 
expected to show increased physiological arousal, as well as other behavioural cues such 
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as increased response times, to the actual murder weapon than to irrelevant items. 
Individuals who are telling the truth are expected to demonstrate no differences between 
the objects. CITs have been developed as questioning techniques for use with the 
polygraph, although they are also commonly used in research examining brain activation 
and ERPs (Gamer et al, 2007; Lui & Rosenfeld, 2008; Phan, Magalhaes, Ziemlewicz, 
Fitzgerald, Green & Smith, 2005).  
A limitation of the CIT is the requirement for interviewers to possess detailed 
knowledge about the crime in order to adequately develop the questions and resulting 
stimuli. It is also essential that details of the crime that are used in the test are not leaked 
to the public, since this may lead to innocent examinees being classified as guilty. A 
similar problem is likely to be encountered when individuals admit to witnessing the 
crime (and therefore are aware of specific details), but deny actual involvement (Honts, 
2004). The National Research Council (2003) has also suggested that innocent 
examinee’s may show reactions to crime-related stimuli because they also happen to be 
personally relevant to them, rather than because they were involved in the crime itself.  
Despite the above limitations, Seymour and Kerlin (2008) demonstrated that 
reaction times could efficiently detect concealed knowledge when a CIT was used. Ben-
Shakhar and Elaad (2003) also supported the potential use of CITs in polygraph 
examinations following a review of the relevant literature, but called for further research 
to be conducted in applied settings in order to test the high validity that these tests have 
shown in experimental studies. 
Indicators of deception 
It is a common belief of lay people that liars behave differently to truth tellers 
(Global Deception Team, 2006). Consequently, a variety of different behaviours have 
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been examined using the methodologies discussed above in an attempt to discover 
reliable cues to deception. These can be broadly categorised into nonverbal behaviours, 
such as body movements and facial expression (Ekman & Friesen, 1974; Porter et al, 
2008), paraverbal behaviours, such as response time (Walczyk et al, 2003), linguistic 
content, such as the use of spatial and temporal information in statements (Bond & Lee, 
2005), and physiologcial indicators, such as skin conductance and brain activation 
(Spence et al, 2001). In the sections below, the different types of indicators will be 
discussed. 
 Nonverbal indicators 
Research regarding visual nonverbal behaviours and deception has generally shown 
nonverbal cues to be unreliable as effective indicators of deception (DePaulo et al, 2003). 
A recent meta-analysis examining 54 studies conducted by Sporer and Schwandt (2007) 
demonstrated that, despite popular stereotypes regarding the nonverbal behaviour of liars, 
only nodding, foot, leg and hand movements were reliably related to deception. 
Regardless of this, nonverbal behaviours remain a popular indicator of deceptive 
behaviour in applied settings (Vrij, 2008a). Previous work has emphasised the importance 
of moderator variables on the behaviours displayed when people lie, such as the research 
design that is employed, variation in the measurement and definition of indicators, and 
the degree of preparation time provided (Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; Sporer & Schwandt, 
2007). The effect that these different factors may have on experimental results makes 
direct comparisons of findings across studies difficult. 
Body movement 
Research conducted to date regarding body movements in deception has divided 
movements into 5 main areas: hand/finger movements; leg/foot movements; head 
CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction & Thesis Overview 
 
 
 
37 
movements; trunk movements and gestures/illustrators. Conflicting results have been 
reported in the literature regarding the relationship between body movements and 
deception (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Porter et al, 2008). For example, Porter et al 
(2008) showed an increase in illustrators and self manipulations when individuals lied 
compared to when they told the truth, but found no difference in head movements 
between the conditions, whereas Kalma, Witte and Zaalberg (1996) supported an increase 
in head movements when individuals lied, but did not support differences in other body 
movements. Furthermore, other studies have failed to support any differences in body 
movement at all (Vrij & Mann, 2001).  
Differences in findings across studies may be attributable to the different 
measurement procedures that are used by different researchers. For example, 
experimental work has often coded gestures as one type of body movement, whereas 
Caso et al (2006) differentiated between several types of gestures (self adaptor, deictic, 
iconic, metamorphic) and demonstrated that the occurrence of these different gestures 
was differentially associated with lying  and telling the truth.  
Research conducted in applied environments has also demonstrated a lack of 
reliability in body movement cues, suggesting that previous findings are not merely due 
to controlled experimental situations being used. For  example, Mann et al (2002) 
examined recordings of police suspect interviews and found that approximately 50% 
showed an increase in head movements and 50% showed a decrease in head movements 
when they lied. They also failed to support differences between true and false statements 
for hand/finger movements, illustrators or self manipulations.  
The research examined has shown considerable variability in relation to findings, 
but only provides consistent support for a decrease in hand and arm movements when 
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people lie (Caso, Vrij, Mann & DeLeo, 2006; Vrij, 2006; Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara & Bull, 
2004; Vrij, Edward & Bull, 2001; Vrij & Winkel, 1991), although this is dependent on a 
variety of moderator variables, such as the threat level of the situation, interview style and 
the level of cognitive load experienced by the liar (Davis, Markus, Walters, Vorus & 
Connors, 2005; Vrij, 1995; Vrij, 2006; Vrij et al, 2008).  
A decrease in hand/arm movements can be explained by the cognitive load 
approach to deception, with the increased cognitive load experienced by liars resulting in 
a reduction in ability to direct body movements. This has been supported in work 
conducted by Vrij, Semin and Bull (1996), which demonstrated that self-reported 
cognitive load and attempted control, rather than nervousness, was associated with a 
decrease in subtle hand/finger and foot/leg movements.  
Gaze aversion  
Despite gaze aversion being the most commonly cited cue to deception 
internationally (Global Deception Team, 2006), the scientific evidence base regarding 
this is considerably lacking. Research regarding gaze fails to support either eye contact or 
gaze aversion as a reliable cue to deception (Kalma et al, 1996; Mann et al, 2002; 
Strömwall et al, 2006; Vrij, Edwards, Roberts & Bull, 2000; Vrij et al, 2008; Vrij & 
Winkel, 1991), although a limited number of studies have demonstrated differences in the 
degree of eye contact when individuals tell a lie (Bond, Kahler & Paolicelli, 1985; 
Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Mann et al, 2002; Mehrabian, 1971; Sitton & Griffin, 
1981). Furthermore, research regarding gaze suggests that this behaviour may be 
attributed more to factors such as the cultural background of the interviewee, and the 
interview style used, than to deception per se (Buller et al, 1989; Vrij & Mann, 2001; Vrij 
et al, 2006; Vrij & Winkel, 1991).  
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Facial cues 
The scientific study of emotional facial expressions was first introduced in the mid-
nineteenth century, through the work of both Guillame Duchenne on the physiology of 
genuine smiles, and Charles Darwin, with the publication of his book, The Expression of 
Emotions in Man and Animals in 1872. In this work, Darwin made mention of the 
possibility that emotional expressions can portray information regarding an individual’s 
true mental state more accurately then words alone. “[W]hen movements, associated 
through habit with certain states of the mind, are partially repressed by the will, the 
strictly involuntary muscles, as well as those which are least under the separate control of 
the will, are liable still to act; and their action is often highly expressive” (Darwin, 1872; 
p.54). Specifically, it was suggested that certain facial muscles are difficult to control 
voluntarily, and that some emotional expressions may therefore be difficult to inhibit 
when individuals attempt to conceal their true emotional state.  
The considerations of Darwin were expanded in relation to deception in the leakage 
hypothesis (Ekman & Friesen, 1969), which claimed that facial movements associated 
with particular emotions may “leak” through attempts to conceal them. In 1978, Ekman 
and Friesen developed the Facial Action Coding System (FACS), which provided a 
systematic way for researchers to measure such facial movements. Separate muscles in 
the face were distinguished and combinations of movements of these muscles (known as 
Action Units) were identified for a variety of different emotional facial expressions, 
providing a method to “dissect” a facial expression in relation to a particular emotion. It 
is these distinct muscle movements that can be examined for “leakage” when individuals 
attempt to hide particular emotional expressions when deceiving others. This idea was 
explored in a study conducted by Ekman, Roper and Hager (1980), who found that fewer 
than 25% of their subjects were able to control their facial expression. It was suggested 
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that this inability to produce particular movements when instructed may also suggest an 
inability to voluntarily suppress such movements when required. Therefore, when 
individuals feel emotions such as fear and anger, they should have difficulty in preventing 
certain facial movements associated with these emotions from occurring, resulting in 
emotional facial “leakage” during deception.  
Emotional leakage can be divided into two main types. The first is commonly 
referred to as a micro expression, which is a full emotional expression displayed for a 
very brief period of time (suggested at around 1/5th – 1/25th second). Such facial 
movements are then quickly neutralised or masked once voluntary control is re-gained. 
Whereas micro expressions represent a so-called full facial expression displayed for a 
brief moment, other subtle facial movements have also been suggested to be worthy of 
examination in relation to deception detection (Warren, Schertler & Bull, 2008). Rather 
than representing an entire facial expression, such movements may provide only 
fragments of an emotional expression, with muscles that are unable to be voluntarily 
suppressed remaining active despite attempts to conceal.  
The possibility that such micro expressions and other subtle facial movements 
could provide a cue to deception in security settings has been of increasing interest in 
recent years. In particular, the US, Israel and the UK have demonstrated interest in using 
micro expression identification techniques in airport security settings (Weinberger, 2010). 
One current example is the implementation of the US SPOT programme (Screening of 
Passengers by Observation Techniques), which has involved the training of 
approximately 3,000 behaviour detection officers in the identification of suspicious 
behaviour in airports, with training including the recognition of micro facial expressions. 
Although the validity of such behaviours as indicators of deceit has not been scientifically 
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confirmed, such programmes already cost in the region of $212 million annually (United 
States Government Accountability Office, GAO, 2010).  
Despite such substantial investment, several reports have highlighted a lack of 
scientific research regarding the validity and reliability of such facial cues as indicators of 
deception (Honts, Hartwig, Kleinman & Meissner, 2009; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; 
United States Government Accountability Office, 2010; United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2011). Aside from a small number of studies by Paul Ekman and 
colleagues in the 1970s and 1980s regarding the muscular dynamics of false smiles 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Ekman, Friesen & O’Sullivan, 1988), only limited recent 
research has been published examining both the existence and efficacy of micro 
expressions in relation to deception (Hurley & Frank, 2011; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; 
Porter, ten Brinke & Wallace, 2012; ten Brinke, MacDonald, Porter & O’Connor, 2012).  
Blink rate 
Although not extensively examined, the improvement in technologies that can 
measure blink rate has resulted in a growth in research examining this behaviour. Blink 
rate has been linked with cognitive processing (Stern, Walrath & Goldstein, 1984) and 
increased cognitive load, with Vrij et al (2008) demonstrating an increase in blink rate 
when liars were asked to recall their story in reverse order. Research conducted by Leal 
and Vrij (2008) and Fukuda (2001) has suggested that when lying, an initial decrease 
followed by an increase in blink rate occurs, highlighting the importance of precise 
temporal measurements when examining the efficacy of blink rate as a cue to deception.  
Although Mann et al (2002) supported a decrease in blinking in 81% of individuals 
lying during police interviews, Klaver et al (2007) and Thonney, Kanachi, Sasaki and 
Hatayama (2005) failed to support the presence of blink rate as a cue to deception. 
CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction & Thesis Overview 
 
 
 
42 
Differences in the conceptualisation of the behaviour (i.e., whether paradigms target 
blinking as an arousal-related or a cognitive-related indicator) and the measurement 
procedures used, are likely to have contributed to the conflicting findings shown to date.  
Paraverbal indicators 
It is increasingly recognised that nonverbal behaviours, such as gaze aversion, are 
not reliable indicators of deceit, with Vrij (2008) claiming that speech-related cues are 
more diagnostic of deception than nonverbal behaviours. This idea is supported by 
research highlighting that observers are more accurate at detecting deceit when they are 
exposed to auditory cues than when they are exposed to visual cues only, suggesting that 
more cues to deception may indeed be ‘leaked’ through vocal channels (Mann, Vrij, 
Fisher & Robinson, 2007).  These vocal cues, such as voice pitch, response time, and 
pauses, represent potential paraverbal indicators of deception.  
A meta-analysis conducted in 2006 by Sporer and Schwandt highlighted conflicting 
findings in relation to the validity of paraverbal indicators of deception, demonstrating 
significant effects for only a small number of cues, including an increase in pitch, 
response latency and speech errors, and a decrease in message duration, when individuals 
tell a lie. The relationship of these cues to deception was shown to vary as a function of a 
number of factors, including the content of the lie, the experimental design, how 
motivated the participants were to deceive, and the degree of preparation participants’ 
engaged in.  
Speech disturbances 
Speech disturbances encompass several categories, including repetitions, errors, 
hesitations and filled/unfilled pauses. Speech disturbances have been shown to be 
significantly affected by the level of difficulty that the liar is experiencing when 
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formulating their lie (Vrij et al, 2008; Vrij & Heaven, 1999). Overall there is a reasonable 
level of support for an increase in speech disturbances as a cue to deception (DePaulo et 
al, 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; Vrij & Mann, 2001; Vrij et al, 2001; Zuckerman et 
al, 1981), although some studies have failed to show any significant differences in 
relation to speech disturbance cues (Porter et al, 2008; Strömwall et al, 2006). Although 
speech disturbances show a degree of promise as a reliable indicator of deception, the 
incidence of such disturbances is affected by moderator variables, such as interview style. 
For example, Vrij et al (2006) highlighted that participant’s show a decrease in speech 
disturbances when an interrogation style procedure rather than an information gathering 
interview procedure is used. Mann et al (2002) further highlighted inconsistencies 
regarding speech disturbances as a cue to deception in their examination of police suspect 
interviews, since only half of liars showed an increase in this cue, suggesting that 
examination at an individual level is required.  
Pitch 
An increase in pitch is associated with increased physiological arousal and therefore 
relies on liars experiencing stress and arousal to a greater degree than truth tellers, which 
cannot be guaranteed. Previous literature reviews (DePaulo et al, 2003; Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2006; Zuckerman et al, 1981) have shown support for an increase in voice 
pitch when individuals lie compared to when they tell the truth, but research examining 
pitch as a cue to deception is limited.  
Speech rate 
A decrease in speech rate has been associated with deception, with several studies 
supporting the idea that liars speak more slowly than truth tellers (DePaulo et al, 2003; 
Vrij & Mann, 2001; Vrij et al, 2001). As lying is often more cognitively demanding than 
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telling the truth, a slower speech rate may be expected when individuals have difficulty in 
formulating their response. Several studies have failed to support such promising findings 
(Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Mehrabian, 1972; Vrij et al, 2004) and Davis et al (2005) 
highlighted the impact of extraneous factors, such as the incriminating potential of the 
question, on speech speed in genuine police interviews. 
Response time 
There has been a resurgence of interest among cognitive psychologists and 
neuroscientists in response time as a cue to deception, since response times provide a 
measure of additional cognitive processing. Although research supports the idea that 
people take longer to respond to questions when they lie than when they tell the truth 
(Gregg, 2007; Seymour & Kerlin, 2008; Vendemia et al, 2005; Walczyk et al, 2003; 
Walczyk et al, 2005), there is still debate regarding this area, since some researchers have 
failed to support these findings (e.g., Greene et al, 1985; Verschuere et al, 2004) and 
others have shown an opposite effect (Ekman, 1988; Levine, Feeley, McCornack, Hughes 
& Harms, 2005).  
Gregg (2007) developed a computer based lie detection technique which utilised 
response times to both control and target statements to identify liars. The author claimed 
that the system could correctly classify separate groups of liars and truth tellers with 85% 
accuracy; however, similar to the CIT, it relies on interviewers having detailed 
information regarding the crime.  
Linguistic indicators 
Research regarding linguistic cues to deception has grown in popularity, with the 
suggestion that liars use different words, phrases and descriptors when recounting their 
stories than truth tellers (Ali & Levine, 2008; Bond & Lee, 2005; Masip, Bethencourt, 
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Lucas, Segundo & Herrero, 2012; Memon, Fraser, Colwell, Odinot & Mastroberardino, 
2010). This linguistic analysis of statements and interview transcripts to detect deceit has 
increased since the development of both Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA; 
Kohnken & Steller, 1988) and Reality Monitoring (RM; Johnson & Raye, 1981).  
Criteria-Based Content Analysis was originally developed for use in child abuse 
cases in German courts and claims that statements based on the memory of an 
experienced event will differ in both quantity and quality from an imagined or false 
experience. Altogether, 19 criteria are used by coders to identify the presence or absence 
of certain words and descriptors in transcripts, such as: 
• Spontaneous corrections: ‘I had just gone upstairs when I heard it, no wait, I 
actually heard it before I went upstairs’. 
• Unusual details: A witness highlighting that a suspect had a birth mark on their 
neck. 
• Contextual embedding: Providing specific details of the time and place of the 
event.  
If such words and phrases are identified in a transcript, this is taken as an indication that 
the individual is telling the truth.  
Reality Monitoring was developed in an academic setting and has a stronger 
theoretical basis than CBCA, highlighting the different memory characteristics of genuine 
and false events. It is argued that memories of experienced events are obtained through 
perceptual processes, whereas false memories are created internally by cognitive 
processes. As such, 8 criteria have been developed that identify whether a particular 
memory is based upon perceptual or cognitive processing. These include the presence or 
absence of: 
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• Perceptual information: Statements related to smells, sounds, tastes and visual 
details. 
• Affect: Information related to how the individual felt.  
• Spatial information: Where the event happened. 
Recent research regarding linguistic cues to deception has shown considerable 
variation, with accuracy rates between 53% and 88% (Vrij, 2008). However, certain 
criteria within CBCA and RM have shown themselves to be more diagnostic of honesty 
than others (Bond & Lee, 2005; Caso et al, 2006; Godert, Gamer, Rill & Vossel, 2005; 
Schelleman-Offermans & Merckelbach, 2010; Sporer & Sharman, 2006; Vrij et al, 2004). 
Newman, Pennebaker, Berry and Richards (2003) also highlighted differences in the 
effectiveness of linguistic indicators according to the subject that an individual is lying 
about, with linguistic markers more consistent when examining attitudes to abortion than 
mock crime information. Similarly, linguistic detection methods require individuals to 
actively falsify a lie and therefore, deception related to denials, exaggerations and 
minimisation of involvement may be more difficult to detect using linguistic indicators. 
Like many potential indicators of deception, linguistic markers are also vulnerable 
to countermeasures. For example, Caso et al (2006) instructed participants in either 
nonverbal behaviour countermeasures regarding body movement, CBCA criteria or gave 
them no instructions. Participants in the CBCA group were able to significantly modify 
their verbal behaviour when lying, whereas participants in the nonverbal behaviour group 
showed no difference in body movements from uninformed liars, suggesting that 
linguistic behaviour may be easier to control effectively than nonverbal behaviour.  
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Physiological indicators 
Although physiological cues have been traditionally used to identify deceit, the 
scientific evidence supporting this is limited (National Research Council, 2003). 
Physiological cues commonly relate to the arousal approach to deception, with the 
assumption that liars will experience increased physiological arousal to questions related 
to the crime under investigation than truth tellers. However, a comprehensive theory as to 
why this may occur is lacking and levels of arousal are vulnerable to both mental and 
physical countermeasures (see. www.Antipolygraph.org).  
A common tool used to measure physiological arousal is the polygraph, which 
measures physiological responses, such as blood pressure and skin conductivity, when 
individuals respond to particular questions. The polygraph has been used in several 
countries, most notably the US, Canada and Japan, to aid in police investigations (Vrij, 
2008). Despite the apparent widespread usage of the polygraph in the field, many courts 
of law will not allow the polygraph to be presented as evidence due to limitations and 
questions concerning its reliability and validity (for discussion, see Ben-Shakhar & 
Furedy, 1990; Honts, Kircher & Raskin, 2002; Iacono & Lykken, 1997).  
In 2003, the National Research Council completed a report on the scientific status 
of the polygraph, with the British Psychological Society completing a similar report in 
2004. These reports highlighted severe limitations in research conducted on the polygraph 
and suggested that other areas of deception detection be explored. Despite such concerns, 
the use of physiological cues to detect deceit remains popular, with the UK Home Office 
recently introducing regular polygraph screening for the monitoring of sex offenders 
(Home Office, 2005). Indeed, Langleben (2008) states that “even the presumed 
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inadmissibility of the polygraph in courts does not preclude it from influencing the 
prosecutions’ decision to prosecute.” (Langleben, 2008; p.6).  
With the recent development in neuroimaging technology, a second stream of 
research regarding physiological cues to deception has focused on the cognitive approach 
to deception, examining the cognitive processes involved in telling lies (Christ et al, 
2009; Sip et al, 2010). Since additional processes have been suggested to be involved in 
lying compared to telling the truth, it is intuitive that such processing may be identifiable 
using methods that target brain activation patterns. Although such methods may be 
considered to be more theoretically based than early uses of the polygraph, the premature 
commercialisation of such technologies has been challenged (Wolpe et al, 2005).    
Facial thermography 
Pavlidis, Eberhardt and Levine (2002) claimed that 83% of subjects could be 
classified correctly as liars or truth tellers by examining heat in the facial area, 
particularly around the eyes and nose. This was further supported by Tsiamyrtzis et al 
(2007), who suggested that facial thermography presents a reliable cue to deception. The 
authors of this research also highlighted limitations of this technique to detect deceit, with 
the degree of temperature elevation shown in the face area dependant on both the 
intensity of the stress experienced and the individual psychophysiology of the subject.  
Despite such apparently promising findings (Pavlidis et al, 2002; Tsiamyrtzis et al, 
2007), work examining facial thermography is extremely limited. The National Research 
Council (2003) criticised the use of thermal imaging as a lie detection tool, claiming that 
previous work “does not provide acceptable evidence for the uses of facial thermography 
in the detection of deceit” (p. 157). Indeed, Pollina and Ryan (2002) demonstrated that 
thermal imaging of the eye and nose area was only useful to detect deceit when combined 
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with traditional polygraph measures. Similarly, Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Leal, Forrester 
and Fisher (2011) found that thermal imaging did not increase detection accuracy further 
than an interviewer’s decision independently. Fifty-one passengers in an airport departure 
lounge either lied or told the truth regarding a forthcoming trip in an interview while a 
thermal imaging camera recorded their skin temperature. It was found that liars 
demonstrated an increased skin temperature during the interview, whereas truth tellers 
remained constant. However, whereas 64% of truth tellers and 69% of liars were 
correctly classified using skin temperature recordings, the interviewers were able to 
correctly classify 72% of truth tellers and 77% of liars independently of these recordings. 
Cardio-respiratory indicators 
Although traditionally used with the polygraph, cardio respiratory indicators of 
deception have shown promise in the research literature, with increased skin conductance 
and respiration line length supported by research studies using CIT paradigms (Ben-
Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Engelhard, Merckelbach & van den Hout, 2003; Gamer et al, 
2007; Tarlovsky, Yechiam, Ofek & Grunwald, 2008).  
Classification levels remain far from ideal and unless these indicators are used in 
conjunction with particular questioning techniques such as the CIT, they provide more 
information regarding the situation an individual is placed in than deceit per se. For 
example, although liars may experience increased arousal, truth tellers are also likely to 
experience a degree of arousal, particularly if they are placed in a situation where they are 
not believed. Since laboratory studies are unlikely to mirror the arousal experienced in 
real world situations, like many physiological cues to deceit, more research is required in 
field settings to reliably evaluate the effectiveness of such indicators.  
Pupil dilation 
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Pupil dilation can provide a marker of both the level of cognitive load experienced 
by an individual and the level of physiological arousal. Reviews conducted by 
Zuckerman et al (1981) and DePaulo et al (2003) regarding deceptive behaviour have 
highlighted pupil dilation as a promising cue to deception, although the amount of work 
explicitly examining this indicator is limited. In 1996, Lubow and Fein demonstrated that 
guilty participants had larger pupil diameters, however, it remains uncertain whether this 
was due to increased physiological arousal or increased levels of information processing.  
Until the factors causing increased pupil dilation can be identified, it is difficult to 
determine the specific situations in which pupil dilation can be reliably used as a cue to 
deception. For example, increased information processing may occur when individuals 
are constructing their lie, but also when truth tellers attempt to retrieve detailed 
information from their long-term memory. Work conducted by Dionisio, Granholm, 
Hillix and Perrine (2001) addressed this issue to a certain extent when they highlighted 
that pupil dilation in their experiment was linked to the amount of cognitive processing 
occurring and that this occurred in 92% of individuals when they responded deceptively. 
Event-related potentials  
Event-related potentials (ERPs) are electrophysiological responses that occur in the 
brain and reflect the occurrence of ongoing cognitive processes (Bressler, 2002). They are 
measured through the application of electrodes to the scalp and as such, require intrusive 
and difficult to use measurement procedures (Nakayama, 2002). Particular brain 
responses, such as the N190 and the P300, have been associated with deceptive responses 
in past research (Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Johnson et al, 2008; Kireev et al, 2008; Lui & 
Rosenfeld, 2008) and are generally measured using versions of CIT paradigms, whereby 
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individuals are presented with both crime-related and unrelated objects and the resulting 
physiological responses are measured.  
The use of ERPs to detect deception has shown promise in the research literature, 
with Farwell and Smith (2001) developing and advertising their ‘brain fingerprinting’ lie 
detection technology. This commercialisation can be considered premature however, 
since the utility of ERPs as an indicator of deception remains problematic. This is due to 
difficulties in identifying the cause of differences in brain activity, which makes is 
difficult to identify the specific situations that such responses may occur in for both truth 
tellers and liars. In addition, Rosenfeld, Soskins, Bosh and Ryan (2004) have highlighted 
the vulnerability of ERPs to countermeasures, with guilty participants who were 
instructed to press a finger or wiggle a toe on certain trials being detected with only 18% 
accuracy. Since studies have often been conducted in very limited laboratory based 
settings, where effects are highly controlled and brain activity is not affected by external 
factors, the reliability and validity of ERPs in field environments has yet to be adequately 
established.  
Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
Improvements in brain imaging technology in recent years has led to an increase in 
research examining specific regions of the brain that may be involved in telling lies. Such 
research has used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) scanners to examine 
brain activation when individuals lie in response to simple questions presented by a 
computer, such as ‘are you catholic?’  
Imaging studies have highlighted that certain areas of the brain, particularly the 
prefrontal cortex, show considerably greater activity when people lie than when they tell 
the truth, and that this activation is separate from occurrences of genuine false memory 
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(Abe et al, 2006; Abe et al, 2008). Since increased activation of the prefrontal cortex can 
be linked with a variety of executive control processes, including response inhibition, task 
switching and working memory (Christ et al, 2009; Spence et al, 2001), this suggests that 
additional cognitive processes are necessary to engage in deceptive communication. 
Further research has supported differences in brain activation patterns according to 
whether lies have been rehearsed (Ganis et al, 2003), and whether the subject of the lie is 
autobiographical or non-autobiographical (Nunez et al, 2005). If different types of lie 
correlate with different brain responses, it seems likely that different types of lie will also 
correlate with different behavioural effects, highlighting the importance of examining 
moderator variables in more detail. 
Several limitations and ethical considerations have been identified in the potential 
use of brain scanning techniques to detect deceit (Ganis, Rosenfeld, Meixner, Kievit & 
Schendan, 2011; Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor & Frith, 2008; Wolpe et al, 2005). FMRI 
machines are large, noisy, both time consuming and expensive to operate, and 
uncomfortable for the individuals being scanned. Like ERPs, research on the use of fMRI 
as a lie detection tool has only been conducted in highly controlled environments and has 
not yet established causal mechanisms for the effects shown (Sip et al, 2008). 
Worryingly, it has been shown that when jurors are presented with fMRI evidence in 
court, they are more likely to judge suspects as guilty compared to when other lie 
detection evidence is presented, such as polygraph or thermal imaging (McCabe, Castel 
& Rhodes, 2011). The potentially influential nature of such data means that all of the 
above issues must be addressed before the use of fMRI evidence is considered acceptable 
in field settings. 
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Human ability to detect deception 
Following from our consideration of behavioural markers of deception, we next 
review research regarding human ability to detect deception. Although individuals’ share 
common beliefs regarding how a liar typically behaves (Global Deception Team, 2006), it 
has been repeatedly shown that individuals are generally poor at detecting deceit in an 
experimental environment. In their meta-analysis of 142 studies, Bond and DePaulo 
(2008) highlighted a mean detection accuracy of 55%, even though a 50% accuracy rating 
is expected by chance.  
A lack of association between the stereotypes people hold regarding deceptive 
behaviour and how liars have actually been shown to behave is likely to contribute to 
individuals’ poor ability to detect deceit. For example, the Global Deception Team (2006) 
conducted an international survey examining beliefs about deception in 75 different 
countries and found gaze aversion to be the most commonly cited cue to deception, a 
belief in sharp contrast to the research literature (DePaulo et al, 2003). This possibility is 
highlighted in research demonstrating that police officers who hold popular stereotypes 
regarding deceptive behaviour, such as ‘liars look away or fidget’, perform less 
effectively when judging the honesty of presented video statements (Vrij & Mann, 2001).  
Although Bond and DePaulo (2008) concluded in their review that deception 
judgements are influenced more by differences in an individual liars credibility than 
differences in the ability to detect lies, recent research has suggested that a minority of 
individuals are better at detecting deceit than others (detecting truths and lies with over 
80% accuracy). These ‘experts’ have been found predominantly in law enforcement and 
secret service occupations (Bond, 2008; Ekman, O’Sullivan & Frank, 1999). The 
existence of such ‘experts’ has been questioned however (Bond & Uysal, 2007), with 
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researchers highlighting a current lack of research examining individual differences in the 
ability to detect deception (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2008). Whether 
some people are actually better at detecting lies than others remains the subject of much 
debate (Bond & Uysal, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2007).  
Truth bias and deception detection 
A significant factor that affects the ability to accurately detect deceit is any 
response biases that an individual may have, which we investigate in Chapter 5. Levine et 
al (2006) highlighted a positive, linear relationship between detection accuracy and the 
ratio of truthful to total messages, suggesting that deception detection ability is influenced 
by the presence of a truth bias. In their study, 463 participants were divided into one of 9 
conditions to view 14 video messages. In one of these conditions, the 14 video messages 
were divided into 7 lies and 7 truths, with the further 8 conditions comprising one of 8 
different base rates ranging from 0-100% truths. Truth accuracy scores ranged from 29%-
100% with a mean of 67%, whereas lie accuracy scores ranged between 0-71%, with a 
mean of 31%. Accuracy means were found to increase as the proportion of messages that 
were true increased.  
Overall, the general population have been shown to have a truth bias, judging more 
messages as truths than as lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Such biases have been shown to 
be context dependent, with participants actually showing a lie bias when judging contexts 
where deception is more often encountered. For instance, when judging the statements of 
salespersons (DePaulo & DePaulo, 1989) or when an element of suspicion is introduced 
(DePaulo et al, 2003). Possible explanations for the presence of an overall truth bias have 
been related to the existence of learned rule systems, termed heuristics, which allow us to 
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make efficient decisions when dealing with complex environments (Fiske & Taylor, 
2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972).  
Potential rule systems related to deception judgements, such as the availability 
heuristic (O’Sullivan, Ekman, & Friesen, 1988) and the anchoring heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), are in accordance with previous suggestions that the truth represents 
our default communicative stance (Gilbert, 1991). The availability heuristic suggests that 
individuals are more often presented with truthful information than false information in 
daily life, and as such, are more likely to judge messages as truths than lies. The 
anchoring heuristic suggests that people make insufficient adjustments from an initial 
value, resulting in a bias towards that value when making decisions. If truthful 
information is considered the “norm”, or default, social behaviour, then extra effort will 
be required to make sufficient judgements away from this default setting and correctly 
identify deceptive messages (Elaad, 2003; Gilbert, 1991).  
A third possible explanation for the truth bias relates directly to social conventions 
and rules. Toris and DePaulo (1984) suggest that social convention prevents us from 
regularly challenging the truthfulness of information we are given. Indeed, such a 
conversation would not only be extremely time consuming, but also considered impolite 
by others, therefore jeopardising the formation and continuation of positive social 
relationships (DePaulo, Jordan, Irvine, & Laser, 1982). Although the above suggestions 
may contribute to the presence of a truth bias, the precise processes affecting this social 
judgement remain unclear. Since the presence of such biases impacts on lie detection 
ability, however, examination of individual differences related to this allows for further 
investigation of the mechanisms involved in both social judgement bias and lie detection 
ability. 
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Training and deception detection 
A small number of studies have been conducted to examine whether it is possible to 
increase people’s ability to detect deception through the use of training programmes 
(Driskell, 2011; Porter, Juodis, ten Brinke, Klein & Wilson, 2010; Vrij, 2008). Vrij 
(2008) reviewed 22 studies examining the effects of training individuals to pay attention 
to, and identify, specific behavioural cues to deception and found that training only 
increased accuracy levels to a minimal degree (approximately 4%). Similarly, Kassin and 
Fong (1999) demonstrated that judges who were trained to examine the behaviours 
advocated by the Inbau group (Inbau, Reid & Buckley, 1986) performed worse than their 
untrained counterparts. 
More positive findings have been reported by other researchers, with a literature 
review conducted by Driskell (2011) concluding that training is effective in enhancing 
deception detection accuracy. The length and quality of individual training programmes is 
likely to account for any conflicting findings in the field, with greater improvements 
shown when participants were trained on behavioural observation skills for a 2-day 
period (47% pre-training, 77% post-training; Porter, Woodworth & Birt, 2000) compared 
to a 2-hour period (51% pre-training, 61% post-training; Porter et al, 2010).  
Interestingly, findings of Porter, Woodworth, McCabe and Peace (2007) and Levine 
et al (2005) suggest that the actual content of training programmes may be less important 
than the fact that people have undergone training at all. Porter et al (2007) demonstrated 
that the provision of any feedback following deception judgements, whether inaccurate or 
accurate, had a positive effect on deception detection ability. Similarly, Levine et al 
(2005) showed that even bogus training groups who were taught to focus on behaviours 
that are not known as indicators of deception, sometimes performed better than control 
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groups who received no training. It is possible that following any kind of training, 
participants are less likely to use heuristics and automatic decision processes when 
making judgements, leading to improvements in situational observation skills. 
Alternatively, Hartwig and Bond (2011) suggest that training may enhance participants’ 
motivation to complete the task to the best of their ability, whereas Levine et al (2005) 
suggest that trained observers may assess information more critically than untrained 
observers.      
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have reviewed the current literature regarding deception 
detection. The experimental work we subsequently present in this thesis addresses two 
main areas discussed above. Firstly, the cognitive processes involved in telling a lie and 
secondly, the factors that impact on human ability to detect deception.  
The previous focus of deception research on identifying an indicator to detect 
deception has resulted in large quantities of data that cannot be adequately explained or 
understood. In order to address this issue, the continued development of theories of 
deceptive communication is required, so that the processes underlying deceptive 
behaviour can be identified. As technology advances, an increased number of researchers 
are focusing on the examination of deceptive cognition, particularly in relation to the 
brain regions involved in producing a deceptive response. Since lying encompasses a 
variety of psychological processes, such as the monitoring of non verbal and verbal 
behaviour, decision making and lie generation, there are several factors that may affect 
behaviour when an individual tells a lie. As shown in the above review, research has 
consistently highlighted the effects of moderator variables, such as interview 
characteristics, interviewer characteristics, subject of the lie and individual differences, 
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on both verbal and non verbal behaviour. The development of deception theories must 
consider this variety of factors. The present thesis extends this work by focusing on 
potential factors that may influence processing differences between liars and truth tellers, 
and further identifies the role of distinct cognitive processes in the additional time 
required to tell a lie. 
The ability to detect the deception of others was also examined in the current 
chapter, and provides a focus for our work in Chapter 5. Although human ability to detect 
deception has been shown to be poor, the possibility that individual differences in 
detection ability exist has been suggested by a small number of researchers. The existence 
of individual differences in degree of truth bias, and how this may interact with deception 
detection judgements, has been neglected in previous work, however. The present thesis 
therefore extends this work by focusing on potential factors that may influence accurate 
deception judgements through examination of both accuracy levels and truth bias when 
individuals make cross-cultural deception judgements.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Decisions, Decisions: Choice when Telling Lies 
Despite the apparent prevalence of lie-telling within society (Serota et al, 2010), lying is a 
complicated behaviour that requires breaking the normal, default rules of communication 
(see Grice, 1989). The liar must first of all decide not to assert the truth, and then must 
assert an alternative statement that is plausible and appears informative to the listener, all 
the while concealing any outward signs of nervousness. Such a pragmatic feat requires 
cognitive processes in addition to those used when telling the truth. In this chapter we 
investigate what those processes might be. 
Our starting point is to examine the reasons given in the literature for why lying 
appears to be more difficult than telling the truth. Longer lie times, for example, must be 
indicative of additional cognitive processes involved in lying compared to telling the 
truth. Based on the framework developed by Walczyk et al (2003), three processes that 
have been implicated in lying are discussed and the empirical evidence in favour of each 
summarised.  
Suppression of the truth 
Our default communicative stance is to tell the truth. Without the assumption that 
speakers utter the truth most of the time, it is difficult to see how efficient communication 
could ever occur (see Grice, 1989, amongst others). This suggests that when people wish 
to lie to a question they will need to intentionally suppress the default, truthful response, 
which should increase the difficulty of lying relative to telling the truth.  
There is indeed plenty of empirical evidence consistent with the claim that telling 
lies involve suppressing the truth. For example many researchers have found longer 
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response times for lying relative to telling the truth (Holden, 1998; Vendemia, Buzan & 
Green, 2005; Vendemia et al, 2005; Walzyck et al, 2003), and there is neuroscientific 
evidence that brain regions active in lying overlap with brain regions associated with 
general response inhibition (Abe et al, 2008; Lee, Liu, Chan, Ng, Fox & Gao, 2005; 
Spence et al, 2001; Spence et al, 2008; and see Christ et al, 2009 for a meta-analysis). 
These findings have meant that recent cognitive models of deception have 
incorporated both the automatic activation of the truth and its resultant suppression as 
additional processes that contribute to longer response times for liars (Vendemia et al, 
2009; Walzyck et al. 2003; Walczyk et al, 2005). For example, the Activation-Decision-
Construction Model (ADCM; Walzyck et al. 2003; 2005) claims that following a 
question, relevant information (in particular, the truth) is automatically activated in long-
term memory (e.g., Kintsch, 1998). This information is then made consciously available 
in working memory (e.g., Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). In order to respond to a question 
deceptively, cognitive resources are required to inhibit the truthful response. Similarly, 
the Working Model of Deception (WMD; Vendemia et al, 2009) highlights response 
inhibition as a pre-requisite to responding to a question deceptively.    
While the need to suppress the truth is undeniably an important component of why 
lying is more difficult than telling the truth, there are several other reasons that have 
received less attention in the literature and that might also contribute. These are discussed 
below. 
The decision to lie 
Assuming that people tell the truth by default (Grice, 1989), they must make a 
conscious choice to lie. The decision to lie is therefore likely to be an additional cognitive 
process associated with lying that takes time to execute. Indeed, current models of how 
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we lie include a lie decision component. For example, the Working Model of Deception 
(WMD; Vendemia et al, 2009) assumes that when an individual hears a question to which 
they may respond deceptively, executive control processes are used to determine the 
appropriate response (i.e., lie or truth), with a decision being made based on the likely 
risks and benefits involved. Similarly, the Activation Decision Construction Model 
Revised (ADCM-R; Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike & Griffith-Ross, 2009) considers 
individuals who have previously decided to lie to particular questions and have rehearsed 
an answer. In these cases, the model states that a decision is still required because 
individuals must remind themselves of their decision to lie when that particular question 
is heard.  
Despite the inclusion of decision components in the models, there is surprisingly 
little work that has specifically investigated how people make the decision to lie. This is 
perhaps because it is experimentally much easier to instruct people when to lie than to 
allow them to choose. We can find only a few papers that have investigated the decision 
process: Walzcyk et al (2005) and Spence et al (2008). Walczyk et al. presented 
participants with a selection of neutral questions and questions probing embarrassing 
information. Participants were instructed to lie to certain questions, such as those 
regarding their employment history, and tell the truth to others, such as those regarding 
what they did on Sunday morning. However, for general questions, they were instructed 
to answer truthfully unless a question probed embarrassing information about which they 
would normally lie to a stranger, in which case they should lie. In this condition, 
participants needed to decide themselves when to lie and when to tell the truth. The 
experiment demonstrated that more time was needed to respond when individuals chose 
to lie compared with when they had been instructed, and both took longer than telling the 
truth, consistent with the idea that the decision of how to respond adds to cognitive 
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processing load. However, it is difficult to be certain whether the elevated response times 
were due to the evaluation of whether a question was embarrassing or to the decision of 
how to respond. 
Spence et al (2008) allowed participants to choose whether to lie or tell the truth to 
computer-generated yes-no questions regarding an embarrassing past life event, although 
participants were asked to achieve an approximate balance between truths and lies over 
the course of the experiment. Similar to findings when individuals have been instructed 
on how to respond (Seymour et al, 2000; Spence et al, 2001; Vendemia et al, 2005), lying 
showed increased activation of the ventrolateral prefrontal cortices compared to truth-
telling. However, because there was no direct comparison of trials between choosing to 
respond and being instructed to respond, little can be concluded about the decision 
process itself. 
Construction of the lie 
Lies and truths also differ in the way in which they are constructed. Lies need to be 
explicitly chosen from a range of alternatives and the result must be plausible and 
consistent with previous information. Truths, on the other hand, seem to be generated 
automatically without a need to select “which” truth. The procedures needed to choose 
which lie to use and to verify the plausibility may be costly to operate. 
Walczyk et al (2005) directly tested whether the added complexity of lie 
construction was a contributing factor to elevated lie response times. Their approach was 
to manipulate whether participants responded to open-ended questions, such as, “What 
colour is your hair?” or yes/no questions, such as, “Is your hair brown?”(Although it is 
appreciated that differing definitions of open-ended questions exist, for clarity the same 
terms as Walczyk et al. are used when interpreting their findings). Walczyk et al. argued 
CHAPTER 2 
Choice when Telling Lies 
 
 
 
63 
that more lie construction was needed to respond to open-ended questions than yes/no 
questions because open-ended questions required explicit retrieval of information from 
long-term memory, whereas yes/no questions merely needed the production of an 
affirmation or denial. If lie construction was contributing to longer lie response times, 
then lying to open-ended questions should be more difficult than lying to yes/no 
questions. Consistent with these predictions, Walczyk et al. observed longer lie response 
times in the open-ended question condition than in the yes/no condition. There are a 
number of issues that make the interpretation of this result difficult, however. First, while 
lying to open ended questions was slow relative to yes/no questions, telling the truth was 
also slow. It is therefore not clear whether their effect relates to lie construction or to the 
difficulty of responding to open-ended questions in general. Second, Walczyk et al. did 
not equate the content of the question across yes/no and open-ended conditions. For 
example, they compared response times to questions such as “Do you like chocolate” 
with questions such as “How many credit cards do you own?” Differences in response 
times could therefore be explained by differences in the ease of accessing information, 
rather than the question types per se. 
While there has been no direct evidence about how people assess the plausibility of 
potential lies, there is indirect evidence that plausible lies are costly to generate. First, 
studies investigating the effects of making lies more complex have found that they are 
easier to detect. For example, asking participants to recall events in reverse order (Vrij et 
al, 2008) and using interview techniques that require longer answers to questions (Vrij et 
al, 2007) have increased discrimination between liars and truth tellers. Finding that lies 
are easier to detect when the lie is more complex suggests that extra resources are needed 
to construct the plausible lie. 
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Secondly, if lie construction independently contributes to the processing difference 
between lying and truth-telling, individuals who have been given the opportunity to 
rehearse or prepare a lie response will require less processing time than unprepared liars. 
Several studies have found evidence that this is the case. In their review of the literature, 
Zuckerman et al (1981) found that the response time difference between lying and truth-
telling only occurred when participants had not rehearsed a response. More recently, the 
meta-analysis conducted by DePaulo et al (2003) similarly found that longer response 
times for liars only demonstrated a significant effect size when participants were not 
given the opportunity to prepare their lie. Alternative paradigms incorporating an explicit 
period of rehearsal have shown smaller response time differences between rehearsed lies 
and truths compared to unrehearsed lies and truths (Walczyk et al, 2009). 
In summary, we have reviewed the evidence for three processes involved in lying 
that are not involved in telling the truth. There is substantial evidence that the first 
process, the suppression of the truth, contributes to the extra costs involved in lying, but 
the evidence for the other processes is weaker. Our study therefore concentrates on 
testing whether the decision to lie and the construction of the lie contribute to the greater 
difficulty of lying, as distinct from suppressing the truth. In doing so, we hope to 
understand in more detail what cognitive processes are involved when people lie. 
The Current Study 
Our paradigm involved presenting participants with a coloured square and asking them to 
lie or tell the truth about the colour. We used vocal onset time as the dependent measure. 
In Experiments 1 and 2 we investigated the decision to lie by comparing trials in which 
participants chose whether to lie or tell the truth compared to being instructed. In 
Experiments 3, 4 and 5 we investigated the lie construction process by comparing one 
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possible lie response to a choice of two or three lie response possibilities, and by 
manipulating the plausibility of particular lie responses.  
The colour-naming paradigm that we have developed is different to the paradigms 
generally used in lie research. For example, in Granhag and Strömwall (2002), 
participants watched a simulated crime and lied about the protagonist, or in Porter et al 
(2008), an interviewer asked questions about an interviewee’s background and the 
participant lied about certain details. The reason for the difference in methodology is that 
most of the previous research into lying has been concerned with lie detection whereas 
we are interested in the underlying cognitive processes. Deception researchers, 
understandably, are interested in the measure which is most able to distinguish lies from 
truths, whether that is skin conductance (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2002), facial expressions 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1974), or offline measures such as linguistic analyses (Bond & Lee, 
2005), none of which are necessarily indicative of cognitive processes. Furthermore, even 
when researchers have used more traditional cognitive markers of deceit, such as 
response times, the emphasis has been on discovering whether a difference between lies 
and truths exists under different lying conditions rather than discovering which cognitive 
processes are responsible. Because we wanted to isolate the individual components of 
lying, our paradigm was designed to eliminate as much variability as possible, such as 
preparation time (Vendemia et al, 2005), motivation (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989) and 
the subject of the lie (DePaulo et al, 2003). Of course, there are likely to be other lie 
factors involved that are not present in our paradigm, such as the added stress of lying (as 
we discuss further in the General Discussion).  
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Experiment 1 
There were two goals for Experiment 1. First, to establish whether our paradigm 
produced results consistent with the past literature on lying; specifically, that lie 
responses require slower response times than true responses (Carrión et al, 2010; 
Vendemia et al, 2005). Second, we wanted to investigate the effects of deciding to lie by 
manipulating whether participants chose to lie, or whether they were directed to lie. Thus, 
prior to the presentation of the coloured square, participants were either presented with an 
instruction to lie or tell the truth in their response or were given a choice between the two. 
On the latter trials, participants had to input their decision (lie or truth) on the keyboard. 
Once the square was presented, participants had to vocally respond with either the true 
colour of the square, or lie about its colour. We reasoned that the decision-making 
process would be involved in the former but not the latter condition and this would be 
reflected in differences in lying latency. 
Different decision processes make different predictions about the interaction 
between the type of instruction (directed or given a choice) and the honesty of the 
response (truth or lie). We consider two possibilities. First, the decision to lie could be a 
departure from the normal, truth-telling state. Deciding to lie, rather than adhering to the 
default truth, would therefore require extra processing effort. This is the basic idea behind 
the decision components of the ADCM (Walzyck et al, 2009) and WMD (Vendemia et al, 
2009). If the decision to lie is more difficult than the decision to tell the truth, participants 
should need relatively longer to lie than to tell the truth in the choice condition compared 
to the directed condition. In short, there should be an interaction between instruction and 
honesty with a larger difference between lies and truths in the choice condition. Second, 
deciding to lie could be no different to deciding to tell the truth. There could be no default 
communicative stance, and so a decision must be made in both lying and truth telling. 
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Having to choose a response would generally be more difficult than being directed on the 
response, however, and so longer overall latencies might be expected for the directed 
compared to the choice conditions, and longer lie latencies than truth latencies. Under this 
account then, only main effects of type of instruction and honesty would be expected. 
 Method  
Participants 
Twenty-one Cardiff University undergraduate psychology students volunteered for 
this study in exchange for course credit. Of these, 20 were female. Participants had a 
mean age of 19.52 (SD = 0.68; Range = 18-21) and spoke English as their first language.  
Design  
A 2 x 2 within-subjects design was used, with the independent variables being 
honesty of response (lie vs. truth) and type of instruction (choice vs. directed). The 
dependent variable was response time. A total of 192 trials were included, with 64 from 
the directed to lie condition, 64 from the directed to tell the truth condition and 64 from 
the choice condition. The order of trials was randomised for each participant. 
Procedure  
The experiment progressed as a series of trials each of which began with the 
presentation of one of three words in the centre of the computer screen (LIE, TRUTH or 
CHOICE). Participants were asked to indicate whether they understood by pressing the 
‘T’ key when presented with the word ‘TRUTH’, the ‘L’ key when presented with the 
word ‘LIE’ and either the ‘T’ or ‘L’ key when presented with the word ‘CHOICE’, 
according to whether they chose to lie or tell the truth. Participants were asked to choose 
to lie and choose to tell the truth at least 10 times, to enable data from both responses to 
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be collected. The word remained on the screen until the participant pressed the 
appropriate button and was then replaced with either a blue or a red square. Participants 
then had to say either the true colour of the square or lie about the colour of the square by 
claiming that it was the opposite colour (e.g., blue if it was red). Voice key responses 
were recorded via a clip microphone. After the vocal response was made, the next trial 
began after 500ms. Instructions were presented on the screen and emphasised the 
importance of responding both as quickly and as accurately as possible. Participants took 
part in a practice block of 12 trials identical to the main trials. The question ‘What colour 
is the square?’ was visually presented prior to both the practice block and the block of 
main trials. All stimuli were presented on a black background, with the squares being of 
equal size and the text being presented in Arial font, size 40. 
Results 
Two subjects were removed from the analysis because they failed to follow experimental 
instructions of choosing to lie at least 10 times in the choice condition.  
We treated response times greater than 2s (approximately 3 SDs above the grand 
mean) as outliers in all of the experiments reported in this chapter. Response times longer 
than this represented an excessively long time to retrieve the name of a colour, and we 
found that using this cut-off meant that a similar number of outliers were eliminated 
across conditions. There were 103 outliers in total, with 95 of these being a result of 
microphone problems (the microphone failed to pick up the initial answer). Inaccurate 
responses (132) were also removed from the analysis. Overall, there were 13 inaccurate 
responses in the choice lie condition, 53 in the choice truth condition, 36 in the directed 
lie condition and 30 in the directed truth condition. In total, 235 out of 3,648 data points 
were removed from the analysis. 
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In the choice condition, the mean number of choice lie trials was found to be 29 and 
the mean number of choice truth trials was found to be 32. Mean response times for the 
four possible conditions were as follows; (1) directed lie trials (DL; M: 822.98, SD: 
110.86), (2) directed truth trials (DT; M: 758.85, SD: 111.08), (3) choice lie trials (CL; M: 
857.39, SD: 109.83), (4) choice truth trials (CT; M: 854.02, SD: 118.12). Figure 1 shows 
the mean response time in all possible cells. In contrast to the hypotheses considered 
above, there appears to be a large difference between truths and lies in the directed 
condition but not in the choice condition. To test this pattern we conducted a repeated-
measures ANOVA, with factors of type of instruction and honesty of response. We found 
a main effect of honesty with true responses being faster than lie responses, F(1,18) = 
7.89, p < .05, η² = .31, and a main effect of type of instruction with responses in the 
choice condition being longer than in the directed condition, F(1,18) = 17.28, p < .001, η² 
= .49. The interaction was also significant, F(1,18) = 9.97, p < .005, η² = .36. The faster 
production of true than lie statements was significant in the directed condition, F(1,18) = 
21.88, p < .001, η² = .51, but not in the choice condition, F(1,18) = 0.40, p = .84, η² < .01, 
CI = [-32, 38].  
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Figure  1. Response times of Experiment 1 as a function of type of instruction and 
honesty. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
 
Discussion 
When directed to lie or tell the truth, participants in our experiment needed on average 
60ms longer to lie than to tell the truth. This result demonstrates that our paradigm 
produces data consistent with previous research investigating response time and lying 
(e.g., Vendemia et al, 2005; Walczyk et al, 2003; 2005). One way in which this result 
extends previous work, however, is that the role of the lie construction process was 
minimal in our experiment. Participants did not have to consider what an appropriate lie 
response might be (the only possible lie response was the alternate colour) nor did they 
have to construct a convincing lie sentence. The most likely explanation for the 
differences in lie times is therefore that participants needed time to suppress the truth 
when lying.  
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The main aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate the effects of deciding to lie over 
being directed to lie. We were interested in whether there was a cost associated with 
deciding to lie in particular (Walzyck et al, 2009) or whether there was a general cost 
associated with having to choose a response compared to being directed. Surprisingly, the 
findings of Experiment 1 were not consistent with either of these possibilities. Although 
we observed an interaction between the honesty of the response and the type of 
instruction, the difference between lying and telling the truth was significantly greater in 
the directed condition than in the choice condition; indeed, there was no significant 
difference between lying and telling the truth in the choice condition. Before discussing 
the theoretical implications of these findings, however, we consider one factor that could 
have obscured differences between conditions in the choice condition. 
Participants were slower to respond overall when they had to choose their response 
type than when they were directed on the response type. In the choice condition, 
participants pressed a button to indicate their choice, whereas in the directed condition 
participants saw the word “truth” or “lie”. Participants therefore received a visual prompt 
regarding the response type in the directed condition but not in the choice condition. A 
greater degree of uncertainty about the expected response in the choice condition could 
therefore explain longer latencies overall, which could in turn have obscured honesty 
differences. We address these problems in Experiment 2 by providing a visual prompt to 
participants in both the choice condition and the directed condition. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 used a similar design to Experiment 1 except that participants were given a 
visual reminder of their decision in the choice condition, just as they were in the directed 
condition.  
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Method 
Participants 
Twenty-three Cardiff University students were paid for participation in the 
experiment. Of these, 14 were female. Participants had a mean age of 21.65 (SD = 4.59; 
Range = 18-37) and spoke English as their first language.  
Design  
The design of the experiment was the same as that shown in Experiment 1. 
However, we increased the total number of trials to 200 to ensure an equal number in the 
choice and directed conditions overall (100 in the choice condition, 50 in the directed to 
lie condition and 50 in the directed to tell the truth condition). 
Procedure 
The task was a modified version of that described in Experiment 1 and involved the 
presentation of one of two words in the centre of the computer screen (READY or 
CHOICE). When the word ‘READY’ was presented, participants were instructed to press 
the space bar. When the word ‘CHOICE’ was presented, participants could press either 
the ‘T’ or the ‘L’ key, depending on whether they had chosen to tell the truth (T) or lie 
(L). On a ‘READY’ trial, the key press was followed by either the letter ‘L’ (relating to 
lie) or ‘T’ (relating to truth) presented in the centre of the screen for a one second period. 
On a ‘CHOICE’ trial, the key press was followed by a visual reminder of what key was 
pressed by presenting either an ‘L’ or a ‘T’ in the centre of the screen for a one second 
period. A coloured square would then appear on the screen and the participant would 
report its true colour or lie about it. The time taken to do this was recorded via a voice 
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key. The presentation of visual prompt was the only aspect of the procedure that differed 
from Experiment 1. 
Results 
One participant was removed from the analysis because they failed to follow 
experimental instructions of choosing to lie at least 10 times, providing a final sample 
size of 22. There were 100 outliers in total, with 67 of these being a result of microphone 
problems. These were removed from the analysis. Inaccurate responses (126) were also 
removed from the analysis.  There were 25 inaccurate responses in the choice lie 
condition, 53 in the choice truth condition, 28 in the directed lie condition and 20 in the 
directed truth condition. In total, 226 out of 4,400 data points were removed from the 
analysis. 
In the choice condition, the mean number of choice lie trials was found to be 47 and 
the mean number of choice truth trials was found to be 49. Mean response times for the 
four possible conditions were as follows; (1) directed lie trials (DL; M: 763.06, SD: 
159.57), (2) directed truth trials (DT; M: 668.73, SD: 142.87), (3) choice lie trials (CL; M: 
769.94, SD: 167.12), (4) choice truth trials (CT; M: 707.83, SD: 152.75). Figure 2 shows 
the mean response time in all possible cells. Overall, telling a lie took longer than telling 
the truth, F(1,21) = 84.66, p < .001, η² =  .80. Choosing how to respond took longer than 
being directed, F(1,21) = 5.55, p < .05, η² = .21. There was also a significant interaction 
between the type of instruction and honesty of response, F(1,21) = 5.93, p < .05, η² = .22, 
such that there was a greater difference between lying and telling the truth in the directed 
condition than in the choice condition. This shows a similar pattern to Experiment 1, 
where a response time difference for lies and truths was only shown in the directed 
condition. Simple main effects analysis found that the effect of honesty of response was 
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present in the directed condition, F(1,21) = 80.30, p < .001, η² = .79 and, in contrast to 
Experiment 1, it was also present in the choice condition, F(1,21) = 31.82, p < .001, η² = 
.60. Participants also took longer to respond when they chose to tell the truth compared to 
when they were directed to tell the truth, F(1,21) = 16.65, p < .001, η² = .44, whereas 
there were no differences in response times when individuals chose to lie compared to 
when they were directed to lie, F(1,21) = 0.25, p = .62, η² = .01, CI = [-21, 35]. 
Figure 2. Response times of Experiment 2 as a function of type of instruction and 
honesty. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 provide further support for the finding that telling a lie takes 
significantly longer than telling the truth. In contrast to the findings of Experiment 1, this 
occurred both when individuals were directed in their response and when they chose their 
response. Furthermore, we no longer observed that responses in the choice condition 
required longer than in the directed condition. These findings suggest that the extra 
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overall processing cost of making a choice in Experiment 1 was likely due to participants 
having difficulty in recalling their chosen response type. Nonetheless, we observed a 
significant interaction between type of instruction and honesty of response, just as we did 
in Experiment 1. The response time difference between lying and telling the truth was 
smaller when participants chose their response than when they were directed to do so. In 
particular, participants were slower to respond with the truth when they chose the 
response compared to when they were directed to do so, but lying was much less affected 
by the choice manipulation. No explanation based on retrieval of the decision can be 
invoked because the visual prompt provided was identical for both conditions. 
Neither of the decision making mechanisms that we discussed in Experiment 1 
were borne out by the data. It is not the case that telling the truth is always the default 
option and that people have to choose to lie but not to tell the truth, otherwise we would 
have observed larger differences between truths and lies in the choice condition than the 
directed condition, nor is it the case that needing to choose a response is simply more 
difficult overall than being directed to respond. The decision mechanism involved in 
choosing whether to lie is therefore more complex than previously thought (c.f. Walzyck 
et al, 2009). Our suggestion for how the decision mechanism functions is as follows. 
First, we assume that when people lie they must necessarily suppress the truthful 
response. This accounts for longer latencies for lies relative to truths in both choice and 
directed conditions. Whether there is an additional cost to deciding to lie, however, 
depends on whether people are in a context in which they expect to tell the truth. When 
they are, the truth will be their default position and deciding to lie may indeed be costly. 
When they are expecting to lie however, the cost would occur when they choose to tell 
the truth. In our experiment, in which lying is expected on a large number of occasions, 
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the default stance could have been to lie. This meant that when participants chose the 
truth, they would have had difficulty suppressing the competing lie response.  
The more general explanation is that people can enter into default lie states or into 
default truth states depending on the context. Deciding to utter the alternative to the 
default carries some cost relative to being directed. The cost of deciding to lie is therefore 
context dependent, unlike the cost of suppressing the truth, which appears to be 
obligatory.  
Experiment 3 
In Experiments 1 and 2 participants did not have a choice about which lie they told. 
When the square was red, for example, they had to lie with “blue,” and vice versa. The lie 
construction element was therefore minimal. Lying is often more complicated than this 
however, because liars have to construct a lie from a range of alternatives, as we 
discussed in the Introduction. Experiment 3 investigated which parts of the lie 
construction process contribute to longer response times. 
We manipulated the range of lie and truth responses available to participants. In one 
condition, the square could be of one of two colours, as in Experiments 1 and 2. This is 
similar to yes-no questions, as in “Is your hair brown?” In the other condition the square 
could be one of three colours, similar to more open-ended questions, such as “What 
colour is your hair?” The three-colour trials therefore required a choice about which lie to 
use, whereas the two-colour trials did not. All participants were directed about whether to 
lie, as in the directed conditions of Experiments 1 and 2. If the need to choose a lie 
contributes to the greater difficulty of lying, longer lie response times will be observed in 
the three-colour lie condition than the two-colour lie condition. Alternatively, longer 
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response times might be observed in the three-colour condition for both lie and truth 
responses.  
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six Cardiff University students participated in this study in exchange for 
payment. Of these, 26 were female. Participants had a mean age of 21.83 (SD = 3.60; 
Range = 18-38) and spoke English as their first language.  
Design  
We used a 2 x 2 design with honesty of response (lie vs. truth) and number of 
response possibilities (two-colour vs. three-colour) as within-subjects factors. The 
dependent variable was response time. The paradigm consisted of two blocks of trials. 
The two-colour block showed participants one of two coloured squares and their lie 
response could only be the opposite colour (hence one possible answer). The three-colour 
block showed participants one of three coloured squares and their lie response could be 
either of the other two colours (therefore a choice of two possible answers). The order of 
these blocks was counterbalanced across participants to minimise order effects. The 
colour pair that participants were given in the two-colour block (red/green, green/blue, 
blue/red) was also counterbalanced across participants so that all colour combinations 
were present in all conditions. Participants took part in a practice block of 12 trials 
identical to the main trials. A total of 202 main trials were used in the paradigm.   
Procedure 
As in Experiment 1, the task involved the presentation of one of two words in the 
centre of the computer screen (LIE or TRUTH) and participants indicated that they 
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understood by pressing the ‘T’ key when presented with the word ‘TRUTH’ and the ‘L’ 
key when presented with the word ‘LIE’.  A coloured square (blue, red or green) was then 
presented. Participants were required to lie or tell the truth about the colour seen. 
Responses were recorded using a voice key.  
Results 
There were 181 outliers in total and 62 of these were a result of microphone problems. 
These were removed from the analysis. Inaccurate responses (175) were also removed 
from the analysis. There were 38 inaccurate responses in the two-colour lie condition, 50 
in the two-colour truth condition, 51 in the three-colour lie condition and 36 in the three-
colour truth condition. Altogether, 356 out of 7,272 data points were removed from the 
analysis. 
Mean response times for the four possible conditions were as follows; (1) two-
colour lie trials (2C-L; M: 866.16, SD: 153.13), (2) two-colour truth trials (2C-T; M: 
812.83, SD: 141.86), (3) three-colour lie trials (3C-L; M: 937.41, SD: 153.07), (4) three-
colour truth trials (3C-T; M: 807.94, SD: 122.67). Figure 3 shows the mean response time 
in all possible cells. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with factors of honesty 
of response and number of response possibilities. Consistent with Experiment 2, telling a 
lie took longer than telling the truth, F(1,35) = 139.79, p < .001, η² = .80. There was also 
a main effect of number of response possibilities, F(1,35) = 4.11, p < .05, η² = .10 and a 
significant interaction, F(1,35) = 31.78, p < .001, η² =  .48. Simple main effects analysis 
revealed that the effect of honesty of response was significant in the two-colour 
condition, F(1,35) = 46.51, p < .001, η² =  .57 and in the three-colour condition, F(1,35) = 
112.02, p < .001, η² =  .76. The interaction was driven by longer response times for lying 
to questions in the three-colour condition compared to questions in the two-colour 
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condition, F(1,35) = 12.51, p < .001, η² =  .26 and no effect of number of possible 
responses on truthful responding, F(1,35) = 0.11, p = .74, η² <  .01, CI = [-25, 35]. 
In order to identify whether participants used one particular colour more often than 
any other, we also examined which colours participants chose when they lied in the three 
colour condition. Red was chosen 33% of the time, blue 35% of the time and green 31% 
of the time. However, none of the colours were chosen more often than chance, t(35)’s < 
1.40, p’s > .18.   
Figure 3. Response times of Experiment 3 as a function of number of response 
possibilities and honesty. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 3 we found that lying takes longer than telling the truth in both colour 
conditions. More interestingly, we also found that there was a greater difference between 
lying and telling the truth in the three-colour condition compared to the two-colour 
condition. The interaction was driven by a significant increase in the time taken to lie to 
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three-colour compared with two-colour questions and a nonsignificant difference in the 
time taken to tell the truth, consistent with the claim that lie construction is a costly 
process. Unlike other studies that have tested the difference between different question-
types, for example, Walczyk et al (2005), our findings cannot be explained by differences 
in question content across conditions.  
There are at least two explanations for why we observed a larger cost of lying in the 
three-colour condition compared to the two-colour condition. The first is that participants 
had to choose a lie in the three-colour condition but not in the two-colour condition (the 
lie was simply the one remaining option in the two-colour condition). Having to make 
any kind of choice may have slowed participants down. The second is that participants 
could have been evaluating each of the possible lie responses in turn for their 
acceptability. Because there were twice as many possible lie responses in the three-colour 
condition compared to the two-colour condition, participants would have had to evaluate 
twice as many possibilities in the three-colour condition than the two-colour condition. 
There may be both a fixed cost of choosing and a cost to evaluating each alternative, or 
there could be one or other. In Experiment 4 we test whether participants evaluate each 
alternative. 
Experiment 4 
If participants evaluate each of the possible lie responses in turn, expanding the range of 
possible lie options should continue to add time onto lie latencies. Conversely, if the cost 
we observed is a choice cost, expanding the range of options should not result in a 
proportional increase in lie latencies (there would be a single choice cost regardless of the 
number of possible lie responses). Experiment 4 tested these explanations by comparing 
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trials with two possible lie responses (a three-colour condition, as in Experiment 3) 
against trials with three possible lie responses (a four-colour condition). 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two Cardiff University students participated in this study in exchange for 
course credit. Of these, 29 were female. Participants had a mean age of 18.94 (SD = 0.95; 
Range = 18-21) and spoke English as their first language.  
Design  
We used a 2 x 2 within-subjects design, with honesty of response (lie vs. truth) and 
number of response possibilities (three-colour vs. four-colour) as within-subjects factors. 
The dependent variable was response time. The paradigm consisted of two blocks of 
trials. The three-colour block showed participants one of three coloured squares and their 
lie response could be either of the other two colours (hence two possible answers). The 
four-colour block showed participants one of four coloured squares and their lie response 
could be any of the other three colours (hence three possible answers). The order of these 
blocks was counterbalanced across participants to prevent order effects. The colours that 
participants were given in the three-colour block (red/green/blue, green/blue/purple, 
blue/purple/red, purple/red/green) were also counterbalanced across participants so that 
all colour combinations were present in all conditions. Participants took part in a practice 
block of 12 trials identical to the main trials. A total of 202 main trials were used in the 
paradigm.   
CHAPTER 2 
Choice when Telling Lies 
 
 
 
82 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 3 except that participants 
saw one of four coloured squares in the four-colour condition. 
Results 
There were 174 outliers in total. 78 of these were due to microphone problems. These 
were removed from the analysis. Inaccurate responses (260) were also removed from the 
analysis. There were 69 inaccurate responses in the three-colour lie condition, 75 in the 
three-colour truth condition, 59 in the four-colour lie condition and 57 in the four-colour 
truth condition. Altogether, 434 out of 6,464 data points were removed from the analysis. 
Mean response times for the four possible conditions were as follows; (1) three-
colour lie trials (3C-L; M: 875.34, SD: 171.42), (2) three-colour truth trials (3C-T; M: 
728.96, SD: 121.51), (3) four-colour lie trials (4C-L; M: 888.39, SD: 148.72), (4) four 
colour truth trials (4C-T; M: 726.17, SD: 106.90). Figure 4 shows the mean response time 
in all possible cells. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with factors of honesty 
of response and number of response possibilities. This found a significant main effect of 
honesty of response with true responses being faster than lie responses, F(1,31) = 117.06, 
p < .001,  η² = .79. However, in contrast to the findings of Experiment 3, a further 
increase in the number of possible lie responses did not affect response times in either the 
truth, F(1, 31) = 0.04, p = .84, η² < .01, CI = [-25, 30] or lie conditions, F(1, 31) = 0.35, p 
= .56, η² < .05, CI = [-58, 32], nor was the interaction between number of response 
possibilities and honesty of response significant, F(1, 31) = 0.57, p = .46, η² < .02. A 
power analysis revealed that if the interaction was as large as we found in Experiment 2, 
i.e., η² = .26, we would have had a 99% chance of finding the effect. 
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As in Experiment 3, we investigated how participants chose their lie response. In 
the 3-colour block, participants chose red 36% of the time, blue 31% of the time, green 
31% of the time and purple 28% of the time. A one-sample t-test found that purple was 
used less than would be expected by chance, t(23) = 2.53, p < .05, but that red, blue and 
green were not, t(23)’s < 1.70, p’s > .11. In the 4-colour block, participants chose red 
29% of the time, blue 20% of the time, green 27% of the time and purple 18% of the 
time. A one-sample t-test found that red was used more than chance, t(31) = 2.28, p < .05, 
whereas blue, t(31) = 3.18, p < .005 and purple, t(31) = 3.58, p < .001 were used less than 
chance. The use of green did not significantly differ from chance, t(31) = 0.83, p = .41.     
Figure 4. Response times of Experiment 4 as a function of number of response 
possibilities and honesty. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 support previous findings of increased response times when 
individuals lie compared to when they tell the truth, regardless of the number of possible 
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lie responses available. We also found that the number of possible lie responses did not 
significantly affect response times when individuals told the truth, consistent with the 
results of Experiment 3. Unlike Experiment 3, however, in this experiment no significant 
differences were demonstrated when individuals lied in the three-colour compared to the 
four-colour block and a power analysis indicated that we had a 99% chance of detecting 
an effect of the same size as that observed in Experiment 3. The processing time 
difference between questions with multiple response possibilities and those with only one 
response option is therefore likely to be due to the cost of choosing between lies in 
working memory, and not due to costs associated with evaluating each possible lie 
response in turn. We are not arguing that participants will never consider additional lie 
options in turn (or that lie times will never increase with options greater than three); 
rather, that the cost of having to choose per se will always be at least part of the extra cost 
of lying in multiple lie contexts. 
Experiment 5 
In our previous experiments we showed that choosing between multiple lie responses 
increases response time. It should also be considered, however, that for the majority of 
lies some responses will be more plausible than others and the successful liar will choose 
these lies more frequently. The liar must therefore not only suppress the truthful response 
to a question but any implausible responses as well. What makes the task even more 
difficult is that responses are not necessarily implausible per se but depend on the 
question asked and the context (much like the truth). For example, “On the moon” would 
be a perfectly plausible (or truthful) answer to some questions, just not the location of the 
stolen money. This means that implausible lie responses cannot be completely suppressed 
during the conversation; the convincing liar must be able to retrieve these responses at 
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any moment to avoid incurring a noticeable cost. Overall then, in any deceptive 
interaction there will be particular lies that cannot be used if the deception is to be 
successful. This discrimination of plausible and implausible lies can be considered a form 
of rule constraint, with limitations on effective response choice.  
We are not aware of any evidence, however, that directly addresses the question of 
how implausible responses are discriminated and suppressed when people lie. One 
possibility is that plausibility computations are carried out in long term memory and that 
only plausible responses are transferred to working memory to be articulated. This 
account is consistent with recent work arguing that many pragmatic and contextual 
phenomena, such as irony, are incorporated very early on in processing with little 
apparent cost (e.g., Gibbs, 1980; 1994; Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers & Carlson, 1999). 
The ADCM (2003) assumes a similar process. An alternative, however, is that since lying 
is arguably an act that works against standard communicative principles (Grice, 1989), 
plausibility constraints may have to be implemented at a higher level than other language 
mechanisms. Truthful communication might use efficient long term memory processes, 
but lying involves explicit, goal-oriented suppression of the default response that needs 
distinct processes implemented in working memory. Experiment 5 was designed to test 
between these two accounts. 
Participants engaged in a colour naming task similar to Experiments 3 and 4. The 
difference was that in Experiment 5 we introduced constraints on which lies (colours) 
participants could use. One aspect of determining the plausibility of a potential lie 
response involves determining which answer can be used and which cannot, if the lie is to 
be believed. Having particular responses that one cannot use introduces a constraint on 
response possibilities. Although it is appreciated that the concept of plausibility involves 
more than just constraint processes, constraint remains a necessary component of 
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plausibility. Therefore in our task, we told participants that they would have to truthfully 
name the colour of different squares presented on a computer screen. These squares 
would be either, red, green, or blue. On lie trials however, participants could only use two 
colours out of the three as a potential lie response, thus there was one colour they were 
informed that they could not use as a lie response throughout the task (e.g., you can use 
blue and green when telling a lie, but you cannot use the colour red). We therefore had lie 
and truth trials, as in previous experiments, but lie trials could be further broken down 
depending on the plausibility constraint. When the coloured square was the disallowed lie 
colour (e.g., red), participants had the choice of two lie possibilities (blue and green). We 
refer to these as lie control trials because the lie possibilities that can be used are the same 
as if no constraint on response was present. When the square was one of the allowed lie 
colours (such as green), participants had to inhibit the disallowed lie colour (red) and 
ensure they chose the alternative lie colour (blue) as their response. These were lie 
constraint trials. If plausibility constraints are implemented in long term memory, only 
allowable responses would be transferred into working memory. In the lie control trials, 
this would mean two potential lie responses, that is, green and blue, but in the lie 
constraint trials, only one possible response would be available, i.e., green. From 
Experiment 3 we know that choosing between two possible lie responses is more difficult 
than lying with only one possible response, hence RTs in the lie control trials should be 
slower than those in the lie constraint trials. Alternatively, if plausibility constraints are 
implemented in working memory, participants would have two lie responses in working 
memory in both conditions. They would then have to explicitly suppress the disallowed 
lie response in the lie constraint condition, which should take additional time, as it did 
when participants suppressed the truthful response throughout Experiments 1-4. RTs to 
the lie constraint condition should therefore be higher than in the lie control condition.  
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Method 
Participants 
Thirty undergraduate psychology students volunteered for this study in exchange 
for course credit. Of these, 29 were female. Participants had a mean age of 20 (SD = 3.2; 
Range = 18-33) and spoke English as their first language.  
Design  
A 2x2 within-subjects design was used, with honesty of response (truth vs. lie) and 
plausibility (constraint vs. control) as within-subjects factors. The dependent variable was 
response time measured in milliseconds (ms). A total of 408 trials were included in the 
main experimental task, with 68 from the lie control condition, 68 from the truth control 
condition, 136 from the lie constraint condition and 136 from the truth constraint 
condition. The order of trials was randomised for each participant.  
Procedure  
A similar paradigm was used to Experiments 3 and 4, with the presentation of either 
the word TRUTH or LIE in the centre of the computer screen. Once again, participants 
pressed the ‘T’ key when presented with the word TRUTH and the ‘L’ key when 
presented with the word ‘LIE’. This was followed by the presentation of either a blue, 
green or red square. As before, participants then had to say either the true colour of the 
square or lie about the colour of the square by claiming that it was a different colour. 
Prior to the main trials, participants completed a short practice block containing 4 trials.  
In contrast with our previous experiments, participants were instructed that they 
could only use two of the presented colours as their lie response and could not use the 
third colour as a lie answer (e.g., participants could use green or blue but not red). The 
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particular colour (red, blue or green) that participants were instructed against using as a 
lie was counterbalanced across participants. 
Results 
There were 264 outliers in total. 256 of these were due to microphone problems. These 
were removed from the analysis. Inaccurate responses (363) were also removed from the 
analysis. Overall, there were 55 inaccurate responses when participants lied in the control 
condition, 162 when participants lied in the constraint condition, 53 when participants 
told the truth in the control condition and 93 when participants told the truth in the 
constraint condition. In total, 627 out of 11,970 data points were removed from the 
analysis. 
Mean response times for the four possible conditions were as follows; (1) lie 
control trials (LControl; M: 909.56, SD: 175.51), (2) truth control trials (TControl; M: 
762.73, SD: 148.29), (3) lie constraint trials (LConstraint; M: 860.16, SD: 151.06), (4) 
truth constraint trials (TConstraint; M: 774.53, SD: 156.15). Figure 5 shows the mean 
response time in all possible cells. A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with 
honesty (truth vs. lie) and plausibility (constraint vs. control) as within-subjects factors. A 
main effect of honesty was demonstrated, F(1,29) = 145.52, p < .001, η² = .83, such that 
lie response times were significantly longer than truth response times, for both control 
and constraint trials. In addition, a main effect of plausibility was demonstrated, F(1,29) 
=14.89, p < .005, η² = .34 and a significant interaction between honesty and plausibility, 
F(1,29) = 23.27, p < .001, η² = .44. This interaction was due to significantly longer 
response times when participants lied in the control condition compared to the constraint 
condition (LControl: M = 909.56, SD = 175.51; LConstraint: M = 860.16, SD = 151.06; 
F(1,29) = 40.48, p < .001, η² = .58). This finding is evidence in favour of constraints 
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being applied in long-term memory. Little difference was shown between the two 
conditions when individuals told the truth (TControl: M = 762.73, SD = 148.29; 
TConstraint: M = 774.53, SD = 156.15; F(1,29) = 2.06, p = .162, η² = .07).  
Figure 5. Response times of Experiment 5 as a function of truthful colour and honesty. 
Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
 
Discussion 
The main effect of honesty of response shown in our previous experiments was also 
demonstrated in Experiment 5, with lying taking longer than telling the truth in both the 
constraint and control conditions. Two main predictions were considered regarding the 
choice between lie possibilities in relation to response plausibility. These focused on 
whether implausible lies entered working memory and were considered in the decision 
process, or whether such responses were inhibited prior to this in long-term memory 
systems. Our findings support the latter hypothesis because there were significantly 
longer lie responses in lie control trials compared to lie constraint trials. If both 
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implausible and plausible lies were transferred to, and active in, working memory, then a 
choice would be required between them (as seen in Experiment 3). This would result in 
little response time difference between the lie control and lie constraint conditions, since 
a choice would be required between two possible responses in both conditions. Our 
findings suggest instead that the implausible lie response is inhibited prior to this decision 
process, so a decision between the two possibilities is not required (since only one colour 
can be plausibly used). This supports the suggestion (consistent with the ADCM) that 
implausible lies are inhibited in long-term memory and only plausible lies enter working 
memory systems.  
General Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to investigate the cognitive processes that occur when 
people lie. Telling a lie typically takes longer than telling the truth and we were interested 
in understanding why. We organised our experiments around three potential contributing 
factors: suppressing a truthful response; the decision to lie; and the construction of a lie. 
We now summarize our results and describe their implications with respect to these 
factors. 
Suppression of the truthful response 
In all of our experiments in which participants were instructed to lie, lying response 
times were longer than truthful response times. More interestingly, we observed this 
result under conditions in which many of the factors that are usually considered to slow 
down lying were absent. In particular, participants did not need to construct a plausible lie 
(in Experiments 1 and 2 only one possible lie response was available) nor did they need 
time to decide to lie (Experiments 3, 4 and 5 removed the decision process completely). 
According to models such as the ADCM Revised (Walczyk et al, 2009), the only process 
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left to explain longer lie response times is that the truthful response needs to be 
suppressed. Our experiments therefore provide direct evidence that suppression of the 
truthful response is a contributing factor to longer lie response times. 
While we agree that suppression is part of the explanation, it is important to outline 
the different mechanisms by which suppression might lead to slower response times. One 
possibility is that lying is a multi-stage, serial processing mechanism in which the truthful 
response is retrieved and enters into working memory first, it is then rejected (because a 
lie is needed), and then a lie response retrieved. Telling the truth, in contrast, is only a 
single-stage processing mechanism, in which the truthful response is retrieved and enters 
into working memory. Under this account, the difference in response times between lies 
and truths is due to having to retrieve two responses in the lie condition (the lie and the 
truth) and only one in the truth condition (the truth). An alternative but similar proposal is 
that lying involves rejecting a response, whereas telling the truth does not. Perhaps 
rejection is a conscious process that takes time.   
A more distinct alternative is that the processes that underlie suppression of the 
truth occur in parallel, and in long-term memory, not in serial, short term memory. 
Assuming that response time is determined by variation in activation levels across the 
response possibilities (with large differences in activation levels being associated with 
short response times), reducing the activation of the truthful response might reduce 
overall variation in activation levels. This would make it more difficult to generate a 
response when lying than when telling the truth because it would be more difficult to 
select one response over the others. While this might explain why lying takes longer than 
telling the truth on some occasions, it is unlikely to be a general explanation. First, recent 
brain imaging research has found increased activation of brain areas associated with 
working memory when individuals lie (Christ et al, 2009). The extra cost of lying cannot 
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therefore be restricted to long-term memory under all circumstances. Second, lying 
involves deliberately choosing not to say the truth (Spence, Hunter, Farrow, Green, 
Leung & Hughes, 2004). Now, since working memory is typically associated with 
conscious awareness (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001), lying should involve truthful 
responses entering working memory (and being suppressed in working memory). 
The two types of suppression that we have identified may both be correct but apply 
under different circumstances. Serial suppression in working memory is likely to be the 
more standard, day-to-day type of suppression in which a speaker lies to an unexpected 
question on a single occasion. However, if a speaker has to lie on multiple occasions to 
the same question, or they are in a situation in which lying is likely to be common and 
expected, they may be able to suppress truthful answers in long-term memory, almost 
“forgetting” the truth because the lie response has been so frequently associated with a 
given question.  
The decision to lie 
Experiments 1 and 2 tested the role of the decision process by comparing response 
times in trials in which participants chose to lie with trials in which they were directed to 
lie. While we found effects of deciding to lie in both of our experiments, we discovered 
that there was a much greater cost to deciding to tell the truth than deciding to lie, relative 
to the cost of being directed in the response. Thus, although Walczyk et al (2009) 
suggested that the decision contribution to elevated lie response times is at least partially 
determined by the difficulty in lying, our data show that this process also occurs for 
decisions related to truthful responses. Our general view is therefore that there is no cost 
of deciding to lie per se but there is a cost to choosing to depart from the norm for that 
context. Most of the time when people lie they will be departing from a truth-telling 
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context, which is likely to incur a cost, but in some contexts, e.g., interrogation situations, 
or playing poker, delays may be experienced when the decision is taken to tell the truth. 
One caveat to our conclusion is that when people choose to lie they often do so on 
the basis of the question that they are asked, whereas in our experiments the choice was 
internally driven. For example, a person may choose to lie to questions about the 
whereabouts of a suspect but not about their own activities. Evaluating the content of the 
question is a component of the decision process which is not included in our task. It could 
therefore be that the evaluation component of the decision process contributes to elevated 
lie latencies. However, we feel that this cost is also caused by a departure from the 
normal communicative stance. This is because if the person would normally tell the truth, 
the question needs to be evaluated in order to decide to lie, but if the person expects to lie, 
the question needs to be evaluated in order to decide whether to tell the truth. Thus, the 
departure from the norm is the causal factor, not the decision to lie. 
Second, we observed longer response times when participants told the truth in the 
choice condition compared to the directed condition. This occurred across both 
experiments and therefore was not related to differential visual availability of the 
response type across conditions. As a consequence of this effect, the difference between 
lying and telling the truth was greatly diminished in the choice conditions (to the extent 
that we did not observe a significant difference in Experiment 1). What is different about 
choosing to tell the truth compared to being directed to tell the truth? One hypothesis is 
that choosing how to respond means considering lie and truthful responses. For example, 
when deciding whether to tell the truth or lie in response to a red square, the responses 
“blue” (the lie) and “red” (the truth) become activated. Consequently, there was a small 
(or nonexistent) response time difference between truthful and lie responses in the choice 
condition because both responses were highly activated under both response conditions. 
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In contrast, being directed to tell the truth means that only the truthful response becomes 
activated (there is no need to consider and suppress the lie response), but being directed 
to lie means that the truth and the lie response become activated (the truth is always 
activated). In other words, both response types were activated in the choice-lie, directed-
lie, and choice-truth conditions, but only the truth was activated in the directed-truth 
condition. 
Finally, these results have important practical consequences. In almost all of the lie 
detection work participants are directed to lie or tell the truth rather than choosing to do 
so whereas when people lie in everyday situations, they choose to lie rather than being 
directed. Our experiments show that the difference between lying and telling the truth is 
much smaller when participants are given a choice, and therefore much less detectable if 
trying to use automated lie detection techniques relying on response time. 
The construction of a lie  
There is a strong intuition that lying takes longer than telling the truth because lies 
need to be constructed whereas truths do not. Yet, previous work is inconclusive about 
why, or even whether, this is the case. Our experiments make two novel contributions to 
understanding the construction component of lying.  
First, having to make a choice about which lie to use from many, arbitrary 
possibilities is difficult. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that when participants had to 
choose a lie they were slow at responding, but, crucially, the same range of response 
options did not slow truthful responses. Even after hundreds of trials, and with only two 
choices, participants experienced difficulty in making an arbitrary choice when they were 
forced to lie. It seems that part of what makes lying difficult is resolving all of the 
inconsequential decisions that are needed in order to construct a story. When telling the 
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truth, the “decisions” are determined by fact, or by memory, and are therefore relatively 
resource free.  
Second, and somewhat conversely, when there is a clear preference about which lie 
is the most appropriate, lying is relatively easy. In Experiment 5 we found that when 
participants were prevented from using one lie response out of two (but were required to 
use both responses when stating the truth), participants behaved as if there was only one 
possible lie available. Rejection of the implausible lie occurred in long term memory, as 
if no choice between lies was necessary. One caveat to this result is that our effects were 
obtained over many trials with the same plausibility constraint applied on each occasion. 
It may be the case that making plausibility assessments in unrehearsed lie situations is 
much more difficult. We leave this investigation to future research, however. 
Whilst our study was not directly designed to aid the detection of deception, our 
results on lie construction nonetheless make one suggestion that contrasts with the 
prevailing view in the literature. Walczyk et al (2003; 2005; 2009) claimed that yes/no 
questions provide better indicators of deceit than open-ended questions. They 
demonstrated greater response time differences between lies and truths when participants 
lied to yes/no compared to open-ended questions. In contrast, we found a greater 
difference for questions with more than one possible lie response. We suggest that 
different patterns arose because different methodologies were used across studies. In our 
experiments, participants answered the same type of question in both conditions and the 
truthful answer was equally accessible across conditions. In Walczyk et al. however, 
different types of questions were asked across conditions and the truthful answer could 
have been more difficult to retrieve in the open-ended questions (hence truthful response 
times were longer in the open-ended condition). While we agree with Walczyk et al. that 
the difficulty of retrieving truthful information contributes to the response time difference 
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between lies and truths, we feel that this issue is orthogonal to the issue of yes/no vs. 
open-ended questioning. The results of our experiments on lie construction suggest that 
an interviewee will need more time to lie to an open-ended question than to a yes/no 
question, ceteris paribus, because they need to choose which lie to use in the open-ended 
case but not in the yes/no case. We therefore suggest using open-ended questions 
whenever possible if detecting deceit is the goal. 
Conclusion 
Despite the wealth of research investigating lying in general, such as lie detection 
(e.g., Vrij et al, 2007), the social psychology of lying (e.g., Cole, 2001; DePaulo & 
Kashy, 1998) and the linguistics and philosophy of lying (e.g., Meibauer, 2005), very 
little work has been conducted on how we lie. This chapter has tried to address the 
imbalance by investigating possible reasons why people take longer to lie than to tell the 
truth. From these experiments, we come to three conclusions. First, lying involves 
suppressing truthful information and suppressing or rejecting a default response will 
increase response time. Second, there can be costs associated with choosing to tell the 
truth, just as there can be with choosing to lie. We therefore maintain that the decision to 
depart from the normal type of communication can be costly, and while this will often be 
a cost associated with a decision to lie, it is not an obligatory component of lying. Lastly, 
lying often requires more choice in generating a response than telling the truth. There is 
typically only one truth but there are many possible lie options. Choosing between these 
additional options is a difficult job and contributes directly to the longer time needed to 
tell a lie.  
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CHAPTER 3 
The Impact of Task Switching when Telling Lies 
Despite the recent growth of interest in the cognitive processes that occur when 
individuals tell a lie, and how these differ from those involved in telling the truth (Spence 
et al, 2001), there remains only a limited understanding of the mechanisms responsible 
for such processing differences. Conclusions commonly relate to the generic involvement 
of working memory, suppression and conflict resolution processes (Christ et al, 2009), 
with several studies suggesting that inhibition of the truthful response is a necessary 
process for deceptive responding (Seymour et al, 2000; Spence et al, 2001; Vendemia et 
al, 2009; Walczyk et al, 2003). There is less consensus, however, regarding the possible 
contribution of other processes to this increased cognitive load.  
One potential factor that is little understood is that of switching between telling a lie 
and telling the truth. If telling a lie involves differential processes to telling the truth, it 
logically follows that different response or task-sets may be associated with each 
response type. Since switching between different task-sets has been shown to increase 
response times (Monsell, 2003) compared to consistently responding in one manner, it is 
possible that these switching processes contribute to the longer response times shown 
when individuals lie. In this chapter we test this hypothesis by reanalysing four previous 
experiments and presenting a fifth specifically designed to assess task-switching between 
lying and truth-telling.  
Task-switching 
Task-switching refers to situations in which there is variation in the cognitive 
operations required to perform a series of tasks, that is, when the task-set changes from 
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trial to trial (see, e.g., Gilbert & Shallice, 2002). The task-set for a particular task might 
include stimulus-category rules, category-response rules, response threshold and response 
modality (Vandierendonck, Liefooghe & Verbruggen, 2010). There is now a large body 
of literature illustrating that switching between different task-sets incurs a response time 
cost compared to consistently responding to a stimulus in the same manner (Monsell, 
2003). For example, Allport, Styles and Hsieh (1994) found longer response times when 
participants switched between reading a word and naming the colour of the word 
compared to doing the same task repeatedly. Such findings have also been shown when a 
response is only considered and not actually executed (Verbruggen, Liefooghe & 
Vandierendonck, 2006).  
The explanation for the switch cost, however, remains controversial. Currently, 
debate focuses on two main viewpoints, the interference view (Allport et al, 1994) and 
the reconfiguration view (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), although a combination of the two 
accounts is increasingly preferred (Meiran, 1996; Vandierendonck et al, 2010). The 
interference view attributes longer response times on switch trials to task-set inertia. This 
refers to the previous task-set remaining active for a period of time after a response has 
been executed and therefore interfering with the implementation of the next required task-
set (Allport et al, 1994). The switch cost is attributed to the extra cognitive effort required 
to resolve such interference, primarily the inhibition of unnecessary processes associated 
with the previous competing task-set (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Mayr & Keele, 2000). The 
reconfiguration view (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), in contrast, claims that switch costs are 
due to the requirement of an active control process reconfiguring a cognitive system for 
any new task prior to undertaking it. Once a particular task-set has been activated, it 
remains the active processing set until a different task-set is required. At this point, 
reconfiguration is necessary to switch from one task-set to another. 
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Both of the theories considered above are consistent with switch costs occurring 
when people lie. If lying involves a different task-set than telling the truth, switching 
between the two sets might cause switch costs. According to the interference view, when 
an individual lies in response to a question, the particular processes required to enable a 
false response, such as inhibition of the truth, would remain active after the falsehood has 
been executed, and these processes would then interfere with the ability to respond 
truthfully to the following question. According to the reconfiguration view, when an 
individual responds to a question falsely, a “lie” task-set would potentially remain active 
until the individual has to respond to a question truthfully, whereby cognitive 
reconfiguration to the “truth” task-set is then required. These reconfiguration processes 
would incur a response time cost, leading to longer response times when individuals 
switch between lying and telling the truth compared to consistently responding in the 
same manner (either truthfully or deceptively). 
In addition to the general task-switching costs, it has also been demonstrated that 
switching from a weaker task to a more dominant task incurs a greater response time cost 
than switching from a more dominant to a weaker task (Allport et al, 1994; Phillip, Gade 
& Koch, 2007; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). Allport et al. suggested that this is due to a 
greater amount of inhibition being required to prevent the more dominant task from being 
performed. This inhibition then carries over into the following trial where it must be 
overridden and the dominant task carried out. The strength of any particular task-set 
therefore affects the amount of inhibition that is applied and in turn, the amount of time 
that is required to recover from this inhibition and subsequently perform the task. In 
relation to deception, therefore, if the truth is considered the more dominant, default 
response, then more inhibition would be required to prevent ourselves from speaking the 
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truth and to tell a lie. This inhibition would then require more recovery time in order to 
subsequently respond truthfully again.  
Task-switching in lying 
Despite the likely contribution of task-switching to elevated lie response times, 
previous work has not explicitly examined the relationship between lying and task-
switching. A small number of deception studies have alluded to task-switching, however, 
and we discuss these studies here.  
A recent activation likelihood estimate (ALE) meta-analysis of 12 fMRI deception 
studies examined the potential contribution of working memory, task-switching and 
inhibitory control to the additional processing shown when individuals tell a lie (Christ et 
al, 2009). ALE maps from brain regions consistently involved in laboratory-based 
deception, such as the inferior frontal gyrus, bilateral insular regions and the right anterior 
cingulate cortex, were compared with ALE maps generated from previous work 
examining the brain regions involved in generic working memory, task-switching and 
inhibitory control processes. Whereas overlap was shown between those brain regions 
involved in deception and those involved in working memory and inhibition processes, 
little overlap was found between deception and task-switching processes. The authors 
concluded that this finding questioned “the contribution of this aspect of executive 
control [task-switching] to deception” (Christ et al, 2009; p. 1564). One limitation of this 
study, however, was that insufficient data was available to focus on particular 
experimental paradigms in the creation of both the task-switching and deception ALE 
maps, whereas this was possible for the working memory and inhibitory control ALE 
maps.  
CHAPTER 3 
Task Switching 
 
 
101 
Fullam, McKie and Dolan (2009) are more positive regarding the potential 
influence of task-switching on deceptive cognition. In their study, participants underwent 
fMRI scanning while they both lied and told the truth regarding whether they had 
performed a number of everyday acts. Enhanced activation in frontopolar regions was 
shown when participants told the truth. Since inhibition of frontopolar regions has been 
suggested to be required in order to switch to, and maintain, a given response-set 
(Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007), Fullam et al (2009) proposed that this increased activation 
may be due to the requirement to reinstigate the switch back to a truthful response-set 
following a lie response. If this is the case, the question remains as to which process is 
more cognitively challenging; inhibiting the frontopolar regions to enable the instigation 
of a deceptive response-set, or the reactivation of such regions to enable an individual to 
then respond truthfully again.  
The extent that the truthful response-set may hinder or facilitate deceptive 
responding was explored by Osman et al (2009). Participants read a short description of 
an event that had occurred and answered a series of questions regarding this. Participants 
performed the task twice and were divided into 4 groups according to how they should 
respond in each session: true-true, lie-lie, true-lie, lie-true. The true-true and lie-lie groups 
used the same response type when completing both the first task session and the second 
task session, whereas the true-lie and lie-true group had to switch response type when 
completing the second task session. Deceptive response times for participants who had 
previously told the truth (true-lie) were compared to those for participants who had 
previously responded to the task deceptively (lie-lie). In line with previous findings, 
slower response times in the first task sessions were shown when participants responded 
deceptively (lie-lie) compared to truthfully (true-lie). No significant differences between 
the two groups were found in the second task session, however, suggesting that switching 
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from responding truthfully to lying did not increase response times compared to 
consistently responding falsely. It may be, however, that the block design of the paradigm 
reduced any task-switching effects. If participants were constantly and unexpectedly 
required to switch between lying and truth-telling, evidence for a significant role of task-
switching processes may have been found.  
Since incongruent responding on the Stroop task also requires the dominant 
response-type to be overridden, Osman et al (2009) instructed participants to complete a 
Stroop task following the initial computer task. This enabled an examination of the effect 
of previous deceptive responding on Stroop task performance. From this, they 
demonstrated that participants with a greater prior experience of deceptive responding 
(lie-lie) were faster in responding to incongruent Stroop trials than participants with no 
prior experience of deception (true-true). Since both incongruent and deceptive 
responding have been suggested to involve similar processes (Vendemia et al, 2005), this 
suggests that the previous execution of false responses aids the ability to respond to latter 
tasks with similar processing requirements, i.e., overriding the prepotent response on 
incongruent Stroop trials. Such findings support the idea that different task-sets are 
invoked when responding deceptively compared to responding truthfully. 
The response time cost associated with task incompatibility has also been used by 
researchers in the development of lie detection tasks (Frost, Adie, Denomme, Lahaie, 
Sibley & Smith, 2010; Gregg, 2007; Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara & Castiello, 
2008). Sartori et al (2008) instructed participants to classify a series of statements 
presented via a computer. In the confession-true task, confessions (e.g., ‘I stole the 
watch’) were classified using the same key as true statements and denials were classified 
using the same key as false statements. However, in the denial-true task, confessions and 
false statements were classified using one key and denials and true statements were 
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classified using a different key. Participants who were lying displayed longer response 
times when denials were associated with the true statement key, whereas participants who 
told the truth had longer response times when confessions were associated with the false 
statement key.  
To summarise, there are suggestions in the literature that lying carries a switch cost, 
but no studies have directly tested this. We therefore re-analysed the data of four 
previously reported experiments (Williams, Bott, Lewis & Patrick, submitted; and shown 
in Chapter 2) to investigate switch costs when participants lied and told the truth. In 
addition, a fifth experiment was conducted to specifically examine whether switching 
between lie and truth trials increases response times compared to trials where no 
switching is required. 
The Current Study 
The task-switching literature suggests two main predictions regarding the relationship 
between the honesty of the response (truth or lie) and the task (switch trials or no-switch 
trials). Firstly, that the additional processing required when individuals tell a lie (Spence 
et al, 2001; Walczyk et al, 2003) suggests that differential task-sets may be involved in 
responding truthfully compared to responding deceptively. If this is the case, then longer 
response times would be expected when participants are required to switch between these 
task-sets (i.e., when switching between lie trials and truth trials) compared to when no 
switching is required (i.e., when a truth trial is followed by a truth trial or a lie trial is 
followed by a lie trial). This main effect of task is well documented in the research 
literature (Monsell, 2003), but has not previously been applied directly to deceptive 
cognition. Secondly, several studies have demonstrated that the relative dominance of the 
task affects the response time cost associated with task-switching, with a greater response 
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time cost incurred when individuals switch from a weaker to a more dominant task than 
vice versa (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Allport et al, 1994). Therefore, if responding 
truthfully is a more dominant task than telling a lie (either through learned experience or 
a default response mechanism), an interaction will be found between the honesty of the 
response and the task, with a greater response time difference shown between switch and 
no-switch trials when participants tell the truth compared to when they tell a lie.  
Experiment 1 
The original aims of Experiment 1 were twofold. Firstly, to examine whether longer 
response times for lies compared to truths were demonstrated using our paradigm. 
Secondly, to examine whether deciding to lie or tell the truth, compared to being directed, 
impacted on response times. Twenty-one participants were either directed or chose to lie 
or tell the truth regarding the colour of a square presented on a computer screen in a 
within-subjects design. For further details regarding the original experimental rationale 
and method, see Chapter 2.  
In order to re-analyse the data to examine task-switching effects, trials were re-
coded into those involving a potential task-switch and those not requiring a switch in 
honesty response-type. If the honesty of the response was different on the previous trial 
compared to the current trial, this was coded as a switch trial. If the honesty of the 
response was the same on both the previous and current trial, this was coded as a no-
switch trial. Due to limitations in the number of trials, data from the directed and choice 
conditions were combined for this analysis.  
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Results and Discussion 
A total of two subjects, 103 outliers and 132 inaccurate responses were removed from the 
analysis (see Chapter 2 for further details).   
The effect of task-switching was examined by comparing response times when a 
trial was preceded by one of the same type (i.e., lie followed by lie or truth followed by 
truth) to when preceded by one of the opposite type (i.e., truth followed by lie or lie 
followed by truth). The mean number of trials and mean response times for each of the 
four conditions was as follows; (1) lie switch trials (LS; Trials: 47; M: 856.87, SD: 
119.37), (2) lie no switch trials (LNS; Trials: 42; M: 810.21, SD: 102.08), (3) truth switch 
trials (TS; Trials: 45; M: 834.48, SD: 110.90), (4) truth no switch trials (TNS; Trials: 46; 
M: 746.20, SD: 104.30). Figure 6 shows the mean response time in all possible cells. A 2 
x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with honesty of response (truth vs. lie) 
and task (switch vs. no-switch) as the within-subjects factors. A significant main effect of 
task was shown, F(1,18) = 40.60, p < .001, η² = .69 and a significant interaction between 
task x honesty of response, F(1,18) = 4.57, p < .05, η² = .20. Simple effects showed that 
participants took significantly longer to respond on switch trials compared to no-switch 
trials both when they told a lie, F(1,18) = 11.61, p = .003, η² = .39  and when they told 
the truth, F(1,18) = 34.62, p < .001, η² = .66. However, the significant interaction reveals 
that this difference was greater when individuals told the truth. It appears to be more 
difficult to switch from a lie response to a truthful response than from a truthful response 
to a lie response. Simple effects tests also showed that lying took significantly longer than 
telling the truth on no-switch trials, F(1,18) = 13.18, p = .002, η² = .42, but not on switch 
trials, F(1,18) = 3.34, p = .084, η² = .16, CI = [-3.27, 48.09].    
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Figure 6. Response times of Experiment 1 as a function of task and honesty. Note: Error 
bars are standard error. 
 
In summary, we found that participants took longer to respond when they had to 
switch from telling a lie to telling the truth, and vice versa, compared to when they 
consistently responded in one manner. These results suggest that telling the truth and 
lying involve different task-sets, and that switching between these task-sets incurs a 
response time cost both when they lie and when they tell the truth. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 also examined the effect of deciding to lie or tell the truth on response time 
using a similar paradigm to Experiment 1. The only difference in the experimental task 
was that participants were provided with a visual reminder of their response choice in this 
experiment. Twenty-three participants were either directed or chose to lie or tell the truth 
regarding the colour of a square presented on a computer screen in a within-subjects 
design. For further details regarding the original experimental rationale and method, see 
Chapter 2.  
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As in Experiment 1, the data were re-coded into trials involving a switch between 
lying and truth-telling and trials not requiring a switch in honesty of response. Once 
again, data from the directed and choice conditions were combined for this analysis. 
 Results and Discussion 
A total of one participant, 100 outliers and 126 inaccurate responses were removed from 
the analysis (see Chapter 2 for further details).   
The effect of task-switching was once again examined by comparing response times 
when a trial was preceded by one of the same type (i.e., lie followed by lie or truth 
followed by truth) to when preceded by one of the opposite type (i.e., truth followed by 
lie or lie followed by truth). The mean number of trials and mean response times for each 
of the four conditions was as follows; (1) lie switch trials (LS; Trials: 42; M: 769.38, SD: 
156.25), (2) lie no switch trials (LNS; Trials: 52; M: 761.34, SD: 166.79), (3) truth switch 
trials (TS; Trials: 42; M: 719.41, SD: 154.09), (4) truth no switch trials (TNS; Trials: 55; 
M: 657.85, SD: 144.03). Figure 7 shows the mean response time in all possible cells. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with honesty of response (truth vs. lie) and 
task (switch vs. no-switch) as the within-subjects factors. Once again, a significant main 
effect of task was shown, F(1,21) = 79.18, p < .001, η² = .79 and a significant interaction 
between task x honesty of response, F(1,21) = 13.28, p = .002, η² = .52. Simple effects 
showed that participants took significantly longer to respond on switch trials compared to 
no-switch trials when they told the truth, F(1,21) = 32.47, p < .001, η² = .61, but not when 
they told a lie, F(1,21) = 0.674, p = .42, η² = .03, CI = [-12.32, 28.39]. Simple effects 
tests also showed that this time lying took significantly longer than telling the truth both 
on no-switch trials, F(1,21) = 77.86, p < .001, η² = .79 and on switch trials, F(1,21) = 
20.98, p < .001, η² = .50.    
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Figure 7. Response times of Experiment 2 as a function of task and honesty. Note: Error 
bars are standard error. 
 
In summary, we found that participants took longer to respond when they had to 
switch from telling a lie to telling the truth compared to responding truthfully on both 
trials. In contrast to Experiment 1 however, there was no significant increase in response 
time when individuals switched from responding truthfully to responding falsely 
compared to lying on both trials. These results suggest that a greater response time cost is 
incurred when switching from a lie-task set to a truth task-set than vice versa. 
Experiment 3 
The original rationale for Experiment 3 was to examine the contribution of lie 
construction processes to longer response times when lying. In particular, we examined 
whether increasing the number of lie possibilities that participants could choose between 
increased response times, since a choice would be required between potential responses. 
Thirty-six participants were directed to lie or tell the truth regarding the colour of a 
square presented on a computer screen in a within-subjects design. In one condition, 
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participants had only one lie response that they could use, whereas in the other condition, 
participants could choose between two lie possibilities. For further details regarding the 
original experimental rationale and method, see Chapter 2.  
As described previously, the data were re-coded into trials involving a switch 
between lying and truth-telling and trials not requiring a switch in honesty of response. 
Results and Discussion 
In total, 181 outliers and 175 inaccurate responses were removed from the analysis (see 
Chapter 2 for further details). The effect of task-switching was examined by comparing 
response times when a trial was preceded by one of the same type (i.e., lie followed by lie 
or truth followed by truth) to when preceded by one of the opposite type (i.e., truth 
followed by lie or lie followed by truth). At this point, data from the two-colour and 
three-colour conditions were combined. The mean number of trials and mean response 
times for each of the four conditions was as follows; (1) lie switch trials (LS; Trials: 50; 
M: 922.38, SD: 144.16), (2) lie no switch trials (LNS; Trials: 48; M: 878.98, SD: 142.78), 
(3) truth switch trials (TS; Trials: 50; M: 858.94, SD: 138.63), (4) truth no switch trials 
(TNS; Trials: 48; M: 759.37, SD: 121.10). Figure 8 shows the mean response time in all 
possible cells. A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with honesty of response 
(truth vs. lie) and task (switch vs. no-switch) as the within-subjects factors. As in 
Experiments 1 and 2, a significant main effect of task was shown, F(1,35) = 71.43, p < 
.001, η² = .80 and a significant interaction between task x honesty of response, F(1,35) = 
16.41, p < .001, η² = .32. Simple effects showed that participants took significantly longer 
to respond on switch trials compared to no-switch trials when they told the truth, F(1,35) 
= 71.05, p < .001, η² = .67 and when they told a lie, F(1,35) = 18.90, p < .001, η² = .35. 
Simple effects tests also showed that lying took significantly longer than telling the truth 
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both on no-switch trials, F(1,35) = 110.22, p < .001, η² = .76 and on switch trials, F(1,35) 
= 46.52, p < .001, η² = .57.    
Figure 8. Response times of Experiment 3 as a function of task and honesty. Note: Error 
bars are standard error. 
 
To examine the effect of the number of lie possibilities on the task-switching 
effects, a repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with honesty of response (truth vs. 
lie), number of response possibilities (2-colour vs. 3-colour) and task (switch vs. no-
switch) as the within-subjects factors. The mean number of trials and mean response 
times for each of the eight conditions was as follows; (1) two-colour lie switch trials 
(2LS; Trials: 25; M: 899.80, SD: 159.09), (2) two-colour lie no switch trials (2LNS; 
Trials: 24; M: 830.16, SD: 156.71), (3) two-colour truth switch trials (2TS; Trials: 25; M: 
871.18, SD: 155.76), (4) two-colour truth no switch trials (2TNS; Trials: 24; M: 753.49, 
SD: 144.31), (5) three-colour lie switch trials (3LS; Trials: 25; M: 946.68, SD: 161.82), 
(6) three-colour lie no switch trials (3LNS; Trials: 24; M: 927.86, SD: 161.14), (7) three-
colour truth switch trials (3TS; Trials: 26; M: 847.78, SD: 143.14), (8) three-colour truth 
no switch trials (3TNS; Trials: 24; M: 766.12, SD: 114.01). Figure 9 shows the mean 
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response time in all possible cells. A significant interaction was found between the 
number of response possibilities and the task, F(1,35) = 13.09, p < .002, η² = .27. 
However, the interaction between the number of response possibilities, the task and the 
honesty of the response was not significant, F(1,35) = 0.30, p = .59, η² < .01. Simple 
main effects tests showed longer response times for switch trials compared to no-switch 
trials in the 2-colour block, both when participants told a lie, F(1,35) = 30.85, p < .001, η² 
= .47 and when they told the truth, F(1,35) = 61.11, p < .001, η² = .64. However, in the 3-
colour block, longer response times for switch trials compared to no-switch trials were 
only found when participants told the truth, F(1,35) = 39.19, p < .001, η² = .53 and not 
when they told a lie, F(1,35) = 1.43, p = .24, η² < .04, CI = [-13.16, 50.80].    
Figure 9. Response times of Experiment 3 as a function of task, number of response 
possibilities and honesty. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
In summary, our results were consistent with those of Experiment 1, in that 
participants took longer to respond when they had to switch both from telling a lie to 
telling the truth and vice versa compared to responding in the same manner on both trials. 
In accordance with Experiment 2 however, when the trials were broken down according 
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to the number of lie response possibilities, a significant increase in response time for 
switch trials was only shown when participants responded honestly and not when they 
told a lie.  
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 was originally conducted to examine whether further increasing the number 
of lie possibilities that participants could choose between further increased response 
times, due to the evaluation and potential suppression of each response possibility in turn. 
Thirty-two participants were directed to lie or tell the truth regarding the colour of a 
square presented on a computer screen in a within-subjects design. In one condition, 
participants had a choice of two lie possibilities, whereas in a second condition, 
participants could choose between three lie possibilities. For further details regarding the 
original experimental rationale and method, see Chapter 2.  
As described previously, the data were re-coded into trials involving a switch 
between lying and truth-telling and trials not requiring a switch in honesty of response. 
Results and Discussion 
In total, 174 outliers and 260 inaccurate responses were removed from the analysis (see 
Chapter 2 for further details). The effect of task-switching was examined by comparing 
response times when a trial was preceded by one of the same type (i.e., lie followed by lie 
or truth followed by truth) to when preceded by one of the opposite type (i.e., truth 
followed by lie or lie followed by truth). At this point, data from the three-colour and 
four-colour conditions were combined. The mean number of trials and mean response 
times for each of the four conditions was as follows; (1) lie switch trials (LS; Trials: 48; 
M: 859.42, SD: 140.59), (2) lie no switch trials (LNS; Trials: 48; M: 878.90, SD: 135.96), 
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(3) truth switch trials (TS; Trials: 49; M: 751.32, SD: 110.34), (4) truth no switch trials 
(TNS; Trials: 48; M: 688.95, SD: 99.26). Figure 10 shows the mean response time in all 
possible cells. A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with honesty of response 
(truth vs. lie) and task (switch vs. no-switch) as the within-subjects factors. A significant 
main effect of task was shown, F(1,31) = 8.19, p < .01, η² = .21 and a significant 
interaction between task x honesty of response, F(1,31) = 22.14, p < .001, η² = .42. 
Simple effects showed that participants took significantly longer to respond on switch 
trials compared to no-switch trials when they told the truth, F(1,31) = 32.065, p < .001, η² 
= .51, but not when they told a lie, F(1,31) = 2.67, p = .11, η² = .08, CI = [-43.81, 4.85]. 
Simple effects tests also showed that lying took significantly longer than telling the truth 
both on no-switch trials, F(1,31) = 176.82, p < .001, η² = .85 and on switch trials, F(1,31) 
= 46.18, p < .001, η² = .60.    
Figure 10. Response times of Experiment 4 as a function of task and honesty. Note: Error 
bars are standard error. 
 
Once again, to examine the effect of the number of lie possibilities on task-
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vs. lie), number of response possibilities (3-colour vs. 4-colour) and task (switch vs. no-
switch) as the within-subjects factors. The mean number of trials and mean response 
times for each of the eight conditions was as follows; (1) three-colour lie switch trials 
(3LS; Trials: 24; M: 874.60, SD: 152.63), (2) three-colour lie no switch trials (3LNS; 
Trials: 24; M: 879.96, SD: 140.35), (3) three-colour truth switch trials (3TS; Trials: 24; 
M: 752.96, SD: 108.74), (4) three-colour truth no switch trials (3TNS; Trials: 24; M: 
685.24, SD: 98.07), (5) four-colour lie switch trials (4LS; Trials: 25; M: 845.98, SD: 
161.45), (6) four-colour lie no switch trials (4LNS; Trials: 24; M: 876.89, SD: 147.87), 
(7) four-colour truth switch trials (4TS; Trials: 25; M: 750.93, SD: 134.17), (8) four-
colour truth no switch trials (4TNS; Trials: 24; M: 693.55, SD: 116.97). Figure 11 shows 
the mean response time in all possible cells. This time, there was no interaction between 
the number of response possibilities and the task, F(1,31) = 1.69, p = .20, η² < .06 or 
between the number of response possibilities, the task and the honesty of the response, 
F(1,31) = 0.26, p = .61, η² < .01. Simple main effects tests showed longer response times 
for switch trials compared to no-switch trials when participants told the truth in both the 
3-colour block, F(1,31) = 28.27, p < .001, η² = .48 and the 4-colour block, F(1,31) = 
11.75, p < .005, η² = .27. However, there were no differences between switch and no-
switch trials when individuals told a lie in either the 3-colour block, F(1,31) = 0.12, p = 
.73, η² < .01, CI = [-36.43, 25.70] or the 4-colour block, F(1,31) = 3.53, p = .07, η² = .10, 
CI = [-64.44, 2.62].  
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Figure 11. Response times of Experiment 4 as a function of task, number of response 
possibilities and honesty. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
In summary, we found that participants only incurred a significant response time 
cost on switch trials when they responded truthfully and not when they responded falsely. 
This provides further support for the idea that a greater response time cost is incurred 
when switching from a lie-task set to a truth task-set than vice versa. 
 Experiment 6 
The additional analyses of four previous experiments reported above have shown that 
response times increase when participants switch between lying and telling the truth, 
compared to consistently responding in one manner. However, none of these experiments 
were specifically designed to investigate task-switching, and our results regarding the 
interaction between switching and lying have been inconsistent across experiments. We 
were unsure whether this might have been an artefact of the post hoc classification of the 
pairs of trials as being switch/no-switch (e.g., different numbers of switch/no-switch trials 
across participants). We therefore designed Experiment 6 to analyse task-switching with 
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an a priori design in which all participants had equal numbers of switch/no-switch and 
lie/truth trials 
The hypotheses of Experiment 6 were similar to those described for Experiments 1 
to 4. First, we wanted to test whether there were greater RTs for switch vs. no-switch 
trials when participants lied, and second, we wanted to test whether there was a greater 
effect of switching for truth telling than lying. We also examined the effects of practice 
on the switch cost. 
 Method 
Participants 
Eighteen students volunteered for this study in exchange for payment. Of these, 13 
were female. Participants had a mean age of 21.72 (SD = 3.10; Range = 19-32) and spoke 
English as their first language.  
Design  
A 2 x 2 within-subjects design was utilised, with the independent variables being 
honesty of response (lie vs. truth) and task (no-switch vs. switch). The dependent variable 
was response time. A total of 208 trials were included in the computer task. Trials were 
created as one of four pairs as follows: a lie trial followed by a lie trial (LL), a truth trial 
followed by a truth trial (TT), a lie trial followed by a truth trial (LT) and a truth trial 
followed by a lie trial (TL). Overall, each pair was presented 52 times throughout the 
task, with only the second trial in each pair being analysed. The order of pairs was 
randomly presented by the computer for each participant. Unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, 
there was no choice condition in this experiment, so participants were directed to lie or 
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tell the truth prior to each trial. The colour of the square (Red, Blue or Green) associated 
with each trial was also randomly controlled by the computer.  
Procedure  
The experiment progressed as a series of trials each of which began with the 
presentation of one of two words in the centre of the computer screen (LIE or TRUTH). 
Participants were instructed to indicate whether they understood by pressing the ‘T’ key 
when presented with the word ‘TRUTH’ and the ‘L’ key when presented with the word 
‘LIE’. The word remained on the screen until the participant pressed the appropriate 
button and was then replaced with either a blue, red or green square. Participants then had 
to say either the true colour of the square or lie about the colour of the square by claiming 
that it was one of the alternative colours according to the instruction (e.g., blue or green if 
it was red). Voice key responses were recorded via a headset microphone. After the vocal 
response was made, the next trial began after approximately 500ms. Instructions were 
presented on the screen and emphasised the importance of responding both as quickly and 
as accurately as possible. Participants took part in a short practice block of eight trials 
identical to the main trials. The question ‘What colour is the square?’ was visually 
presented prior to both the practice block and the block of main trials. All stimuli were 
presented on a black background, with the squares being of equal size and the text being 
presented in Arial font, size 40. 
Results 
There were 82 outliers in total, with 67 of these being due to microphone errors (the 
microphone failed to pick up the initial answer). Inaccurate responses (64) were also 
removed from the analysis. Overall, there were 31 inaccurate responses in the switch lie 
condition, 21 in the switch truth condition, 0 in the no-switch lie condition and 12 in the 
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no-switch truth condition. In total, 146 trials out of 3,744 were removed from the 
analysis. 
Mean response times for each of the four conditions was as follows; (1) lie switch 
trials (LS; M: 943.04, SD: 261.05), (2) lie no switch trials (LNS; M: 878.87, SD: 164.00), 
(3) truth switch trials (TS; M: 760.09, SD: 141.92), (4) truth no switch trials (TNS; M: 
690.96, SD: 105.63). Figure 12 shows the mean response time in all possible cells. 
Monsell (2003) claimed that it is easier to re-enable a particular task-set if a task has 
recently been performed. Since participants in this experiment are repeatedly performing 
the same two tasks (lying or telling the truth about the colour of a square) in quick 
succession, we also examined the potential effect of practice in this experiment. Trials 
were further split in half and divided into those presented in the first-half of the task (trial 
104 and below) and those presented in the second-half of the task (trial 105 and above). 
Mean response times for each of the eight conditions was as follows; (1) first-half lie 
switch trials (FH-LS; M: 970.26, SD: 302.58), (2) first-half lie no switch trials (FH-LNS; 
M: 907.30, SD: 168.32), (3) first-half truth switch trials (FH-TS; M: 769.51, SD: 159.63), 
(4) first-half truth no switch trials (FH-TNS; M: 706.54, SD: 111.77), (5) second-half lie 
switch trials (SH-LS; M: 923.15, SD: 248.15), (6) second-half lie no switch trials (SH-
LNS; M: 857.43, SD: 170.40), (7) second-half truth switch trials (SH-TS; M: 752.10, SD: 
133.79), (8) second-half truth no switch trials (SH-TNS; M: 677.80, SD: 108.68). Figure 
13 shows the mean response time in all possible cells. A repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted with honesty of response (truth vs. lie), task (switch vs. no-switch) and 
practice (first-half vs. second-half) as within-subjects factors. This found a trend towards 
significance for the effect of practice, F(1,17) = 4.16, p = .057, η² = .20, with quicker 
response times in the second-half of the task compared to the first-half. In accordance 
with our previous findings, a main effect of task was found, F(1,17) = 7.02, p < .02, η² = 
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.29, with longer response times on switch trials compared to no-switch trials, and also a 
main effect of honesty of response, F(1,17) = 58.43, p < .001, η² = .77, with longer 
response times on lie trials compared to truth trials. No significant interaction between the 
honesty of response and task was found, F(1,17) = 0.02, p = .89, η² = .001. Simple main 
effects analyses, however, found that response times were longer on switch trials 
compared to no-switch trials only when participants told the truth, F(1,17) = 18.03, p < 
.001, η² = .51, and not when they told a lie, F(1,17) = 2.59, p = .13, η² = .13. Practice was 
not found to interact with either honesty of response, F(1,17) = 1.09, p = .31, η² = .06, or 
task, F(1,17) =.13, p = .73, η² = .01. The potential 3-way interaction between the factors 
was also not significant, F(1,17) = .04, p = .84, η² = .01. 
Figure 12. Response times of Experiment 6 as a function of task and honesty. Note: Error 
bars are standard error. 
 
600	  
700	  
800	  
900	  
1000	  
1100	  
No	  Switch	   Switch	  
Re
sp
on
se
	  T
im
e	  
(m
s)
	  
Truth	  Lie	  
CHAPTER 3 
Task Switching 
 
 
120 
Figure 13. Response times of Experiment 6 as a function of task, practice and honesty. 
Note: Error bars are standard error. 
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Following our re-analysis of Experiments 1-4, whereby switching between lying and 
telling the truth was found to incur a response time cost compared to consistently 
responding in one manner, Experiment 6 was designed specifically to examine task-
switching and lying. In support of the cognitive load explanation of deception, it took 
longer for participants to respond falsely compared to responding truthfully. This 
difference remained on both switch and no-switch trials. In accordance with our previous 
findings, longer response times were shown on switch trials compared to no-switch trials, 
with a greater increase shown when participants switched from lying to telling the truth 
than vice versa. 
Since participants performed the same tasks repeatedly over many trials, we also 
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claimed that it is easier to reinstate a particular task-set if that task has recently been 
performed. We demonstrated, however, no reduction in switch costs over the course of 
the task, suggesting that repeated performance did not diminish the task-switching effect. 
Interestingly, the generic response time difference between lying and telling the truth was 
also found to withstand repeated responding. 
General Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether switching between lying and 
telling the truth requires additional processing compared to consistently responding in 
one manner. Although previous research has shown that switching between different 
tasks incurs a response time cost (Monsell, 2003), the phenomenon of task-switching has 
not been directly investigated in relation to the additional cognitive processes occurring 
when individuals lie. If switching between lying and telling the truth are indeed linked to 
different response- or task-sets, then we would expect switching between the two to incur 
a response time cost, a finding which has both practical and theoretical applications. 
Therefore, data from four previous experiments were analysed and a fifth experiment was 
conducted to examine whether switching between telling a lie and telling the truth results 
in longer response times compared to responding in the same manner consecutively. 
Trials were divided into those where participants had to switch from telling a lie to telling 
the truth and vice versa (switch trials) and those where participants responded with the 
same response-type as on the previous trial (no-switch trials).  
Overall, all five experiments showed that switching between response types 
increased response times compared to consistently responding truthfully. The findings in 
relation to telling a lie, however, were more complex. Namely, Experiments 1 and 3 
found that response times were also longer on lie switch trials compared to lie no-switch 
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trials, whereas Experiments 2, 4 and 6 found little difference between the two conditions. 
Possible reasons for this, and the implications of these findings, are discussed in more 
detail below. This suggests that task-switching may contribute to, but is not a necessary 
component of, the additional processing seen when individuals lie compared to when they 
tell the truth.  
Both Rogers and Monsell (1995) and Allport et al (1994) have attempted to explain 
why switching between different tasks takes longer than repeating the same task again. 
Although their explanations for these switch costs differ, namely whether they are due to 
reconfiguration of task-set parameters or resolving interference from the previous task, 
this switch cost fundamentally occurs when two sequential tasks involve different task-
sets. The original premise of this study was that the additional processes suggested to be 
involved in telling a lie may result in this response type also being associated with a 
different task-set compared to responding honestly. As previous research has repeatedly 
demonstrated that switching between differential task-sets incurs a response time cost, 
our findings of longer response times when individuals switch between telling a lie and 
telling the truth suggest that both of these response types invoke a different task-set.  
Interference vs reconfiguration 
Our task was not designed to distinguish between the interference (Allport et al, 
1994) and reconfiguration (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) explanations. Nonetheless, our 
results appear more consistent with an interference approach to switch costs, as we 
describe below. 
At the beginning of each trial, participants were shown the word LIE or TRUTH as 
their task instruction. They then had to press either the L key or the T key, and it was not 
until participants had pressed this key that the trial continued and the word was replaced 
CHAPTER 3 
Task Switching 
 
 
123 
with a coloured square. Participants should therefore have had sufficient time to perform 
any necessary reconfiguration processes and update task parameters for the upcoming 
task (either telling a lie or telling the truth). If reconfiguration was the sole determiner of 
switch cost, the preparation time should have been sufficient to allow the reconfiguration 
to take place. Instead, we observed persistent switch costs across all of the experiments. 
This suggests that a previous task-set (e.g., telling a lie) remains active and then interferes 
with upcoming task requirements. 
Our findings in this regard are consistent with other researchers who have identified 
a residual switch cost even when preparation intervals are provided (Altmann, 2002; 
Logan & Bundesen, 2003). Consequently, the reconfiguration view has been modified to 
include a two-stage process (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubenstein, 
Meyer & Evans, 2001). This model suggests that endogenous preparation for the 
upcoming task can be undertaken before a stimulus is actually presented, and then 
continues with the activation of specific task rules once a stimulus has been shown.  
Further explanations for the presence of a residual switch cost are provided by De 
Jong (2000), who suggested that they may be due to participants’ failure to engage in 
preparation when provided with the opportunity. This explanation also applies to our task. 
On certain trials participants may choose to engage in preparation and complete 
reconfiguration processes, while on other trials they may fail to complete these processes 
prior to the stimulus being presented. The residual switch cost is merely the average of 
trials where reconfiguration has been completed combined with those where 
reconfiguration has not been completed. Indeed, residual switch costs are not always 
shown in the task-switching literature (Gillbert & Shallice, 2002; Meiran, 1996; 
Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck & Demanet, 2007).  
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Truth as a default  
Although we found general response time costs associated with task-switching in 
our study, Experiments 2, 4 and 6 only demonstrated this cost when participants 
responded to truth trials and not when they responded to lie trials. Although a significant 
difference was found in Experiments 1 and 3 for lie trials, this was still to a lesser degree 
than that found on truth trials. This possible interaction was considered in our hypotheses 
and relates to previous findings in the task-switching literature. Namely, that switching 
from a weaker task to a more dominant task incurs a greater response time cost than 
switching from a more dominant to a weaker task (Allport et al, 1994). Allport et al. 
suggested that this effect results from a greater amount of inhibition being required to 
prevent the dominant task from being undertaken and that this inhibition then carries over 
into the following trial, where the dominant task must then be reinstated. Since we 
repeatedly found that a greater response time cost was associated with switching from 
telling a lie to telling the truth than vice versa, this suggests that telling the truth is the 
more dominant of the two response types. 
There are two alternative explanations for this finding, however, that should also be 
considered. Firstly, that a smaller difference on lie trials is due to a response time ceiling 
effect. This possibility is supported by the findings of Experiments 3 and 4 in particular, 
since lie trials that involved the additional process of choosing between multiple lie 
response possibilities (i.e., the 3-colour and 4-colour blocks) do not show a task-
switching effect, whereas those trials where only one lie possibility could be used (i.e., 
the 2-colour block) did show this effect. Since having to make a choice between multiple 
lie possibilities has been shown to increase response times compared to having only one 
lie response option (Williams, Bott, Lewis & Patrick, submitted), the task-switching 
effect may be encompassed in the longer response times already demonstrated in these 
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trials. The fact that smaller switch effects were still seen in lie trials with only one lie 
possibility compared to truth trials may also be due to the longer response times already 
shown when individuals respond falsely compared to when they respond truthfully. This 
explanation, however, does not account for the lack of a lie switch cost in Experiment 2 
where only one lie response is available.  
Secondly, if task-switching costs are indeed due to interference from the previous 
task, the extent of this interference may be related to the task-set parameters necessary for 
the two different response types. Indeed, on both no-switch and switch lie trials, the 
truthful response interferes with the production of the lie response and has to be inhibited. 
Therefore on lie trials, participants have to resolve conflict between the two response 
types both when they switch between tasks and when they perform the same task, so 
either a reduced switch-cost or no cost at all may be expected. However, on truth trials, 
the lie response may only be active and interfere with telling the truth when participants 
have previously told a lie, so a greater switch cost would occur. For these different 
possibilities to be fully evaluated, further work is required to manipulate the activation 
level of both the truth and lie response.  
In 2011, Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer and Otgaar demonstrated that the relative 
strength of the truth response was indeed malleable. In their study, participants were 
assigned to either the frequent truth, frequent lie or control condition and response time 
and error rates were examined in relation to computer presented yes-no questions. Results 
showed that the response time difference between lying and telling the truth was reduced 
in the frequent lie condition, suggesting that telling the truth becomes more difficult when 
lying is more likened to the default response-type. 
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Practice effects 
Monsell (2003) claimed that recent practice of a task makes it easier to re-enable 
that task-set. Although participants in the current study were not given the opportunity to 
explicitly practice a lie response, the quick succession of trials may lead to participants 
finding it easier to re-enable both the truthful and lie task-sets as the experiment 
progressed. Although a particular response is not practiced prior to the vocal response 
time measure, participants are aware of both the response type (whether they are going to 
lie or tell the truth) and the different colours that may be shown (i.e., red, blue or green). 
This design may result in potential practice effects; therefore this possibility was 
examined in Experiment 6.  
Two main findings of interest regarding practice effects should be considered. 
Firstly, the overall response time difference between telling a lie and telling the truth 
remained throughout the task, consistent with previous deception research (Johnson, 
Barnhardt & Zhu, 2005; Vendemia et al, 2005). Secondly, and importantly for the 
practical implications of this task-switching effect, is the finding that the longer response 
times for truth switch trials compared to truth no-switch trials remained in both halves of 
the task, potentially resulting in longer response times over the course of a questioning 
session for all individuals who respond to any question deceptively. 
Practical Applications 
 Recent research conducted by Vrij and colleagues has highlighted specific 
interview techniques that aim to increase the cognitive load that is already experienced 
when people tell a lie (Vrij et al, 2009), such as asking individuals to recall their story in 
reverse order (Vrij et al, 2008). The findings of the current study provide an additional 
interview technique that may be considered in relation to such practical situations, 
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namely the alternating of questions where individuals are likely to respond truthfully 
(such as a known biographical fact) with those where they are likely to respond 
deceptively (such as those related to an event under investigation). Indeed, we have 
shown that when individuals have to switch between lying and telling the truth compared 
to responding in the same manner consecutively, additional cognitive processes are 
occurring related to interference from the previous response and reconfiguration for the 
upcoming task. These additional cognitive processes are reliably demonstrated in 
observable behavioural differences, namely longer response times to questions.   
In addition to the basic premise that task-switching may increase the cognitive load 
experienced by liars, further factors related to this effect also have practical importance. 
Firstly, it has been suggested that the greater difficulty experienced during switch trials 
may elicit increased general arousal and greater error monitoring (Monsell, 2003), which 
would allow for a greater number of indicators and behaviours to be examined, 
potentially enhancing deception detection (Vrij et al, 2000). Secondly, the task-switching 
effect has been suggested to be increased by factors, such as anxiety, that reduce 
attentional control (Ansari, Derakshan & Richards, 2008). Thirdly, it should be 
considered that different types of lie may result in different effects, since both 
spontaneous and rehearsed lies, and lies related to autobiographical and non-
autobiographical information, have been shown to involve different cortical regions (Abe 
et al, 2006; Mameli, Mrakic-Sposta, Vergari, Fumagalli, Macis, Furrucci et al., 2010; 
Morgan, LeSage & Kosslyn, 2009). As a result, it is possible that different categories of 
lies, and even the contexts that they are told in, may be associated with different task-sets, 
rather than with a generic ‘lie’ or ‘truth’ task-set.  
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Conclusions 
Over the years, several interview strategies have been highlighted that can improve 
the discrimination of truths and lies by increasing the cognitive load that a liar 
experiences (Vrij et al, 2008). This increased level of cognitive processing results in 
behavioural differences when people lie, such as longer response times to questions 
(Walczyk et al, 2003). Although the precise mechanisms responsible for this additional 
processing are not well understood, researchers have suggested specific processes, such 
as inhibition of the truthful response, that are involved in telling a lie (Seymour et al, 
2000; Spence et al, 2001). However, the potential role of other cognitive processes in 
deceptive responding, including those associated with switching between tasks, was 
previously unclear (Christ et al, 2009).  
This study has clarified the potential role of task-switching as an additional 
cognitive process when individuals lie to certain questions and not others. Namely, that 
switching between lying and telling the truth is more difficult, and involves additional 
cognitive resources, than responding truthfully. Furthermore, since this difference was 
greater when participants switched from telling a lie to telling the truth rather than vice 
versa, this suggests that telling the truth is a more dominant cognitive task than lying. 
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CHAPTER 4  
Can The Lie Response Be Externally Influenced? 
The recent focus of research on cognitive techniques to detect deception has allowed for 
the progression of current understanding regarding the additional cognitive processes 
involved in telling lies (Christ et al, 2009; Vendemia et al, 2009; Walczyk et al, 2003). 
Theoretical considerations have generally focused on the role of truth suppression, 
generic executive control processes, and more recently, the decision to lie. Less work has 
been conducted, however, on how people construct their lie response. In this chapter, we 
examine how the lie response is chosen by manipulating the relative activation of 
particular response possibilities using priming techniques.  
Priming and telling lies 
Priming effects are well documented in psychology and involve exposing an 
individual to a particular stimulus, such as a word or image, which will then influence 
that individual’s response to a later stimulus (Tulving, Schacter & Stark, 1982). For 
example, if an individual is asked to read a list of words that involves many repetitions of 
the word table, then this enhances the likelihood that they will respond table when 
presented with the word tab in a subsequent word completion task. Such primes can be 
presented either subliminally or overtly, with subliminal primes being presented for such 
a short period of time that they are considered outside of conscious awareness (Tulving et 
al, 1982). 
 Although priming has not generally been considered in the lie detection literature, 
in 2009, Lui and Rosenfeld examined the potential use of priming as a countermeasure-
resistant lie detection technique using ERPs. In their study, participants provided 
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experimenters with the last names of five people they knew very well and also selected 
four names from a list of twenty that did not have any personal meaning to them. These 
names were used as task stimuli. Participants were then shown a series of both 
acquaintance and non-acquaintance names and had to press a yes or no button according 
to whether they knew a person by that name. Participants were instructed to respond 
truthfully to only one of the acquaintance names and to deny knowing the other four (i.e., 
to lie in response). These names were also preceded by the presentation of a subliminal 
prime displaying either an acquaintance or non-acquaintance name. It was hypothesised 
that lying would orient participants sensitivities to the familiarity of names, increasing the 
ERP difference between the primed acquaintance and primed non-acquaintance 
conditions. Although no significant difference in response time was shown when 
individuals were primed with an acquaintance name compared to a non-acquaintance 
name prior to their lie response, differences in ERP amplitude between the two conditions 
were found. Lui and Rosenfeld’s study is, as far as we are aware, the only study to 
directly examine priming effects when telling lies.  
Priming and lie response choice 
Although it is well-established in the lie detection field that additional processes are 
involved in telling a lie compared to telling the truth (Spence et al, 2001; Spence et al, 
2008), the majority of work examining these processing differences has generally focused 
on internal mechanisms related to potential inhibition of the truthful response and 
production of an alternative. How this lie response is actually chosen, however, as well as 
the factors associated with this, is less well-known. For instance, if I was asked what I 
was doing at home yesterday, what is it that leads me to choose watching TV rather than 
reading a magazine when telling a lie? Both could be potentially plausible responses. One 
possibility is that the choice of lie response is based on cognitive demands, with the final 
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option chosen being the least cognitively demanding and plausible possibility. Since liars 
are already under a higher degree of cognitive load to ensure they appear believable (Vrij 
et al, 2011), it is intuitive that they may choose the least challenging potential option as a 
lie response.  
If the least cognitively challenging lie is indeed the one that is chosen as the 
response, then it may be possible to influence this response choice process through the 
external presentation of primes that are potential lie responses. Such a method would 
enhance the relative activation of one particular lie response compared to any other, and 
lead to an individual using this prime as their lie response.   
Lie construction processes 
There has been surprisingly little research conducted on how people choose which 
lie to use. The majority of discussions of deceptive cognition acknowledge that additional 
processes are required in the construction of an alternative, plausible lie response, but 
precisely how this response is chosen is not known. For example, the Activation Decision 
Construction Model (ADCM; Walczyk et al, 2003; 2005) highlights lie construction 
processes as a major contributory factor to the longer response times shown by liars.  
According to the ADCM, once a decision has been made to lie to a question and the 
truthful response suppressed, a suitably plausible lie must be constructed. The truth is 
considered to provide a retrieval cue which aids lie construction through the activation of 
related information in semantic and episodic memory systems. The choice of which 
information to use when considering potential lie responses is thought to be constrained 
by the social context, since certain lies may be implausible, inconsistent with previous 
responses or will fail to achieve the goals of the liar (DePaulo et al, 1996; Ekman et al, 
1999; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Following this process, the model claims that the chosen lie 
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is a reflection of the relative activation of possible responses, with the most active lie 
possibility in working memory being disclosed as the response (see Kintsch, 1998).  
The extent that lie response choice represents an active or passive process is not 
considered by the ADCM. Namely, is the response chosen a relatively automatic and 
passive process? Or are possible responses actively and carefully considered before a 
final response is chosen? If the first option, then it is theoretically possible to influence 
the lie response that an individual chooses through the manipulation of relative activation 
levels of particular responses. Since the truth is generally considered the default 
communicative response (Grice, 1989) and is likely to have the strongest association with 
the question that is asked, this information should provide the most active response 
possibility. When telling a lie, suppression processes are required to prevent this truthful 
response from being uttered (Walczyk et al, 2003). Following this, the lie response will 
be the strongest competing alternative. If one particular lie response is made considerably 
more active than another, for example through the use of priming techniques, then this 
response may be the most likely to be used when telling a lie. Alternatively, if lies are 
more actively and carefully considered when deciding on a possible response, then the 
relative activation of particular lies may be irrelevant when a number of plausible and 
suitable responses are possible, since each lie may be actively considered and decided 
between.  
A final point to be considered in relation to the processes involved in lie creation is 
the potential necessity to suppress the truthful response. Although several studies and 
theoretical discussions claim that suppression of the truth is a necessary process when 
telling a lie (Christ et al, 2009; Vendemia et al, 2009; Walczyk et al, 2003), Verschuere et 
al (2010) suggest that the extent that the truth is a default response, and hence the 
necessity to inhibit it, is affected by the relative frequency with which individuals tell lies. 
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If the strength of the truthful response is indeed malleable, then it is possible that the 
external activation of potential lie responses may reduce the relative strength of the truth 
response in comparison to the lie response, and similarly negate the requirement to 
suppress it, since the externally presented lie response may already be the strongest 
response option. Alternatively, the truth may remain the strongest response option, and 
thus still require additional suppression, with the externally activated lie response simply 
being the strongest possible response option following the truth.  
The potential effect that priming a lie response has on the cognitive processes 
involved in telling a lie could mirror those involved in rehearsed and spontaneous lies. 
For instance, if a lie has been rehearsed, it may form the strongest association with the 
question and thus, negate the need to suppress the truthful response. If a lie has not been 
rehearsed, however, truthful information is likely to have the strongest association with 
the question, and thus will need to be suppressed in order to tell a lie. Since unrehearsed 
lies have been suggested to be more cognitively demanding, seen in longer response 
times to questions (DePaulo et al, 2003), this is likely to be due to both the necessity to 
choose a lie response and also to suppress truthful information. Providing a potential lie 
response may similarly reduce the response time for liars due to the removal of both of 
these processes, resulting in a much smaller difference, if any at all, between liars and 
truth tellers.   
The Current Study 
The aim of this chapter was to expand current knowledge of lie construction processes by 
manipulating the relative activation of potential lie response options. Two experiments 
were conducted that were designed to externally activate particular lie responses when 
individuals lied or told the truth. 
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Participants completed the same colour-naming task described in the previous 
chapters. They saw a square presented on the screen and had to truthfully describe the 
colour or lie about it. The difference was that in this task, participants were presented 
with a masked colour word prior to the coloured square presented on the screen. The 
colour words were primes and we expected the primes to interact with the lie response. 
There were three types of prime trials. First, correct prime trials provided participants 
with a legitimate response for the trial. Hence, when participants had to name the colour 
of the square truthfully, the prime word provided the correct colour, and when the 
participant had to lie, the prime word gave a possible lie response. Second, incorrect 
primes provided participants with an illegitimate response. When participants had to 
truthfully name the coloured square, the prime was of an incorrect colour, and when a lie 
was required, the prime was of the correct colour. Finally, there was a no-prime condition 
which involved the presentation of only the mask prior to the square (no colour word was 
presented). 
Experiment 7 
Experiment 7 examined the ADCM predictions regarding how a lie response is chosen 
from memory. As discussed previously, the ADCM predicts that the lie response chosen 
is the most active in working memory. If this is the case, participants primed with 
plausible lie responses should choose the same colour as the correct prime for their lie 
response significantly more often than choosing a different colour to the correct prime.  
In order to test this hypothesis, participants completed a computer task whereby 
they were instructed to lie or tell the truth regarding the colour of a square shown on a 
computer screen (red, green or blue). A series of correct, incorrect or blank primes were 
presented prior to the square being shown. For correct and incorrect prime trials, these 
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primes consisted of the word RED, GREEN or BLUE. Some of these primes were 
presented for 100ms, and were considered our high visibility primes, whereas others were 
presented for only 40ms, and were considered our low visibility primes. It was considered 
that if primes required more active processing in order to be regarded as a potential lie 
response (and hence required more time to be processed), participants would use correct 
high visibility primes as their lie response more often than low visibility primes. 
In addition to examining participant response choice on each trial, we also 
measured and analysed response time. This allowed us to measure whether the prime is 
processed, and hence active, in working memory. If a response time difference is shown 
between prime and no-prime trials, this suggests that the prime is either aiding or 
interfering with lie response processes (depending on the direction of the difference), and 
is therefore not merely being ignored by participants.   
Method 
Participants 
Nineteen university students participated in the study in exchange for payment. Of 
these, 13 were female. Participants had an average age of 21.89 (SD = 2.98; Range = 20-
30) and spoke English as their first language. 
Design 
A 2 x 5 within subjects design was utilised, with honesty of response (truth vs. lie) 
and prime type (no-prime vs. low visibility correct prime vs. high visibility correct prime 
vs. low visibility incorrect prime vs. high visibility incorrect prime) as within-subject 
factors. The main task consisted of a total of 360 trials, with half of these instructing 
participants to tell the truth and half of these instructing participants to lie. In each 
CHAPTER 4 
Influencing the Lie Response 
 
 
136 
honesty condition, there were 60 no-prime trials, 60 correct primes (30 low visibility and 
30 high visibility) and 60 incorrect primes (30 low visibility and 30 high visibility). Since 
the no-prime condition just presented a blank screen between the forward and backward 
masks, it did not contain correct and incorrect primes. The colour of the prime (red, green 
or blue) and the colour of the square (red, green or blue) were counterbalanced within the 
task. The order of trials was randomly controlled by the computer. 
Procedure 
On each trial, participants were shown either the word LIE or TRUTH in the centre 
of the screen. Participants were instructed to press the ‘L’ key if the word ‘LIE’ was 
shown and the ‘T’ key if the word ‘TRUTH’ was shown. The prime-mask stimuli then 
appeared on the screen. This involved the presentation of ‘####’ in the centre of the 
screen for a 200ms period, followed immediately with either a word (BLUE, GREEN or 
RED) in the low visibility and high visibility prime conditions or a blank screen in the no 
prime condition. In the low visibility and no prime condition, this stimuli was displayed 
for a period of 40 ms. In the high visibility prime condition this stimuli was displayed for 
100 ms. This stimuli was immediately followed by the presentation of a backward mask, 
‘####’. The stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) for all three prime types was 140 ms, 
therefore the backward mask was shown for 40 ms in the high visibility prime condition 
and for 100 ms in the low visibility and no prime condition. A coloured square was then 
displayed in the centre of the screen (blue, green or red) and participants either lied about 
the colour of the square by claiming it was one of the opposite colours (e.g. blue or green 
if the square was red) or told the truth about the colour of the square according to the 
instruction at the start of the trial. Prior to the main task participants completed a short 
practice trial consisting of 12 trials which were identical to the main trials. After every 
150 trials participants were given the option of pausing the task for a short period of time.  
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Results 
Response time outliers were defined as response times over two seconds in length. There 
were 67 in total and these were removed from the analysis and coded as missing data. 
Inaccurate responses (270) were also removed from the analysis. There were 92 
inaccurate responses in the correct prime condition, 96 in the incorrect prime condition 
and 82 in the no-prime condition. In total, 337 out of 6,840 data points were removed 
from the analysis, amounting to 3% of all trials. 
Response Choice 
Trials where individuals were instructed to lie and were provided with a correct 
prime were analysed separately to examine whether participants used the prime as their 
lie response. A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with response choice (same as 
the prime vs. different to the prime) and prime visibility (high vs. low) as the within-
subject factors and the number of responses as the dependent measure. This resulted in 4 
conditions; (1) participants chose the same answer as the high visibility prime (HV-S; M: 
14.42, SD: 3.80), (2) participants chose a different answer to the high visibility prime 
(HV-D; M: 15.58, SD: 3.80), (3) participants chose the same answer as the low visibility 
prime (LV-S; M: 15.58, SD: 3.02), (4) participants chose a different answer to the low 
visibility prime (LV-D; M: 14.42, SD: 3.02). These 4 conditions are highlighted in Figure 
14. No effect of response choice was shown, F(1,18) = 0.01, p = .99, η² = 0.001, CI = [-
2.12, 2.12], and this was not affected by prime visibility, F(1,18) = 0.92, p = .35, η² = 
0.05, CI = [12.59, 17.41].   
Paired sample t-tests were also conducted to test the hypothesis that participants 
would use the prime as their answer more often than not. This hypothesis was not 
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supported in either the low visibility, t(18) = 0.83, p = 0.41, CI = [-1.76, 4.07] or the high 
visibility condition,  t(18) = 0.66, p = 0.52, CI = [-4.82, 2.51].  
Figure 14. Number of responses for correct prime lie trials in Experiment 7 as a function 
of prime visibility and response choice. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
For this experiment, the proportion of responses where individuals used the prime 
as their chosen response on correct lie trials was calculated for each participant. These are 
shown in Figure 15. Since participants had a choice of two possible lie responses, there 
was a 50% probability that individuals would use either response merely by chance. A 
one-sample t-test was conducted to examine whether the proportion of ‘same as prime’ 
responses significantly differed from this 50% threshold. No significant differences were 
demonstrated, t(18) = 0.031, p = 0.98, CI = [-3.53, 3.63].  
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Figure 15. Percentage of responses the same as the prime on correct lie trials according to 
participant in Experiment 7. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
In summary, we found no evidence that the prime affected lie response choice. This 
finding conflicts with the predictions of the ADCM. In the next section we consider 
whether the prime had any effect on response time. 
Response Times 
To examine whether response times were faster when participants were provided 
with a correct prime compared to no-prime, a repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted 
with honesty of response (lie vs. truth) and correct prime type (no-prime vs. low visibility 
correct prime vs. high visibility correct prime) as within-subject factors. Response time 
was the dependent measure. This resulted in 6 conditions; (1) no-prime lie trials (NP-L; 
M: 789.34, SD: 156.33), (2) low visibility correct prime lie trials (LVC-L; M: 794.15, SD: 
158.30), (3) high visibility correct prime lie trials (HVC-L; M: 844.92, SD: 197.25), (4) 
no-prime truth trials (NP-T; M: 686.20, SD: 93.34), (5) low visibility correct prime truth 
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trials (LVC-T; M: 692.92, SD: 119.93), (6) high visibility correct prime truth trials (HVC-
T; M: 705.30, SD: 116.76). Figure 16 shows the mean response time in all possible cells. 
As found in our previous work, a main effect of honesty of response was shown, with 
participants taking longer when lying compared to telling the truth, F(1,18) = 33.99, p < 
.001, η² = 0.65. A main effect of prime type was also demonstrated, F(2,17) = 6.63, p < 
.01, η² = 0.44, with the longest response times shown on high visibility prime trials. No 
interaction was demonstrated between the two factors, F(2,17) = 2.34, p = .13, η² = 0.22.  
To examine whether response times were significantly longer when participants 
were provided with an incorrect prime compared to no-prime, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA was also conducted with honesty of response (lie vs. truth) and incorrect prime 
type (no-prime vs. low visibility correct prime vs. high visibility correct prime) as within-
subject factors and response time as the dependant measure. This resulted in 6 conditions; 
(1) no-prime lie trials (NP-L; M: 789.34, SD: 156.33), (2) low visibility incorrect prime 
lie trials (LVI-L; M: 778.38, SD: 174.72), (3) high visibility incorrect prime lie trials 
(HVI-L; M: 804.25, SD: 159.44), (4) no-prime truth trials (NP-T; M: 686.20, SD: 93.34), 
(5) low visibility incorrect prime truth trials (LVI-T; M: 725.95, SD: 99.64), (6) high 
visibility incorrect prime truth trials (HVI-T; M: 805.42, SD: 139.76). Figure 16 shows 
the mean response time in all possible cells. Once again, a main effect of honesty of 
response was shown, with telling a lie taking longer than telling the truth, F(1,18) = 7.72, 
p < .02, η² = 0.30. A main effect of prime type was also demonstrated, F(2,17) = 8.93, p < 
.005, η² = 0.51, with longer response times for incorrect prime trials compared to no-
prime trials. An interaction was also found between the two factors, F(2,17) = 11.39, p < 
.002, η² = 0.57, such that there were no significant response time differences between any 
of the prime conditions when participants told a lie, F(2,17) = 1.38, p = 0.28, η² = 0.14, 
CI = [-50.75, 20.92], whereas response times were significantly slower in both the high 
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visibility incorrect prime and the low visibility incorrect prime condition compared to the 
no-prime condition when participants told the truth, F(2,17) = 15.95, p < .001, η² = 0.65. 
In addition, lying was found to take longer than telling the truth in the no-prime 
condition, F(1,18) = 31.95, p < .001, η² = 0.64, but not in either the low visibility 
incorrect prime condition, F(1,18) = 3.44, p = .08, η² = 0.16, CI = [-6.99, 111.87], or the 
high visibility incorrect prime condition, F(1,18) = 0.004, p = .95, η² < 0.001, CI = [-
40.11, 37.77]. 
Figure 16. Response times for Experiment 7 as a function of prime condition and 
honesty. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
 In summary, we found response time differences between prime and no-prime 
trials, suggesting that the prime is being processed, and is therefore active, in working 
memory. When participants were provided with a correct prime response, longer response 
times were found for high visibility prime trials compared to no-prime trials, suggesting 
that such primes are slowing the production of lie and truth responses. When participants 
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were provided with an incorrect prime response, both the low visibility and high visibility 
incorrect primes were found to slow response times when participants responded 
truthfully. This suggests that incorrect primes interfere with the production of a truthful 
response.  
Response time on correct prime lie trials 
In order to examine whether using the correct prime as a lie response decreased the 
required cognitive processing, response times were further examined on correct prime lie 
trials according to whether participants used the prime as their chosen response or not. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with response choice (same as the prime vs. 
different to the prime) and prime visibility (low vs. high) as the within-subject factors and 
response time as the dependent measure. This resulted in 4 conditions; (1) participants 
chose the same answer as the high visibility prime (HV-S; M: 872.51, SD: 207.12), (2) 
participants chose a different answer to the high visibility prime (HV-D; M: 816.04, SD: 
196.93), (3) participants chose the same answer as the low visibility prime (LV-S; M: 
804.35, SD: 180.12), (4) participants chose a different answer to the low visibility prime 
(LV-D; M: 787.69, SD: 145.32). Figure 17 shows the mean response time for all possible 
cells. A significant main effect of prime visibility was found, with longer response times 
for high visibility compared to low visibility prime trials, F(1,18) = 10.46, p < .005, η² = 
0.37, and also response choice, with longer response times when participants chose a 
response the same as the prime compared to different to the prime, F(1,18) = 11.69, p < 
.005, η² = 0.39. The interaction between the two factors was not significant however, 
F(1,18) = 1.95, p = .180, η² = 0.098.  
In summary, when participants use the same response as the correct prime when 
lying, it takes them longer to respond than if they use a different response. Participants 
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also take longer to respond when the prime is shown for a longer period of time (100ms) 
compared to when it is shown for a shorter period of time (40ms), suggesting that 
increasing the length of prime exposure increases the degree to which the prime is active, 
and hence interferes, with working memory processing. 
Figure 17. Response times for Experiment 7 as a function of response choice and prime 
visibility. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
 
Discussion 
If, as the ADCM predicts, it is the most active lie possibility that is used in response to a 
question, then it may be possible to externally influence the lie response that is used. 
Experiment 7 examined whether it was possible to manipulate the lie response that is 
chosen. The aim of this experiment was to examine whether the process of lie response 
choice is influenced by the relative activation level of particular lie possibilities. Our 
results, relating to both lie response choice and response time, failed to support the 
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possibility that lie responses can be externally influenced or the cognitive processes 
associated with lie construction reduced.  
When provided with potential lie response primes, participants did not use these 
primes as their lie response any more than would be expected by chance. Similarly, 
providing correct lie primes failed to make lying any easier, with response time 
differences actually suggesting the opposite. Indeed, when participants used the correct 
prime as their lie response, they actually took longer to respond than when they used a 
different response to the prime. These findings suggest that not only do participants 
appear to disregard the correct prime when choosing a lie response, but that using the 
prime increases the time required for lying and hence, actually interferes with the 
cognitive processes involved in telling a lie. One possible explanation for this finding 
may be that when participants were shown a correct prime, they associated this with the 
colour of the upcoming square which they were describing and thus categorised it as a 
response option that was not to be used when telling a lie. This would explain the longer 
response times on correct prime lie trials when the same response as the prime is used, 
since it may be necessary to over-ride any previously applied response inhibition 
processes in order to use this response.  
In relation to general processing differences between lying and telling the truth, as 
has been shown in previous studies, telling a lie was found to take longer than telling the 
truth in all conditions except when incorrect primes were presented. The presentation of 
incorrect primes increased response times when individuals told the truth, likely due to 
the requirement to suppress an untruthful and incorrect response, which in turn reduced 
the response time difference between lying and truth telling. Since participants already 
had to suppress the truthful, and hence incorrect, response whenever they told a lie, no 
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additional processing was required in the incorrect prime condition compared to the no-
prime condition.  
Experiment 8 
Following on from Experiment 7, we conducted a second experiment with a greater 
choice of colours for participants to choose between. Since participants in our first two 
experiments only had a choice of two possible response options on lie trials, it may be 
that this reduced the effectiveness of the prime. By increasing the number of lie response 
possibilities that participants could choose between, the following could be examined. 
Namely, whether a wider response choice reduces or increases participants’ use of the 
correct prime as their lie response.  
If the correct prime is associated with truthful information, it may have only been 
used in the previous experiments to enhance variation in the responses that were given. 
When a greater number of responses are available to choose between, there are already 
multiple alternative options for participants to viably use, potentially reducing the 
likelihood that the prime will be considered as a plausible response option. Alternatively, 
since the choice between response options was a minimal one, participants may not have 
found the task cognitively challenging enough to focus on and utilise any visual aids that 
were provided, since they had sufficient time and resources to actively consider which lie 
response to use out of the two possibilities. By increasing the number of response 
options, the task of choosing between response possibilities may become more 
demanding, and as such, participants may rely to a greater extent on previously primed 
information (i.e., relative activation levels) when responding in time pressured 
environments. In order to examine these possibilities, the number of masked colour words 
was increased from three to five (red, blue, green, yellow or purple) and the potential 
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colour of the square was also increased from three to five (red, blue, green, yellow or 
purple).  
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-one undergraduate psychology students volunteered for this study in 
exchange for course credit. Of these, 19 were female. Participants had a mean age of 
18.81 (SD = 0.60; Range = 18-20) and spoke English as their first language. 
Design and Procedure 
Apart from the addition of an increased number of colours for both the prime (RED, 
BLUE, GREEN, YELLOW or PURPLE) and the square (red, blue, green, yellow or 
purple), all aspects of the procedure remained identical to Experiment 7.  
Results 
Response time outliers were removed from the analysis. There were 428 in total. 
Inaccurate responses (179) were also removed from the analysis. On lie trials, there were 
20 inaccurate responses in the correct prime condition, 36 in the incorrect prime condition 
and 37 in the no-prime condition. On truth trials, there were 27 in the correct prime 
condition, 24 in the incorrect prime condition and 35 in the no-prime condition. In total, 
607 out of 7,560 data points were removed from the analysis, amounting to 8% of all 
trials. 
Response Choice 
Trials where individuals were instructed to lie and were provided with a correct 
prime were analysed separately to examine whether participants used the prime as their 
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lie response. A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with response choice (same as 
the prime vs. different to the prime) and prime visibility (high vs. low) as the within-
subject factors and the number of responses as the dependent measure. This resulted in 4 
conditions; (1) participants chose the same answer as the high visibility prime (HV-S; M: 
12.29, SD: 5.16), (2) participants chose a different answer to the high visibility prime 
(HV-D; M: 18.76, SD: 5.17), (3) participants chose the same answer as the low visibility 
prime (LV-S; M: 10.05, SD: 3.23), (4) participants chose a different answer to the low 
visibility prime (LV-D; M: 21.09, SD: 3.42). These 4 conditions are highlighted in Figure 
18. 
 Figure 18. Number of responses for correct prime lie trials in Experiment 8 as a function 
of prime visibility and response choice. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
 
Results demonstrated a main effect of response choice, with participants using a 
response different to the prime more often than the same as the prime, F(1,20) = 25.49, p 
< .001, η² = 0.56. No significant effect of prime visibility was shown, F(1,20) = 0.96, p = 
.76, η² = 0.005, CI = [-0.273, 0.369], but the interaction between the two factors was 
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significant, F(1,20) = 10.14, p < .005, η² = 0.34. Simple effects tests demonstrated that 
participants used the same response as the prime to a greater degree on high visibility 
prime trials compared to low visibility prime trials, F(1,20) = 8.63, p < .01, η² = 0.80, 
whereas participants used a different response to the prime more often on low visibility 
prime trials compared to high visibility prime trials, F(1,20) = 10.96, p < .005, η² = 0.88. 
These tests further showed that participants used a response different to the prime more 
often than the same as the prime on both high visibility, F(1,20) = 8.36, p < .01, η² = 
0.29, and low visibility trials, F(1,20) = 59.96, p < .001, η² = 0.75. Paired sample t-tests 
were also conducted to examine whether participants used the prime as their answer more 
than they used an answer different to the prime. This showed that participants used an 
answer different to the prime more than the same as the prime in both the low visibility, 
t(20) = 7.74, p < .001 and high visibility condition,  t(20) = 2.89, p < .01. 
The proportion of responses where individuals used an answer the same as the 
prime was also calculated according to each participant (Figure 19). Since participants 
had a choice of four possible lie responses, there was a 25% chance that individuals 
would use a response the same as the prime by chance alone. A one-sample t-test was 
conducted to examine whether the proportion of ‘same’ responses significantly differed 
from this 25% threshold. It was demonstrated that, overall, individuals used a response 
the same as the prime significantly more than would be expected by chance, t(20) = 3.70, 
p < .001.  
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Figure 19. Percentage of responses the same as the prime on correct lie trials according to 
participant in Experiment 8. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
In summary, we found that participants in this experiment used the prime as their 
lie response more than would be expected by chance alone. The length of time that 
participants were exposed to the prime was also found to have an effect, with participants 
more likely to use the prime when it was shown for a longer period of time (100ms).  
Previous responses and lie response choice  
In addition to the presented primes, the answer that was used in response to a 
previous trial may also effect the relative activation of particular response possibilities, 
and hence influence subsequent lie response choice. In order to examine the potential 
influence of this factor, paired sample t-tests were conducted that compared the actual lie 
response used with both the colour of the square in the previous trial and the vocal 
response used in the previous trial. This demonstrated that participants used more lie 
responses that were different to the colour of the previous square, (M = 157.05, SD = 
19.05), than were the same as the colour of the previous square, (M = 33.19, SD = 18.05), 
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t(20) = 15.38, p < 0.005, and also that participants used more lie responses that were 
different to the response used in the previous trial, (M = 135.43, SD = 42.15), than were 
the same as the response used in the previous trial, (M = 54.81, SD = 41.84), t(20) = 4.40, 
p < .005. This shows that colours encountered and used in the previous trial are no more 
likely to be used as the lie response.  
To further examine how people may choose their lie response, the particular colours 
that participants used when telling a lie were examined in more detail. Since all five 
colours were presented as stimuli an equal number of times throughout the task, all 
colours should be equally active in memory systems. Despite this, participants 
demonstrated differences in the extent that particular colours were used as a lie response. 
The mean number of times that each colour was used as a lie response was calculated for 
the task and demonstrated that red (M = 50.14, SD = 22.22), blue (M = 44.0, SD = 17.84) 
and green (M = 49.14, SD = 19.59) were most commonly used as a lie response, with 
yellow (M = 28.71, SD = 14.51) and purple (M = 18.33, SD = 10.07) used significantly 
less, t(20) = 2.96, p < .01. The mean number of times that each colour was used as the lie 
response is demonstrated in Figure 20.  
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Figure 20. Mean number of lie responses as a function of colour used in response for 
Experiment 8. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
Response Times  
To examine whether response times were faster when participants were provided 
with a correct prime compared to no-prime, a repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted 
with honesty of response (lie vs. truth) and correct prime type (no-prime vs. low visibility 
correct prime vs. high visibility correct prime) as within-subject factors. Response time 
was the dependent measure. This resulted in 6 conditions; (1) no-prime lie trials (NP-L; 
M: 802.64, SD: 134.07), (2) low visibility correct prime lie trials (LVC-L; M: 817.64, SD: 
142.66), (3) high visibility correct prime lie trials (HVC-L; M: 792.99, SD: 132.53), (4) 
no-prime truth trials (NP-T; M: 704.53, SD: 122.63), (5) low visibility correct prime truth 
trials (LVC-T; M: 706.87, SD: 124.11), (6) high visibility correct prime truth trials (HVC-
T; M: 708.36, SD: 137.88). A main effect of honesty of response was found, with telling a 
lie taking longer than telling the truth, F(1,20) = 36.67, p < .001, η² = 0.65. There was no 
significant effect of correct prime type however, F(2,19) = 0.97, p = .39, η² = 0.09, CI = 
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[-28.78, 5.62], or any interaction between the two factors, F(2,19) = 1.12, p = .35, η² = 
0.10. Figure 21 shows the mean response times in all possible cells. 
To examine whether response times were significantly longer when participants 
were provided with an incorrect prime compared to no-prime, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA was also conducted with honesty of response (lie vs. truth) and incorrect prime 
type (no-prime vs. low visibility incorrect prime vs. high visibility incorrect prime) as 
within-subject factors. This resulted in 6 conditions; (1) no-prime lie trials (NP-L; M: 
802.64, SD: 134.07), (2) low visibility incorrect prime lie trials (LVI-L; M: 803.64, SD: 
131.21), (3) high visibility incorrect prime lie trials (HVI-L; M: 792.99, SD: 136.55), (4) 
no-prime truth trials (NP-T; M: 704.53, SD: 122.64), (5) low visibility incorrect prime 
truth trials (LVI-T; M: 720.38, SD: 121.40), (6) high visibility incorrect prime truth trials 
(HVI-T; M: 729.66, SD: 135.05). Figure 21 shows the mean response time in all possible 
cells. Once again, a main effect of honesty of response was shown, with telling a lie 
taking longer than telling truth, F(1,20) = 22.22, p < .001, η² = 0.53. There was no 
significant effect of incorrect prime type, F(2,19) = 0.94, p = .41, η² = 0.09, CI = [-20.49, 
19.12], but a significant interaction was found between the two factors, F(2,19) = 3.56, p 
< .05, η² = 0.27. Simple effects tests demonstrated that lying took longer than telling the 
truth in the no-prime condition, F(1,20) = 26.55, p < .001, η² = 0.57, the low visibility 
incorrect prime condition, F(1,20) = 17.87, p < .001, η² = 0.47, and the high visibility 
incorrect prime condition, F(1,20) = 10.27, p < .005, η² = 0.34. These tests also 
demonstrated that response times were longer on high visibility incorrect prime trials 
compared to no-prime trials, but only when participants told the truth, F(2,19) = 3.68, p < 
.05, η² = 0.28. 
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Figure 21. Response times for Experiment 8 as a function of prime condition and 
honesty. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
 
In summary, we found that response time differences between prime conditions in 
this experiment were not as large as in Experiment 7. The only significant finding was of 
longer response times when participants responded truthfully on high visibility incorrect 
prime trials compared to no-prime trials. This lends further support to the suggestion that 
the presentation of incorrect information interferes with the production of a truthful 
response. 
Response times on correct prime lie trials 
Response times were further examined according to whether individuals used the 
same response as the prime compared to a different response to the prime on correct 
prime lie trials. A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with response choice (same 
as prime vs. different to prime) and prime visibility (low vs. high) as the within-subject 
factors and response time as the dependent measure. This resulted in 4 conditions; (1) 
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participants chose the same answer as the high visibility prime (HV-S; M: 771.33, SD: 
151.30, (2) participants chose a different answer to the high visibility prime (HV-D; M: 
803.59, SD: 146.88), (3) participants chose the same answer as the low visibility prime 
(LV-S; M: 786.08, SD: 144.22), (4) participants chose a different answer to the low 
visibility prime (LV-D; M: 814.89, SD: 133.34). Figure 22 shows the mean response time 
for all possible cells. There was no significant effect of prime visibility, F(1,20) = 1.10, p 
= .31, η² = 0.05, CI = [-12.87, 38.92], but contrary to the findings of Experiment 7, a 
significant effect of response choice was shown in the opposite direction, with longer 
response times when participants chose a response different to the prime compared to the 
same as the prime, F(1,20) = 4.17, p = .05, η² = 0.17. There was no significant interaction 
between the two factors however, F(1,20) = 0.009, p = .93, η² < 0.001.  
Figure 22. Response times for Experiment 8 as a function of response choice and prime 
visibility. Note: Error bars are standard error. 
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In summary, our findings contrast with those of Experiment 7 that using the prime 
as your lie response takes longer than using a response different to the prime. Instead, we 
found the opposite, namely that using a response different to the prime leads to longer 
response times, suggesting that the prime aids in the production of a lie response. 
Discussion 
Experiment 8 was conducted to examine whether a greater number of response options 
increased the likelihood that participants would use the correct prime as their lie response. 
It was considered that, if the failure to use the prime when telling a lie in Experiment 7 
was due to the task not being sufficiently demanding, increasing the number of response 
options may increase the difficulty of the task. This would lead to participants paying 
greater attention to, and having a greater reliance on, previously primed information. On 
first examination, the results of this experiment do not support this possibility, since 
increasing the number of response options from two to four did not lead to participants 
using the same response as the prime more than a response different to the prime when 
telling a lie.  
Contrary to the findings of Experiment 7 however, it was also shown that 
participants used the same response as the prime significantly more than would be 
expected by chance, suggesting that the correct prime is influencing the lie response 
chosen to a certain degree. The hypothesis that providing a correct prime reduces the 
increased cognitive difficulty associated with telling lies was also supported in this 
experiment, since response times were shown to be faster when participants chose a 
response the same as the prime compared to different to the prime. Despite this however, 
response times remained longer in all conditions when participants told a lie compared to 
when they told the truth. 
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The length of time that the prime was presented for was also shown to have an 
effect on whether participants used the prime as their response. When correct primes were 
shown for a longer period of time, i.e., on high visibility prime trials, participants used the 
prime as their response more often than they did on low visibility prime trials. When 
correct primes were shown for a shorter period of time however, i.e., on low visibility 
prime trials, participants used a response different to the prime more often than on high 
visibility prime trials, suggesting that when the prime is noticeably visible to participants 
they are more likely to use it in their response. This may be due to participants paying 
greater attention to the prime on high visibility trials (due to an increased level of 
exposure) and therefore receiving a greater degree of activation relative to other response 
possibilities, thus increasing the likelihood that it will be used as the lie response.  
If high visibility primes increase the activation level of primed lie responses relative 
to low visibility primes, this suggests that consideration of the lie response involves 
active, rather than passive, processing choices, especially when combined with findings 
of faster response times when participants use the prime as their lie response. Indeed, if 
the activation and choice of response possibilities was a passive process, with participants 
just producing the most active lie response at that time, then externally increasing the 
relative activation of one response may not affect response times, since the most active lie 
in that moment would be used regardless of the presence of an external prompt. If 
response choice is a more active process, however, then possible lie responses may 
ordinarily be carefully considered and evaluated, regardless of relative activation levels. 
The need to provide a response as quickly as possible, which was required in our task, 
may negate this choice between potential lie responses when a prime has already been 
provided, leading to a reduction in response times.  
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General Discussion 
Our experiments examined whether cognitive processing differences between lies and 
truths are reduced when individuals are provided with a plausible response possibility. 
Both of these points were examined in relation to the claims of the ADCM, which 
considers that it is the most active lies in memory systems that are used as the response 
when individuals tell a lie. A priming methodology was used that allowed for the external 
activation of possible lie responses when participants lied and told the truth regarding the 
colour of a square. 
Our first hypothesis concerned lie response choice, and considered that if the lie 
response used is the most active response following the truth, then participants would use 
the prime as their lie response when primed with a correct lie possibility more than would 
be expected by chance. This hypothesis was partially supported. Although in Experiment 
7, participants did not use the correct prime as their lie response more than chance, when 
the number of overall response possibilities was increased in Experiment 8, participants 
did use the prime as their response at greater than chance levels. In relation to our second 
hypothesis, response times were examined when individuals lied using the same response 
as the prime compared to using a different response to the prime. This allowed us to 
examine whether using the prime as a lie response reduced the cognitive processes 
required to tell a lie relative to telling the truth. Since choosing a lie response out of 
multiple possibilities has been shown to contribute to the longer response times required 
to tell a lie (see Chapter 2), we hypothesised that priming a particular lie response may 
negate, or at least reduce, the cognitive processing required when lying. From this, we 
would expect faster response times when participants use the prime as their lie response 
compared to when they use a different response. Once again, this hypothesis was partially 
supported, although converse findings were demonstrated across our experiments. In 
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Experiment 7, contrary to our hypothesis, response times were shown to be longer when 
participants used the prime as their lie response, whereas in Experiment 8, response times 
were shown to be faster when participants used the prime as their lie response compared 
to when they used a different response.  
Lie response choice and task difficulty 
The results of our experiments demonstrate that externally activating a particular lie 
response does not necessarily lead to this lie being used as the question answer. This 
finding conflicts with the claim of the ADCM that it is the most active, plausible lie that 
is used as a response. If this were the case, we would expect participants to consistently 
use the same lie response as the prime significantly more than using a different response, 
since this colour should be the most active following the truth. Our finding that 
participants use the prime as their response more than chance in Experiment 8, but not in 
Experiment 7, suggests that prime utilisation is related to the number of response options 
that are available to use when lying.  
One possibility that explains our response choice results is that an increased number 
of response options increases the difficulty of the task, since there are more response 
options that can be considered. When participants are primed with correct lie responses in 
the first experiment, there is only one other alternative lie response available in addition 
to the prime, whereas in Experiment 8, there are multiple alternative possibilities. If 
participants initially link the prime with truthful information (since it is shown prior to 
the actual colour of the square) and suppress it accordingly, the only remaining response 
possibility in Experiment 7 is likely to be actively considered. If participants choose to 
use this alternative colour as their response, they must simply produce their answer. If, 
however, the participant considers that the prime word can also be used as a lie response 
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and subsequently decides to use it as their answer, the initial suppression that was 
instigated when this response was linked to truthful information has to be over-ridden. 
This additional process would explain the longer response times in Experiment 7 when 
participants use the prime as their lie. Additionally, the response time cost incurred also 
explains why participants do not use the prime as their response more than chance, since 
it is less efficient to do so. In Experiment 8, however, the increased number of response 
options may result in a more active and careful consideration of lie possibilities when 
choosing how to respond, thus increasing the cognitive demand associated with lying in 
this task. In order to reduce this demand, it may be more efficient for participants to over-
ride any association that the prime has with truthful information, than to choose between 
the multiple lie possibilities that are permitted, resulting in participants utilising the 
primed lie response. This would explain why participants show faster response times 
when they use the same response as the prime compared to a different response in 
Experiment 8, since using the prime is less cognitively challenging than choosing an 
alternative lie option. This relative ease would also explain why participants use the 
prime as their response significantly more than chance, since it is more cognitively 
efficient to do so when completing a challenging task. If this explanation is indeed 
correct, then it provides further support for our previous finding that the choice between 
lie response possibilities independently contributes to the greater time required to lie, 
even when very simple lie responses are used (see Chapter 2). 
Lie response choice and the truth 
The possibility that the correct prime is initially considered as truthful information, 
and hence avoided as such, enables a consideration of what may represent truthful 
information in such cognitive tasks. Since the prime and the square were presented one 
following the other, both stimuli may have been processed and stored together as part of a 
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‘truthful response set’. As a result, the prime may not have been considered when 
individuals generated an alternative answer. This process could be considered as ‘truth by 
association.’ In order to be more efficient in their response, participants may have 
suppressed the most active colours in working memory and chosen the least active 
alternative, since this may have been less likely to be considered as truthful information. 
Consequently, participants in this task may be defining the truth as one of the most active 
responses. This seems a plausible explanation considering that some of our primes related 
to correct possible responses whereas others related to incorrect responses (i.e., the truth 
on lie trials and potential lies on truth trials). From this, participants may not expect all 
primes to provide a correct lie response on lie trials. Conversely, it should also be 
considered that incoming information provided by external sources may be stored as 
truthful by default, since we more often encounter truthful information than false 
information in daily life. This could result in any externally cued information being 
neglected when participants generate the simple lies required in our experiments.  
If an individual’s lie response is not affected by external cues from the 
environment, how exactly do people generate a lie response? One possibility is that the 
level of activation of a particular lie response is determined by factors internal to 
individual participants. In this way, an individual may utilise a specific schema to create 
their lie. This schema may have been activated when the truthful response was retrieved. 
Indeed, the ADCM claims that when the truth is activated in long-term memory, 
additional information linked to this memory also becomes active. When considering lie-
telling in more applied paradigms, researchers such as Vrij (2008) suggest that lies are 
often embedded in truthful information, with individuals manipulating details of true 
experiences when deceiving others. If deceptive answers are indeed developed from 
already known information, this suggests that lie responses are likely to differ more 
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according to individual differences in the internal activation of information compared to 
information presented in the wider environment.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter aimed to further explore the processes involved in lie 
response choice. The ADCM claims that possible lie responses are activated in long-term 
memory and implausible answers then inhibited. It is the most active lie following this 
process that is used in response to the question. By priming participants with both correct 
and incorrect potential responses, we were able to manipulate the relative activation of 
possible lie responses. Although the ADCM does not consider the role of externally cued 
response possibilities, the results of our experiments show that externally prompting, and 
hence activating, lie responses does not necessarily result in these responses being used. 
This finding is not inconsistent with the construction component of the ADCM, since it is 
possible that lie responses are only generated and processed internally via long-term 
memory systems, but it suggests that further work must be undertaken to specify 
precisely which information is considered when generating lie responses, and how such 
evaluations are made. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Individual Differences and Deception Detection 
Deception and lie-telling is a common occurrence in everyday life (DePaulo et al, 1996; 
Serota et al, 2010), ranging from the minor ‘white lies’ we tell the people around us, to 
lies concerning major transgressions, such as denial of involvement in a crime. Given the 
apparent widespread incidence of deception in society, it is surprising that the majority of 
us are unable to accurately differentiate between truthful statements and lies, with a 
recent meta-analysis calculating an overall accuracy rate of around 55% (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2008). To explore possible reasons for this low judgement accuracy, research 
has focused on three main areas of deception detection. Firstly, whether manipulating 
situational aspects of a judgement session can increase accuracy rates, for example, 
varying the modality of message presentation (Kassin, Meissner & Norwick, 2005). 
Secondly, whether certain populations or groups are more accurate than others, for 
example, looking at group differences according to occupation (Kassin et al, 2005; Vrij & 
Graham, 1997), age (Stanley & Blanchard-Fields, 2008) and gender (Porter et al, 2007). 
Finally, a limited number of researchers have examined potential individual differences in 
the ability to detect deceit (O’Sullivan, 2005; Porter, Campbell, Stapleton & Birt, 2002; 
Vrij, Harden, Terry, Edward & Bull, 2001), specifically in relation to certain personality 
characteristics, such as social anxiety (DePaulo & Tang, 1994) and self-awareness 
(Johnson, Barnacz, Constantino, Triano, Shackelford & Keenan, 2004). Although all 
three areas remain a worthy topic of study, the possible existence of individual 
differences in detection ability is currently of particular debate (Bond & DePaulo, 2008; 
Bond & Uysal, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2005). The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to focus on 
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the latter research area and examine individual differences in lie detection ability and 
truth bias in relation to a number of personality traits. 
Individual differences and deception detection 
The current interest regarding the existence of individual differences in deception 
detection ability has been triggered by findings of large variations in judgement accuracy 
across individuals, with accuracy levels as low as 20% (against a chance level of 50%) 
and as high as 90% shown in some studies (O’Sullivan & Ekman, 2004; Vrij & Graham, 
1997; Vrij, Mann, Robbins & Robinson, 2006). Alternative explanations for these 
variations, however, have been put forward by a number of researchers (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2008; Bond & Uysal, 2007; Levine et al, 2005; Levine, 2010). These include 
suggestions that judgement accuracy varies according to chance patterns. Further, it is 
suggested that accuracy is influenced by additional factors other than the characteristics 
of the judge. For example, it has been claimed that accuracy ratings are related more to 
the skill and demeanour of particular liars than to differences in people’s ability as judges 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2008): Aspects such as demeanour and social skill may lead to 
particular individuals being consistently judged as dishonest even when they are telling 
the truth (Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Kraut, 1980; Zebrowitz, Voinescu & Collins, 1996). 
This could result in accuracy ratings being more affected by the extent of stereotype use 
than by stable differences in ability (Bodenhausen, 1990).  
The number of messages that people judge has also been suggested to affect the 
pattern of accuracy ratings (Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Bond & Uysal, 2007), with smaller 
accuracy differences shown amongst judges who make a large number of truth/lie 
judgements compared to those who make a small number of judgements. Finally, the 
tendency of lay people to judge statements as truthful, a phenomenon known as truth bias 
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(Pronin, Lin & Ross, 2002; Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance & Rosenthal, 1979), has 
been suggested to affect accuracy ratings. In particular, Levine et al (2006) showed that 
judgement accuracy has a positive linear relationship with the number of truthful 
messages judged, so it may be that people differ more in their tendency to judge 
statements as truthful, than in their ability to detect lies.  
Truth bias and deception detection 
The existence of a truth bias in the general population is well documented. Bond 
and DePaulo (2006) observed that judges rated 56% of messages as truthful and 44% as 
deceptive, when an equal number of both were presented. However, such biases have 
been shown to be context dependent, with participants actually showing a lie bias when 
judging contexts where deception is more often encountered. For instance, when judging 
the statements of salespersons (DePaulo & DePaulo, 1989) or when an element of 
suspicion is introduced (DePaulo et al, 2003).  
Possible explanations for the presence of an overall truth bias have been related to 
the existence of learned rule systems, termed heuristics, which allow us to make efficient 
decisions when dealing with complex environments. An example of one of these rule 
systems is the availability heuristic (O’Sullivan et al, 1988), which suggests that 
individuals are more often presented with truthful information than false information in 
daily life, and as such, are more likely to judge messages as truths than lies. A second 
possibility has been based on the anchoring heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), 
which suggests that people make insufficient adjustments from an initial value, resulting 
in a bias towards that value when making decisions. If truthful information is considered 
the norm, or default, social behaviour then extra effort will be required to make sufficient 
judgements away from this default setting and correctly identify deceptive messages 
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(Elaad, 2003; Gilbert, 1991). A third explanation of the truth bias relates directly to social 
conventions and rules. Toris and DePaulo (1984) suggest that social convention prevents 
us from regularly challenging the truthfulness of information we are given. Indeed, such a 
conversation would not only be extremely time consuming, but also considered impolite 
by others, therefore jeopardising the formation and continuation of positive social 
relationships (DePaulo et al, 1982). Although the above suggestions may contribute to the 
presence of a truth bias, the precise processes affecting this social judgement remain 
unclear. Since the presence of such biases impacts on lie detection ability, however, 
examination of individual differences related to this allows for further investigation of the 
mechanisms involved in both social judgement bias and lie-detection ability. This 
represents an area of research that has been neglected in the past and provides a second 
focus of examination for this chapter. 
Personality and lie detection  
If individual differences in lie detection do exist we would expect the following two 
conditions to be supported. First, that consistency in judgement accuracy is shown over 
repeated tests and, second, that particular characteristics relate to either increased or 
decreased ability levels. In relation to the former, the possibility that judgement accuracy 
is consistent over time has been supported by a small number of researchers, with certain 
individuals consistently demonstrating high accuracy ratings. For example, Bond (2008) 
examined the detection accuracy of 112 people from the law enforcement sector and 
identified 2 individuals who demonstrated accuracy rates over 80% in two separate tests. 
Indirect support of this possibility also comes from findings of a positive relationship 
between an individuals’ ability to detect the lies of adults and to detect those of children 
(Edelstein, Luten, Ekman & Goodman, 2006), and also a relationship between the cues 
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that individuals believe are indicative of deception and judgement accuracy (Forrest, 
Feldman & Tyler, 2004). Unfortunately, however, reliability in lie-detection performance 
has failed to be consistently supported by some researchers (e.g., Leach, Lindsay, 
Koehler, Beaudry, Bala, Lee & Talwar, 2009). The existence of a response bias, on the 
other hand, has been consistently shown over repeated studies (Köhnken, 1989). Unless 
situational conditions are set to increase the suspicion of judges (DePaulo et al, 2003), the 
general population consistently demonstrates a truth bias. Specific populations who are 
more likely to encounter deception in their daily lives, such as police officers (Garrido, 
Masip & Herrero, 2004) and prisoners (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Andersson, 
2004), have been shown to demonstrate the opposite, with a greater tendency to judge 
information as deceptive rather than truthful. Whether individual participants consistently 
demonstrate the same degree of response bias over multiple tests, however, has, to our 
knowledge, yet to be examined. 
Some research has also addressed the second condition through the examination of 
the relationship between accuracy and different personality characteristics. In particular, 
they have focused on traits related to social anxiety and shyness (DePaulo & Tang, 1994; 
Vrij & Baxter, 1999), self-awareness (Johnson et al, 2004; Malcolm & Keenan, 2003) 
and extraversion or introversion (Peace, Porter & Almon, 2012; Porter et al, 2002; Vrij et 
al, 2001). Despite this work, however, consensus remains to be found on whether 
particular characteristics are associated with lie detection accuracy. For example, whereas 
DePaulo and Tang (1994) found that individuals low in social anxiety were better at 
discriminating truths from lies, this finding was not supported in further studies (Vrij & 
Baxter, 1999; Vrij et al, 2001). Similarly for truth bias, whereas individuals with a more 
positive view of others, such as extraverts, have been suggested to rate others as more 
credible (Cole, Leets & Bradac, 2002; Cramer, Brodsky & DeCoster, 2009), a recent 
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study found that extraversion negatively correlated with accuracy when detecting truthful 
sexual assault claims, suggesting that a truth bias may not be present in all scenarios 
(Peace et al, 2011). 
Despite such inconsistencies, there are several reasons why we would expect some 
individuals to be intrinsically better lie detectors than others. The awareness of one’s own 
mind that characterises traits such as self-awareness and introversion, for instance, may 
increase awareness for the internal states of others. In general support of this, O’Sullivan 
(2005) commented that the majority of people she interviewed who had previously been 
identified as exceptional lie detectors seemed to have introverted personalities. Such 
suggestions are unsurprising, since it is intuitive that lie detection involves the ability to 
accurately identify other peoples’ mental states. This is supported by findings of better 
lie-detection ability in individuals who can adequately identify emotional expressions 
(Stanley & Blanchard-Fields, 2008; Warren, Schertler & Bull, 2009). If such awareness 
of mental and emotional states is a key factor involved in lie detection, however, then 
detection ability could be directly linked to specific measurable traits, such as emotional 
intelligence (Riggio, Tucker & Throckmorton, 1987).     
In contrast to suggestions that a greater degree of internal focus and awareness 
improves lie detection ability, Vrij et al (2001) failed to show a relationship between lie 
detection ability and introversion (as measured by subscales of the Fenigstein, Scheier & 
Buss, 1975, Self-Consciousness Scale). In their study, 61 participants judged 30 short 
video clips of different individuals, 10 of these were truthful answers to questions 
regarding a staged theft and 20 were lie responses to the same questions. Half of the lies 
presented were low stake and half were high stake, where motivation to try hard to 
deceive was instructionally manipulated. Using a similar paradigm, Vrij and Baxter 
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(1999) also failed to find a link between deception detection and introversion (as 
measured by the Briggs, Cheek & Buss, 1990, scale).  
Although arguments have been made above for possible reasons why introverts 
could make better lie detectors, we now consider possible reasons that would suggest the 
opposite. Firstly, since extraverts have demonstrated enhanced skill at decoding 
nonverbal behaviour in complex tasks (Ackert & Panter, 1988; Lieberman & Rosenthal, 
2001), this may result in an enhanced ability to detect subtle behavioural cues to 
deception in social situations. Secondly, in comparison to introverts, extraverts actively 
seek out social stimulation and interaction, spending more time in social situations 
(Depue & Collins, 1999; Gray, 1970; 1981; Nettle, 2007) and experiencing higher levels 
of positive affect in such situations than introverts (Costa & McCrae, 1980; Lucas & 
Baird, 2004; Watson & Clark, 1992). This increased sociability of extraverts could 
provide a mechanism for enhanced lie detection ability, since greater exposure to other 
people may enhance learning opportunities to associate particular behaviours with 
particular intentions. This could explain the findings of DePaulo and Tang (1994) that 
individuals low in social anxiety are better at discriminating truths from lies than those 
high in social anxiety. Finally, innate cognitive mechanisms could also increase the lie 
detection ability of individuals high in extraversion. For example, extraversion has been 
associated with increased central executive efficiency (Lieberman & Rosenthal, 2001), as 
well as improved task-focused self-control and discrepancy detection when completing an 
oddball task (Eisenberger, Lieberman & Satpute, 2005). Taken together, the above 
findings suggest that extraverts may indeed show an increased ability in discriminating 
lies and truths.  
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Cross-cultural lie detection  
In order to further understand the mechanisms involved in credibility judgements, 
through both the extent of truth bias and differences in accuracy levels, variation in 
judging the honesty of individuals from different cultures can be examined. Whereas 
some nonverbal behaviour has been found to be universal across different cultures, such 
as facial expressions of basic emotions (Ekman, 1972, 1973; Ekman & Friesen, 1971), 
others are more culturally specific. For instance, cross-cultural differences have been 
found in the meaning and use of emblematic gestures (Ekman, 1976; Friesen, Ekman & 
Wallbott, 1979; Morris, Collett, Marsh & O’Shaughnessy, 1980), as well as in patterns of 
eye contact and interpersonal distance (Exline, Jones & Maciorowski, 1977; Hall, 1963; 
Vrij, Dragt & Koppellar, 1992; Watson, 1970) in Western, Asian and Arab cultures. 
Differences even occur in the manipulation of universal emotional expressions in social 
situations, with Japanese participants more likely to mask negative emotions than 
American participants in the presence of a second individual (Friesen, 1972). Such a 
different pattern of behaviour across cultures is not surprising when the definition of 
culture is considered. Matsumoto (2006) defines culture as a “shared system of socially 
transmitted behaviour that describes, defines, and guides people’s ways of life, 
communicated from one generation to the next.” (p.220).  As such, an individual from 
one culture will have learnt to associate particular behaviours with particular social 
situations and intentions, and will use these associations to guide their own social 
interactions, decisions and communication. This is seen in suggestions of more accurate 
emotion recognition for individuals from the same cultural group compared to a different 
cultural group (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002).  
Since we increasingly interact in a global society, this has resulted in a growth in 
the number of situations where an individual from one culture has to judge the honesty of 
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an individual from a different culture. One particular example of this can be seen in the 
judgements of immigration control officers at border crossings, who have to determine 
whether individuals from a variety of countries are legitimate immigrants to the UK 
(Home Office, 2011).  As such it should be considered that differences in nonverbal 
behaviour due to different cultural backgrounds may be confused with behaviour 
indicative of deception, which in turn may affect credibility judgements. This is 
particularly likely when a judge is not familiar with the behavioural norms of a specific 
culture. For instance, behaving in an anxious and avoidant manner has been linked with 
deception (DePaulo et al, 2003) and yet, individuals from Asian cultures have been 
characterised as anxious, passive and non-assertive in social situations (Okazaki, Liu, 
Longworth & Min, 2002). Similarly, Vrij and Winkel (1992; 1994) demonstrated that 
behaviour typical of Surinamese individuals was judged as more suspicious by Dutch 
Caucasian police officers than the typical behaviour of Dutch Caucasian individuals. In 
their studies, Surinamese behaviour was associated with increased gaze aversion, speech 
disturbances, smiling and use of illustrators, which may have contributed to the suspicion 
of the judging police officers (Vrij & Winkel, 1991). Thus it seems that such differences 
in cultural behavioural norms are likely to impact on both the degree of truth bias and lie 
detection accuracy.  
Although past research on cultural issues related to deception has focused primarily 
on differences in motivations to deceive and the acceptance of deception (Aune & 
Waters, 1994; Lewis & George, 2008; Mealy, Stephan & Urrutia, 2007; Park & Ahn, 
2007; Seiter, Bruschke & Bai, 2002), a limited number of studies have examined 
differences in lie detection ability. This work was conducted by Bond, Omar, Mahmoud 
and Bonser (1990) and Bond and Atoum (2000), who specifically explored the impact of 
culture on deception detection accuracy by examining differences between the honesty 
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judgements of Americans, Jordanians and Indians when judging the statements of other 
Americans, Jordanians and Indians. Initially Bond et al (1990) found that Jordanian and 
American students could significantly detect lies of individuals from the same cultural 
background, but were unable to detect the lies of individuals from a different culture. This 
study, however, used video messages that were presented without sound, and as such, a 
second study was conducted by Bond and Atoum (2000) to further investigate these 
findings. Overall, findings of the second study suggested that deception judgements were 
more accurate within cultures than across cultures. Interestingly, Americans also showed 
a greater truth bias when judging senders from a different culture compared to when 
judging other Americans, whereas Jordanians showed no differences between the two. 
This suggests that an element of overcompensation may be involved in preventing the use 
of stereotypes when judging individuals from a different cultural group. 
A final point to be considered in international deception detection is the issue of 
language. Conversing in a non-native, second language is likely to induce greater 
cognitive load than conversing in a native language, resulting in second language 
speakers demonstrating more cues that are traditionally associated with deception, such as 
longer response times and fewer details (DePaulo et al, 2003; Walczyk et al, 2003; 
Williams et al, in prep). In line with this possibility, Da Silva and Leach (in prep) found 
judges were more likely to exhibit a lie-bias when viewing second-language speakers and 
a truth-bias when observing native-language speakers. Such findings can also be 
considered in relation to previous research demonstrating that difficulties in 
understanding foreign accents and processing less fluent information can impact on the 
perception of credibility of a speaker (Dixon, Mahoney, & Cocks, 2002; Lev-Ari & 
Keysar, 2010; Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Smith & Bond, 1994).  
CHAPTER 5 
Individual Differences and Deception Detection 
 
 
 
172 
The Current Study 
We conducted two experiments to examine the role of individual differences in response 
bias and judgement accuracy in a deception detection task. In Experiment 9, 76 
participants viewed 32 messages and judged the honesty of each one, as well as 
completing a variety of self-report individual difference measures. This allowed us to 
examine potential relationships between personality traits and both the degree of truth 
bias demonstrated and judgement accuracy. Experiment 10 was designed to extend this 
work by comparing honesty judgements for individuals of the same culture (UK) 
compared to a different culture (South East Asian) to the judge. This enabled an 
exploration of the potential role of social mechanisms in maintaining the truth bias, since 
individuals are likely to have less social experience of interacting with individuals of a 
different cultural background to their own, as well as potential differences in judgement 
accuracy.  Through the consideration of previously discussed findings, a more in-depth 
examination of the potential factors influencing response bias and judgement accuracy 
than has previously been conducted is possible.  
Experiment 9 
The aim of Experiment 9 was to examine whether certain personality characteristics are 
related to individual differences in lie detection ability and truth bias. Participants 
assessed a number of videos as to whether the person was being truthful or not. In 
addition to judging each clip, our participants also filled out several self-report 
personality measures. These measured traits related to the ability to effectively identify 
and infer information from wider behaviours, in particular, emotional intelligence, 
extraversion and autism spectrum characteristics.  
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There were three hypotheses regarding detection ability. Judges who demonstrate 
higher scores on the extraversion subscale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-
Revised Short Scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991) will show higher discrimination 
accuracy. Judges who score higher on the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire – 
Short Form (Petrides & Furnham, 2006) will also show enhanced discrimination 
accuracy. Similarly, since autism spectrum traits are characterised by problems attributing 
mental states to others we would expect judges who score higher on the Adult Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001) to 
have lower discrimination accuracy.  
In addition to detection ability, we also consider the following hypotheses regarding 
the possible relationship between these measures and degree of truth bias. Firstly, if truth 
bias is directly related to the availability heuristic, then a positive relationship between 
extraversion and truth bias may be demonstrated due to the enhanced social experience 
and exposure of extraverts. Equally, a positive relationship between extraversion and 
truth bias may also be related to the higher levels of positive affect experienced by 
extraverts, which may result in evaluating the messages of individuals as more positive, 
and hence, trustworthy (Cole et al, 2002; Cramer et al, 2009). Secondly, since autism 
spectrum traits are related to a lack of understanding of acceptable social behaviour 
(Baron-Cohen et al, 2001), if truth bias is a product of social norms that encourage us to 
regard information as truthful, a negative relationship may be shown between degree of 
truth bias and autism spectrum traits. 
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Method 
Creation of Sender Messages 
Participants 
The video data used in this study was a subsample of data collected at Cardiff 
University specifically to examine the ability to detect deceit. Fifteen individuals from the 
community were originally recruited via the Cardiff University Community Panel. Eight 
of these individuals were then used to create the final stimulus set, referred to as the 
Deception Detection Assessment Tool (DDAT). Four of these individuals were males. 
These individuals will be referred to as senders. All senders identified their nationality as 
either British or Welsh and spoke English as a first language. Sender age fell into the 
following categories: 29 and under = 12.5%; 30-39 = 37.5%; 50-59 = 25%; Over 60 = 
25%.   
Message Generation Task 
The task for the creation of messages involved senders both truthfully and falsely 
describing an image presented on a computer screen. The computer task began with the 
presentation of the word READY in the centre of the screen for a 1 second period. This 
was then replaced with a photographic image taken from the International Affective 
Picture Stimuli set (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2001). These images involved a 
variety of different categories, and concerned subjects such as a street riot scene and a 
scene from a wedding. This image was shown for a 10 second period and was then 
replaced with either the word LIE or the word TRUTH presented in the centre of the 
screen. When senders saw the word, they had to turn and face the experimenter (who was 
unable to see the screen) and had to either truthfully describe the image or lie about the 
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content of the image in as much detail as possible to the experimenter, according to the 
instruction. When senders had finished their description, they pressed any key on the 
keyboard and the next trial began. All senders viewed the same lie images, but different 
truth images (to prevent message similarity across senders). In total, senders viewed 24 
images and had to truthfully describe half of these images and falsely describe the other 
half. The order of lie and truth trials was randomised. The experimenter was blind to the 
honesty instruction of particular trials. Senders were recorded using a Canon HD camera 
in a quiet room at the School of Psychology. The room contained a table with a laptop 
adjacent to the sender and two chairs, one for the sender and one for the experimenter. 
Participants were provided with both written and spoken instructions regarding the 
experimental task. Participants were asked in particular to try and remember as many 
details from each image as possible. When lying, participants were instructed that their 
descriptions should be sufficiently different from the original picture so that an observer 
would not be able to guess which picture they had viewed if shown a series of 
alternatives. They were informed that this was part of a larger project to examine 
individual differences in ability to detect deceit, and as such, future participants would be 
watching their recorded statements to try and differentiate when they were lying and 
when they were telling the truth. Therefore, they were asked to be as convincing as 
possible, both when they were lying and when they were telling the truth. Following 
completion of the recording session, participants completed a short demographics 
questionnaire and were then fully debriefed.  
Creation of the DDAT 
Four statements each were included from eight of the senders. These 32 statements 
were chosen on the basis that they were of similar duration (no longer than 1 minute), 
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were of sufficient technical quality and were from a similar time point in the task. These 
time points were two statements taken from the middle of the first half of the task (trials 
4-9) and two statements from the middle of the second half of the task (trials 16-21). The 
ratio of truths/lies of these 4 statements varied for each individual, ranging between 1 lie 
and 3 truths to 3 lies and 1 truth. However, the combined total of lie statements was equal 
to the combined total of truth statements, with 16 of each presented. Overall, the 
statements that were presented to participants ranged in duration between approximately 
20 and 60 seconds. 
Judgment Study 
Participants 
Seventy-six Cardiff University students volunteered for this study in exchange for 
payment. Of these, 21 were male and 68 identified their nationality as British or Welsh.  
These participants will henceforth be referred to as judges. Judges had a mean age of 
22.44 (SD = 2.12; Range = 18-49) and spoke fluent English.   
Design and Procedure 
A correlational design was used, whereby judgement accuracy ratings were 
compared with the questionnaire data provided by the personality measures. Judges were 
tested in groups of between 2 and 20 individuals in a lecture theatre and were informed 
that they would view a series of 32 video clips of different individuals describing an 
image that they have previously viewed on a computer screen. On some of these clips, 
individuals would be truthfully describing the image and on others they may be lying 
about the image that they saw. Participants were informed that their task was to identify 
which clips were true and which were lies. Once all participants were seated, the video 
clips were presented via a projector.  The task was divided into 4 blocks, with each sender 
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being presented once in each block. The order of presentation of senders in each block 
was randomised prior to the first testing session, with the only limiting factor being that 
no single sender was displayed consecutively in the following block. The order of 
presentation of video clips was then identical for each of the judgement sessions. Prior to 
each video clip, the word READY was presented in the centre of the screen for a 3 
second period. Following each clip, the sentence ENTER YOUR RATINGS NOW was 
presented in the centre of the screen until the experimenter pressed the spacebar to begin 
the next clip. Following the presentation of each clip, participants were asked to indicate 
their lie/truth judgement, confidence and trustworthiness rating on the rating sheet 
provided. Once all participants had done this, the experimenter began the next clip. 
Following completion of the judgement session, participants completed the questionnaire 
measures and were then fully debriefed. 
Questionnaire Measures 
Judges were given a questionnaire pack containing a number of questionnaire 
measures. These included the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised Short Scale 
(EPQ-R SS; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991), the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire 
Short Form (TEIQue-SF; Petrides & Furnham, 2004), the Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
(AQ; Baron-Cohen et al, 2001) and a demographics questionnaire. These measures are 
described in detail below. 
The EPQ-R SS is a 48-item self-report measure divided into 4 subscales. Three of 
these subscales measure the personality dimensions of neuroticism, extraversion and 
psychoticism and the fourth is a lie scale for the revelation of falsehoods. The items 
included in this short form questionnaire were taken from the Eysenck Personality 
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Questionnaire-Revised, with 12 items being chosen from each of the separate scales. 
Participants respond either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to each question.  
The TEIQue-SF is a 30-item self-report measure designed to measure trait 
emotional intelligence. Two items were taken from each of the 15 subscales of the 
TEIQue, based on their correlations with the total subscale scores. Participants respond 
on a 7-point likert scale.  
The AQ is a 50-item self-report measure divided into 5 main areas: social skill, 
attention to detail, imagination, communication and attention switching. Participants 
choose one of four responses: definitely agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, definitely 
disagree; and these responses relate to whether participants display autistic-like 
characteristics.  
A demographics questionnaire was created which included questions related to 
participants educational level, occupation, age, sex and nationality. In addition, 
participants completed 4 questions related to perceived lie/truth detection ability using a 
7-point likert scale. In addition, a rating sheet was also created to be used during the 
presentation of video statements for participants to record their judgements. Space was 
provided for participants to provide a binary judgement of whether they considered each 
clip to be a lie or a truth, as well as to rate their confidence in their decision (using a 7-
point likert scale) and the trustworthiness of the individual (using a 7-point likert scale). 
The following two open-ended questions were included at the bottom of the rating sheet: 
What factors made you think that someone was lying? What factors made you think that 
someone was telling the truth? 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics were computed on the questionnaire measures to examine mean, 
range and standard deviation of scores, shown in Table 1. To examine the relationship 
between our separate questionnaire measures, bivariate correlations were computed. 
These showed a positive relationship between the extraversion subscale of the EPQ-SS 
and the TEIQue, r = .502, p < .001, and a negative relationship between the AQ and both 
the TEIQue, r = -.601, p < .001 and the extraversion subscale, r = -.638, p < .001.  
Accuracy of lie-detection 
The overall percentage accuracy for honesty judgements was then calculated for 
each participant. This revealed a mean accuracy rating of 54.98% (Minimum: 37.50%; 
Maximum: 71.90%), with 61.59% for truths and 48.44% for lies. A one-sample t-test 
showed that total accuracy was significantly above chance, t(75) = 5.45, p<.001. No 
relationship was found between lie detection accuracy and any of the 4 self-report 
questions regarding ability to detect truths and lies and ability to deceive others, all r’s < 
.15, all p’s > .21. This suggests that self-reported detection ability is not related to actual 
ability levels. Paired sample t-tests of the overall number of statements judged as truths 
compared to lies demonstrated the presence of a truth bias, with more statements judged 
as truths (M = 18.04; SD = 4.06) than as lies (M = 13.96; SD = 4.06), t(75) = 4.37, 
p<.001.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of questionnaire measures for Experiment 9.    
 Extraversion Emotional 
Intelligence 
Autism 
Spectrum 
Minimum 0.00 89.00 4.00 
Maximum 12.00 192.00 30.00 
Mean 8.60 148.54 15.08 
Standard 
Deviation 
3.60 18.45 6.46 
 
Personality traits and accuracy 
Bivariate correlations were computed to examine the relationship between the 
personality measures of interest and percentage judgement accuracy. A significant 
positive correlation was found between the extraversion scale of the EPQ-R SS and 
percentage accuracy, r = .315, p = .006, showing that higher scores on the extraversion 
scale were related to higher accuracy levels. The AQ, however, did show a trend for a 
negative relationship, r = -.205, p = .076. Table 2 shows r values for all correlations.  
Table 2. Correlations (r values) between personality measures and percentage accuracy, 
d’ and c for Experiment 9.  
 Extraversion Emotional 
Intelligence 
Autism 
Spectrum 
Percentage Accuracy .315* .013 -.205 
d’ .296* .073 -.248 
C .241 .224 -.207 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed). 
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In accordance with signal detection theory (Swets, 1964), the proportion of hits 
(H), misses (M), correct rejections (CR) and false alarms (FA) were calculated for each 
participant. A hit was defined as a correct lie judgement, a miss was defined as a 
participant judging a lie statement as a truth, a correct rejection was defined as a correct 
truth judgement and a false alarm was defined as a participant judging a truthful 
statement as a lie. These values were used to measure d’ for each participant. The d’ 
statistic provides a measure of detection sensitivity and is computed using the following 
equation:   
d’ = z(H) – z(FA) 
with z being the transformation of the proportion into a probability score based on a 
normal distribution. Bivariate correlations were then computed to examine the 
relationship between d’ and the questionnaire measures. These are shown in Table 2. The 
only significant correlation was a positive relationship with the extraversion scale of the 
EPQ-R SS measure, demonstrating that participants who scored higher on the 
extraversion scale were more accurate at discriminating truths and lies, r = .296, p = .009. 
The AQ this time showed a significant negative relationship with discrimination 
accuracy, r = -.248, p = .031, but this did not survive corrections for multiple 
comparisons. To examine the extent that extraversion accounted for variance in d’, a 
multiple regression was computed with age, sex and the questionnaire measures as 
predictors and d’ as the dependent variable. Only the extraversion score was significantly 
related to d’, t = 2.483, p = .015. The model summary from this regression shows that 
extraversion scores account for 8.7% of the total variance in d’ (R² = .087). Finally, the 
relationship between discrimination accuracy and mean confidence was also examined. 
Although the overall correlation between d’ and confidence was not significant, r = .131, 
p > .10, there was a significant positive correlation between mean confidence and trait 
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emotional intelligence, r = .307, p = .007, such that participants who scored higher in 
emotional intelligence were more confident in their judgements, despite being no more 
accurate. None of the other questionnaire measures significantly correlated with 
confidence. Correlations are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Correlations (r values) between personality measures, d’, c and mean confidence 
for Experiment 9.  
 d’ c Extraversion Emotional 
Intelligence 
Autism 
Spectrum 
Mean 
Confidence 
.131 -.019 .070  .307*  -.088 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed). 
 
Since the AQ showed a trend towards a negative relationship with detection 
ability, overall AQ scores were broken down into 5 separate subscales to examine the 
nature of this relationship in more detail. These subscales were taken from Hoekstra, 
Bartels, Cath and Boomsma (2008) and included social skill, communication, attention 
switching, imagination and attention to detail. Bivariate correlations were then computed 
between d’ and the subscale scores. Significant negative correlations were found between 
d’ and three of these subscales: the social skill subscale, r = -.266, p = .020, the 
communication subscale, r = -.259, p = .024 and the attention to detail subscale, r = -.232, 
p = .044.  
Personality traits and bias  
A measure of response bias (criterion; c) was computed to examine whether certain 
personality characteristics are related to the tendency to judge a greater number of 
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messages as truths than as lies (truth bias). Criterion (c) was calculated using the 
following equation (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991): 
c = -0.5*(z(H)+z(FA)) 
A positive relationship was shown between the extraversion scale and c, r = .241, p = 
.031, suggesting an inclination for extraverts to have a greater truth bias. This 
relationship, however, was no longer significant following adjustments for multiple 
comparisons. A trend towards a positive relationship was also found between the TEIQue 
and c, r = .224, p = .052 and towards a negative relationship between the AQ and c, r = -
.207, p = .072. No significant correlations were found between any of the AQ subscales 
and c. Table 2 shows r values for all correlations.  
Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 9 was to investigate possible individual differences in relation to 
degree of truth bias and the ability to detect deception. In particular, the personality traits 
of extraversion, emotional intelligence and autism spectrum characteristics were 
examined. Overall, we found that total judgement accuracy was significantly greater than 
chance, but in accordance with previous findings (Bond & DePaulo, 2008) the accuracy 
rate remained low at 55%. We also found an overall truth bias, which is consistent with 
previous studies of lay populations (Levine et al, 2006; Levine, Park & McCornack, 
1999). In terms of personality characteristics, the only self-report measure that was found 
to have a significant relationship with discrimination accuracy was the extraversion scale 
of the EPQ-R SS, with higher scores in extraversion associated with higher judgement 
accuracy. Following regressions analyses, it was shown that extraversion was the only 
significant predictor of discrimination accuracy, accounting for 8.7% of the total 
variance.  
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Personality and lie detection 
Our original hypotheses that extraversion would be associated with higher 
judgement accuracy, whereas autism spectrum characteristics would be associated with 
lower judgement accuracy, were supported, highlighting the presence of individual 
differences in discrimination accuracy in our sample. The predicted positive relationship 
between emotional intelligence and discrimination accuracy, however, was not supported. 
Regression analyses also demonstrated that extraversion was the only significant 
predictor of discrimination accuracy in our study, accounting for 8.7% of the total 
variance.  
When introducing the Chapter, we highlighted several possible reasons why 
extraverts may show increased accuracy at discriminating truths from lies. These included 
enhanced skill at decoding nonverbal behaviour (Ackert & Panter, 1988; Lieberman & 
Rosenthal, 2001), greater social experience from increased time spent in social activities 
(Nettle, 2007), increased central executive efficiency (Lieberman & Rosenthal, 2001), 
and improved discrepancy detection (Eisenberger et al, 2005). It is possible that these 
factors singularly, or in combination, contribute to the increased discrimination accuracy 
shown by extraverts. Since we failed to replicate this finding in Experiment 10, however, 
we delay discussion of these possibilities until the General Discussion. 
In our introduction we also highlighted that the ability to interpret the emotional 
and mental state of others has been suggested to increase lie detection ability (Johnson et 
al, 2004; Stanley & Blanchard-Fields, 2008) Our findings failed to support this 
hypothesis, however, since the TEIQue failed to show a significant relationship with 
discrimination accuracy. Of particular interest, however, is the finding of a trend towards 
a negative relationship with the AQ and lie detection, but no such finding in the opposite 
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direction for the TEIQue. Since autism spectrum characteristics have been associated 
with a deficit in understanding the mental states of others, termed theory of mind (Baron-
Cohen, 1989), it was expected that this would provide an opposite measure to the 
TEIQue. Indeed, a significant negative correlation was found between the two measures. 
Further examination in relation to the subscales of the AQ also showed that the negative 
trend with detection ability was present in both the communication and social skills 
domain, both of which relate to theory of mind deficits (Frith, 1989). Since both overall 
AQ scores and subscale scores were negatively correlated with scores on the TEIQue, the 
predicted relationship between the two measures was found in our study, which makes 
the lack of a similar pattern in relation to lie detection particularly surprising. One 
possible explanation is that a deficit in the ability to interpret emotional and mental states 
decreases lie detection ability, but an enhanced ability to understand such states has no 
further effect. Alternatively, since scores on the AQ are negatively correlated with 
extraversion scores, it may be that individuals who score higher on the AQ spend less 
time in social situations. This may result in less social experience, which could negatively 
affect lie detection ability (as discussed previously). This seems an unlikely explanation 
for the results, however, given our finding of a positive correlation between extraversion 
and emotional intelligence.  
Personality and truth bias 
We presented two hypotheses regarding the relationship between personality and 
truth bias. Firstly, that a positive relationship would be found between extraversion and 
truth bias, resulting from increased social experience or higher levels of positive affect. 
Secondly, that a negative relationship would be shown between autism spectrum traits 
and truth bias, due to a lack of understanding of social communication rules. Although 
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none of these relationships were found to be significant, the above hypotheses were 
partially supported by findings of a positive relationship between extraversion and truth 
bias, and a negative trend between autism spectrum traits and truth bias. Although the 
precise mechanisms responsible for such biases cannot be fully determined, we suggest 
that these findings can be considered in relation to previous explanations of the truth bias 
affect, namely the availability heuristic and the influence of social conventions that 
encourage us to evaluate the majority of information as trustworthy. This social 
mechanism can explain why extraverts demonstrate a higher truth bias, namely because 
they are more concerned with, and have greater exposure to, positive social interactions 
(Nettle, 2007). Since individuals who scored higher in autism spectrum traits also 
demonstrated a reduced truth bias, this further highlights the role of social learning 
processes in explaining the existence of the truth bias. The lack of understanding of social 
conventions and behavioural norms that characterises autism spectrum disorders (Baron-
Cohen, 2008) may result in a failure to acquire a ‘socially-learned’ truth bias.   
Additionally to the above findings, we also found a positive trend between 
emotional intelligence and truth bias.  This was not considered in our original hypotheses, 
but could be related to the drive to maintain positive social relationships in individuals 
higher in emotional intelligence. Indeed, Goleman (2006) suggests that optimism and the 
ability to relate positively to others may be a reflection of specific emotional intelligence 
competencies. Similarly, Bar-On (2000) highlights the ability to be aware of, understand, 
and relate to others as one of an array of emotional intelligence abilities. If the truth bias 
is related to the maintenance of positive social relationships according to accepted social 
interaction and communication rules, then individuals who are more adept at, or 
concerned with, the maintenance of positive relationships may demonstrate a stronger 
truth bias.  
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Experiment 10 
Experiment 9 demonstrated that individual differences in the ability to detect deceit exist, 
and that these differences are strongest in relation to the personality trait of extraversion. 
As discussed previously, however, the mechanisms responsible for this require further 
examination. The aims of Experiment 10 were twofold. First, to examine whether the 
higher accuracy shown by extraverts is due to learnt associations resulting from greater 
social experience (Allport, 1924; Nettle, 2007), or whether this ability is an inherent 
cognitive trait of extraverted individuals (Eisenberger et al, 2005; Lieberman & 
Rosenthal, 2001). Second, to examine whether the use of senders from different cultures 
results in further individual differences related to both judgement accuracy and bias. In 
order to investigate these questions, judgements by United Kingdom nationals for two 
separate sender samples were compared: one collected in Singapore and one collected in 
the United Kingdom.  
The comparison of judgements for two different cultural groups allows us to 
consider the following hypotheses. If the higher accuracy previously shown by extraverts 
was predominantly due to increased social experience, then extraversion should be 
positively related to detection accuracy when judging senders from the same cultural 
group (UK senders), but not when judging senders from a different cultural group (South 
East Asian senders). This would be due to a greater familiarity with the behavioural 
norms of UK senders in deceptive and honest interactions. If, however, ability differences 
are singularly due to extraverts’ greater cognitive efficiency at decoding behaviour in 
complex situations, then extraversion should be positively related to detection accuracy 
for judgements of both UK and South East Asian senders. In relation to truth bias, if the 
higher truth bias previously shown by extraverts was predominantly due to increased 
social experience, then extraversion should be positively related to truth bias when 
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judging senders from the same cultural group (UK senders), but not when judging senders 
from a different cultural group (South East Asian senders). This would be due to a greater 
familiarity with the behavioural norms and expectations of UK senders. If, however, 
ability differences are singularly due to the greater positive affect experienced by 
extraverts’ overall, then extraversion should be positively related to truth bias for 
judgements of both UK and South East Asian senders.  
In relation to cross-cultural judgement accuracy, previous literature suggests the 
following hypotheses for our experiment. Firstly, that discrimination accuracy would be 
greater when judging UK senders compared to South East Asian senders. Secondly, if 
judges view individuals from a different cultural background as less credible than those 
from the same cultural background, a truth bias would be shown for UK senders (as 
shown in Experiment 9) and a lie bias shown for South East Asian senders. If judges 
overcompensate for possible cultural difference stereotypes, however, findings may be 
similar to those of Bond and Atoum (2000), with judges demonstrating a greater truth 
bias for South East Asian senders compared to UK senders. Excepting the previously 
discussed hypotheses regarding the relationship of extraversion to judgement accuracy, 
due to a lack of research regarding individual differences and cross-cultural deception 
detection, no further hypotheses were considered regarding our individual difference 
measures and differences in detection accuracy and/or bias. 
Method 
Creation of Sender Messages 
Participants 
The video data used in this study was made up of two separate samples. Sample 1 
was collected in Singapore through poster and e-mail advertisements to businesses and 
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colleges/universities. Sample 2 was collected in the UK through the School of 
Psychology Experiment Management System. There were 7 male participants in each 
sample, and these made up our senders. Six senders in sample 1 were students, and 1 was 
a researcher. All identified their nationalities as Malaysian (1), Indian (2), Vietnamese (3) 
or Sri Lankan (1), spoke English as a second language and reported their age as 29 or 
under. All senders in sample 2 were students, identified their nationality as either British 
(5) or Welsh (2) and spoke English as a first language. The messages were generated in 
the same way as described in Experiment 1. Six senders reported their age as 29 or under, 
whereas 1 reported their age as 30-39. The video data was combined to create the 
Deception Detection Cultural Assessment Tool (DDCAT).  
Creation of the DDCAT 
Four statements were included from each sender, 2 lies and 2 truths. This differed 
to Experiment 9 because we planned to analyse individual sender effects in this 
experiment. In total, 56 statements (half lies and half truths) were included in the 
DDCAT. Statements were chosen on the basis that they did not exceed 1 minute, were of 
sufficient technical quality and were from a similar time point in the task.  
Judgment Study 
Participants 
Seventy-seven Cardiff University students volunteered for this study in exchange 
for payment. Of these, 16 were male. All identified themselves as UK nationals and 
spoke English as a first language. 71 reported their ethnicity as being of a White 
background, 2 as a Mixed background and 4 as an Asian background. Participant age data 
was gathered categorically, with 74 participants reporting their age as between 20-29 and 
the remaining 3 reporting an age of 30-39.    
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Design and Procedure  
A correlational design was used, whereby judgement accuracy ratings were 
compared with the questionnaire data provided by the personality measures. Participants 
viewed the DDCAT (described above) and judged a total of 56 video clips. The task was 
divided into 4 blocks, with each individual being presented once in each block. The order 
of presentation of individuals in each block was randomised prior to the first testing 
session, with the only limiting factor being that no single individual was displayed 
consecutively in the following block. The order of presentation of video clips was then 
identical for each of the judgement sessions. The questionnaire measures were identical 
to those in Experiment 9, except for the inclusion of an additional question asking 
participants to rate their degree of familiarity and interaction with individuals from Asian 
cultures on a scale of 1-7. In all other aspects, the design and procedure of the study were 
identical to Experiment 9.    
Results 
Descriptive statistics were computed on the questionnaire measures to examine mean, 
range and standard deviation of scores, shown in Table 4. An adequate range of scores 
was demonstrated for all questionnaires. To examine the relationship between our 
separate questionnaire measures, bivariate correlations were computed. These showed a 
positive relationship between the extraversion subscale of the EPQ-SS and the TEIQue, r 
= .491, p < .001, and a negative relationship between the AQ and both the TEIQue, r = -
.590, p < .001 and the extraversion subscale, r = -.425, p < .001.  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of questionnaire measures for Experiment 10. 
 Extraversion Emotional 
Intelligence 
Autism 
Spectrum 
Minimum 0.00 85.00 3.00 
Maximum 12.00 181.00 31.00 
Mean 8.65 144.77 15.68 
Standard 
Deviation 
3.53 21.28 6.32 
 
Asian experience and judgment accuracy 
Since a primary interest in this study was the examination of cultural differences in 
deception detection, participants were asked to rate their degree of familiarity and 
interaction with individuals from Asian cultures on a scale of 1-7 (1 being no 
familiarity/interaction and 7 being a very high degree of familiarity/interaction). Prior to 
the main analysis, participants were divided into two groups. Group 1 consisted of 
participants who rated their experience between 1 and 4 and group 2 consisted of 
participants who rated their experience between 5 and 7. Of the 77 participants, 23 were 
in group 2. d’ and bias were then calculated for judgements related to the South East 
Asian senders and UK senders independently for each group. We compared these 
measures using independent samples t-tests. There was no significant difference between 
the two groups for d’ for either the UK senders, t(74) = .63, p=.533, or the South East 
Asian senders, t(74) = 1.53, p=.130. Similarly, there was no significant difference 
between the two groups for bias for either the UK senders, t(74) = -.85, p=.397, or the 
South East Asian senders, t(74) = -.14, p=.892. For each group, paired sample t-tests were 
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also conducted to compare accuracy and bias for the UK and South East Asian senders. 
For both groups, d’ was found to be higher for UK senders compared to South East Asian 
senders (Group 1: t(53) = 2.94, p<.01; Group 2: t(23) = 2.57, p<.02). Similarly, truth bias 
was also found to be higher for UK senders compared to South East Asian senders 
(Group 1: t(53) = 2.58, p<.02; Group 2: t(23) = 4.66, p<.001). Since no significant 
differences in judgement accuracy or bias were demonstrated across the two groups, the 
groups were combined for all further analyses.  
Cross-cultural judgment accuracy 
The overall percentage accuracy for honesty judgements was then calculated for 
each participant. This revealed a mean accuracy rating of 56.49% (Minimum: 41.07%; 
Maximum: 69.64%). Mean truth detection accuracy was 54.85% for South East Asian 
senders and 60.39% for UK senders, and lie detection accuracy was 24.74% for South 
East Asian senders and 39.61% for UK senders. A one-sample t-test showed that total 
accuracy was significantly above chance, t(76) = 9.22, p<.001. As mentioned above, d’ 
was calculated both overall and separately for South East Asian and UK senders. One 
sample t-tests were conducted on these d’ measures to examine whether discrimination 
accuracy was above chance. The general d’ (M = .36, SD = .34) was significantly above 
chance, t(76) = 9.30, p<.001, as was the UK d’ (M = .34, SD = .32), t(76) = 9.38, p<.001 
and the South East Asian d’ (M = .16, SD = .32), t(76) = 4.36, p<.001. To compare the 
discrimination accuracy for South East Asian senders and UK senders, paired sample t-
tests were conducted. As predicted, it was found that discrimination accuracy for UK 
senders was significantly higher than for South East Asian senders, t(76) = 3.85, p<.001. 
Additionally, bivariate correlations were conducted to examine whether there was a 
significant relationship between d’ for South East Asian senders and UK senders. The 
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correlation was not significant, r = .180, p = .12. As in Experiment 9, no relationship was 
found between lie detection accuracy and any of the 4 self-report questions regarding 
ability to detect truths and lies and ability to deceive others, all r’s < .13, all p’s > .26. 
To examine possible differences in truth bias according to sender culture, the 
degree of truth bias was calculated using criterion (c) from Signal Detection Theory. 
Although a truth bias was shown towards both South East Asian senders, t(76) = 26.22, 
p<.001, and UK senders overall, t(76) = 28.88, p<.001, paired sample t-tests 
demonstrated that a greater truth bias was present when judging UK senders (M = .91, SD 
= .27) compared to South East Asian senders (M = .79, SD = .26), t(76) = 3.94, p<.001). 
Bivariate correlations demonstrated a positive relationship between c for South East 
Asian senders and UK senders, r = .545, p < .001.  
Bivariate correlations were computed between general d’ and mean confidence. No 
significant relationship between the two measures was found, r = .040, p = .129. Bivariate 
correlations were also computed between ratings of sender trustworthiness and 
confidence ratings. A positive relationship was found between mean trustworthiness and 
mean confidence, r = .499, such that the more trustworthy participants rated a sender to 
be, the more confident they were in the accuracy of their judgement. Finally, paired 
samples t-tests were conducted to examine whether participant confidence ratings and 
ratings of sender trustworthiness differed across the two sender samples. Participants 
were found to be more confident when judging UK senders compared to South East 
Asian senders, t(76) = 5.26, p<.001, and rated UK senders as more trustworthy than 
South East Asian senders, t(76) = 5.51, p<.001.  
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Personality and judgment accuracy 
Bivariate correlations were computed to examine the relationship between the 
personality measures of interest and d’. Correlations were computed both for general d’ 
collapsed across sender type, and for South East Asian and UK d’ independently. No 
significant correlations were found when general d’ was examined. When d’ was 
examined specific to sender type, a positive relationship was shown between the TEI and 
South East Asian d’, r = .225, p = .05. This correlation did not remain significant 
following bonferroni corrections, however. Similar to Experiment 9, the AQ also showed 
a trend for a negative relationship with the South East Asian d’, r = -.194, p = .09, but not 
with UK d’, r = -.041, p = .73. The increased discrimination accuracy shown for 
individuals higher in extraversion in Experiment 9 was not replicated for either general 
d’, r = .122, p = .30, South East Asian d’, r = .078, p = .51, or UK d’, r = .030, p = .80. 
Tables 5 and 6 shows r values for all correlations.  
In line with Experiment 9, overall AQ scores were once again broken down into 5 
separate subscales (Hoekstra et al, 2008). Bivariate correlations were then computed 
between d’ and these subscale scores. Similar to the findings of Experiment 9, a trend 
towards a negative relationship was once again found between d’ and the social skill 
subscale, r = -.213, p = .06 and the communication subscale, r = -.204, p = .08. This time, 
a significant negative correlation was also shown between c and the imagination subscale, 
r = -.257, p = .02. No other correlations between the subscales and d’ and c reached 
significance. Bivariate correlations were then computed between the AQ subscales and d’ 
and c according to sender type. The only significant correlations were between South East 
Asian d’ and the attention switching subscale, r = -.305, p = .007, and UK c and the 
imagination subscale, r = -.257, p = .025. 
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Personality and truth bias 
To examine the possible relationship between personality and degree of truth bias 
(c), bivariate correlations were also computed between the personality measures and both 
general c, South East Asian c and UK c. No significant correlations were demonstrated 
between general c and any of the questionnaire measures. Of particular interest is the 
finding of a positive correlation between the EPQ-E and UK c, r = .315, p < .01, but no 
positive correlation between the EPQ-E and South East Asian c, r = -.009, p = .94, 
suggesting that extraverts only show a truth bias when judging individuals of their own 
culture and not when judging individuals of a different cultural background. To examine 
whether these two r values significantly differed from each other (i.e., that the 
relationship between extraversion and UK c was significantly stronger than between 
extraversion and South East Asian c), the t difference statistic was calculated for the 
comparison of dependent r’s. Results demonstrated that the relationship between 
extraversion and UK c was significantly stronger than between extraversion and South 
East Asian c, t(72) = 3.12, p<.0.01. No other significant relationships were found between 
the questionnaire measures and either South East Asian c or UK c. 
Table 5. Correlations (r values) between personality measures and general d’ and c for 
Experiment 10.  
 Extraversion Emotional 
Intelligence 
Autism 
Spectrum 
d’ .122 .160 -.117 
c .000 .156 -.079 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level following bonferroni corrections (two-tailed). 
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Table 6.  Correlations (r values) between personality measures and d’ and c according to 
sender type for Experiment 10. 
 Extraversion Emotional Intelligence Autism Spectrum 
 UK South East 
Asian 
UK South East 
Asian 
UK South East 
Asian 
d’ .030 .078 .059 .225 -.041 -.194 
C .315* -.009 .104 .130 -.108 -.005 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level following bonferroni corrections (two-tailed). 
 
 
Discussion 
We presented two main aims for Experiment 10. Firstly, to further examine the 
relationship between extraversion and judgement accuracy and truth bias demonstrated in 
Experiment 9 and secondly, to explore possible individual differences in judgement 
accuracy and bias when judging senders from different cultural backgrounds. In relation 
to the first of these aims, we considered two competing hypotheses for judgement 
accuracy. If the enhanced judgement accuracy of extraverts relates to their enhanced 
social experience, a positive relationship would be shown when judging individuals of the 
same cultural background, but not when judging individuals from a different cultural 
background. If, however, the enhanced judgement accuracy is related to inherent 
cognitive skills in decoding communicative behaviour, this increased accuracy should be 
shown when judging all senders, regardless of cultural background. Our results did not 
support either of these hypotheses, since no significant relationship was found between 
extraversion and judgement accuracy for either the UK or South East Asian senders. We 
also considered two competing hypotheses for truth bias. If the enhanced truth bias 
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displayed by extraverts relates to enhanced social experience, a positive relationship 
would be shown when judging individuals of the same cultural background, but not when 
judging individuals from a different cultural background. If, however, the enhanced truth 
bias is related to greater positive affect, an increased truth bias would be shown when 
judging all senders, regardless of cultural background. Our results supported the first of 
these hypotheses, since higher scores in extraversion were significantly related to an 
increased tendency to judge messages as truthful, but only when those messages were 
delivered by senders from the same cultural background. In relation to our second aim, 
our initial hypothesis that participants would demonstrate significantly enhanced 
accuracy and truth bias when judging UK senders compared to South East Asian senders 
was supported.   
Cross-cultural lie detection 
In accordance with Bond and Atoum (2000), our findings further support the 
suggestion that individuals are more accurate at discriminating the truths and lies of 
individuals from the same cultural background as themselves compared to a different 
cultural background. The cross-cultural differences in nonverbal communication 
previously mentioned (Ekman, 1976; Exline et al, 1977; Friesen et al, 1979; Vrij et al, 
1992) are likely to result in difficulties in accurately interpreting the communicative 
behaviour of other cultural groups. For instance, Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) and 
Friesen (1972) highlighted differences in how emotions are expressed, and therefore 
recognised, across different cultural groups (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Friesen, 1972). 
In line with such findings, we are likely to be more accurate in evaluating the 
communicative intentions of individuals from our own cultural group, not only because 
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we have more social experience of such behaviour, but also because we use similar 
actions and rules when communicating ourselves.  
Contrasting the findings of Bond and Atoum (2000), however, we found a greater 
truth bias when judging individuals from the same cultural group compared to a different 
cultural group, whereas Bond and Atoum demonstrated the opposite. This difference 
could be due to the study design used, since the biases shown by the participants in Bond 
and Atoum’s study emerged when individuals were communicating in an unfamiliar 
language to the judges. The authors considered this finding in relation to how judges 
attribute a cause to a communication failure. For instance, when judges are unable to 
understand the communication of an individual from a different cultural group, they may 
overcompensate for this misunderstanding by giving senders the benefit of the doubt and 
judging them as truthful (Smith & Bond, 1994). Since our senders all communicated in 
English, this effect may not have been present. Instead, our judges may have attributed 
any differences in communicative behaviour to deception rather than cultural 
background. This is supported by findings of Vrij and Winkel (1991) that judges were 
more suspicious of behaviour typical to individuals from a Surinamese culture compared 
to individuals from their own culture.  
The fact that our South East Asian senders communicated in a second language, 
rather than their native languages, may also have contributed to our findings of a 
decreased truth bias. The increased difficulty that individuals may show when 
communicating in a second language, such as less fluent speech, greater errors and longer 
response times, could be interpreted by judges as indicators of deceit. This is seen in the 
findings of Da Silva and Leach (in prep), who compared detection accuracy for foreign 
individuals speaking in their native language compared to a second language. Overall, a 
lie bias was shown when individuals judged second language speakers, compared to a 
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truth bias when judging native language speakers. Our findings of a greater truth bias for 
individuals of the same culture, therefore, could be due to judges attributing behavioural 
differences resulting from communicating in a second-language to deception. It should be 
considered, however, that in our study such judgement differences did not negate the 
presence of a truth bias completely, or lead to a lie bias, but merely reduced the extent of 
truth bias displayed. It is only when the truth bias displayed for South East Asian senders 
is compared to that of UK senders that the differences in level of bias emerge.  
General Discussion and Conclusions 
The primary aim of the current study was to examine individual differences in the ability 
to detect deceit, in relation to both judgement accuracy and response bias. To do this, 
Experiment 9 examined judgement accuracy and response bias according to a variety of 
individual difference measures, including extraversion, emotional intelligence and autism 
spectrum traits. Experiment 10 then extended this work by examining these measures in 
relation to cross-cultural deception detection, i.e., accuracy and bias when judging 
individuals from the same cultural background compared to a different cultural 
background. As highlighted previously, the presence of individual differences in the 
ability to detect deceit remains a topic of much controversy, with some researchers 
supporting the existence of stable individual differences (O’Sullivan, 2005; O’Sullivan & 
Ekman, 2004) and others arguing against this (Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Levine, 2010). 
Our findings suggest that individual differences in judgement accuracy do exist and 
that these can be related to both judgement bias and overall accuracy rating. In 
Experiment 9, we found a positive relationship between emotional intelligence and 
degree of truth bias, and also between extraversion and degree of truth bias. Although the 
correlation between emotional intelligence and bias was not replicated in Experiment 10, 
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we were able to replicate our extraversion finding, but only when participants judged 
senders from the same cultural background as their own (UK senders) and not when 
judging those from a different cultural background (South East Asian senders). Since this 
relationship was not shown when participants judged South East Asian senders, however, 
this suggests that the truth bias demonstrated by extraverts may relate to socially learned 
information. If this is the case, this would explain why such biases are not shown when 
judging individuals with whom we have less social experience, i.e., individuals from a 
different cultural background to our own. These findings suggest that the existence of a 
truth bias could be due to the use of heuristic processes, such as the anchoring or 
availability heuristic, and that the extent of heuristic use differs according to the context 
in which an individual is operating. For example, when judging individuals from a 
different cultural background to our own with whom we are less familiar, the heuristics 
that usually guide our credibility judgements may be overridden by more deliberate 
processes. If considered in this way, the truth bias can be viewed as a socially learned 
heuristic which operates in a particular cultural context and allows us to deal efficiently 
with the large number of communications that we engage in over the course of any given 
day. When placed outside of this particular context, the truth bias is diminished by the 
requirement to consider more carefully the validity of information provided to us from 
individuals with whom we have less social experience and who may be from a different 
cultural ‘group’ to our own.  
In relation to individual differences in judgement accuracy, both autism spectrum 
characteristics and extraversion were found to be significantly related to d’ in Experiment 
9. Although we failed to replicate these findings in Experiment 10, it is possible that this 
may be due to the senders that were used in this experiment. Since both the UK senders 
and the South East Asian senders were made up of a different sample to that used in 
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Experiment 9, judgement accuracy may have been affected to a greater degree in this 
sample by the particular traits of the senders. For example, Bond and DePaulo (2008) 
suggested that judgement accuracy is affected more by the demeanour of the liar than by 
the ability of the judge. Similarly, characteristics such as facial appearance and social 
skills have been shown to affect credibility judgements (Kraut, 1980; Levine et al, 2009; 
Zebrowitz et al, 1996). It may be, therefore, that the sender sample used in Experiment 10 
was more difficult to accurately judge, and that any advantage extraverts had in 
Experiment 9 was lost due to these factors in Experiment 10. Because of these 
possibilities, we discuss reasons behind our significant findings in Experiment 9 below. 
Firstly, the decreased ability of individuals high in autism spectrum characteristics 
to accurately discriminate between truths and lies could be a result of decreased theory of 
mind abilities, since such deficits affect an individual’s ability to determine the intentions 
of others (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). Such deficits have been linked to an 
impaired capacity of autistic children to deceive others (Baron-Cohen, 1992), and thus, 
may similarly be linked to an impaired ability to correctly identify deception in others. 
Since theory of mind deficits have been suggested to negatively affect the formation of 
successful social relationships, through difficulties in understanding social reciprocity or 
the impact of behaviour on others (Baker, 2003), the contribution of such deficits to 
decreased detection accuracy is further supported by our findings of a negative 
relationship between both the social skill and communication AQ subscales and 
discrimination accuracy. Secondly, our finding of a positive relationship between 
extraversion and the ability to detect deceit can be considered in relation to a number of 
possible explanations. These include enhanced skill at decoding nonverbal behaviour 
(Ackert & Panter, 1988; Lieberman & Rosenthal, 2001), greater social experience from 
increased time spent in social activities (Nettle, 2007), increased central executive 
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efficiency (Lieberman & Rosenthal, 2001), and improved discrepancy detection 
(Eisenberger, Lieberman & Satpute, 2005). It is possible that these factors singularly, or 
in combination, contribute to the increased discrimination accuracy shown by extraverts 
in Experiment 9.  
The precise mechanisms responsible for the enhanced skill of extraverts in 
decoding nonverbal behaviour, however, are currently unknown. Ackert and Panter 
(1988) suggest that increased decoding ability could be due to superior attentional and 
perceptual abilities. This would allow extraverts to gain more information from complex 
social interactions than introverts, either through passive information gathering or greater 
motivation to seek information out. Alternatively, the greater social experience of 
extraverts may provide them with more opportunities to associate particular behaviours 
with particular outcomes or intentions. This idea was suggested as early as 1924 when 
Floyd Henry Allport proposed that individuals who avoid social interactions will miss out 
on opportunities to learn the vocabulary of facial expression. This could be reflected in 
more recent evidence that extraverts show enhanced ability on tasks that involve both the 
decoding of posed emotional expressions (Funder & Harris, 1986; Mill, 1984) and the 
attribution of conversation topics to visually presented ambiguous social situations 
(Ackert & Panter, 1988). Lieberman and Rosenthal (2001), however, found that 
extraverts displayed enhanced nonverbal sensitivity only when a secondary task was 
introduced, leading to the requirement of efficient multitasking processes. This is logical 
when considered with findings of greater central executive efficiency for extraverts 
(Lieberman & Rosenthal, 2001). Therefore, differences in detection ability are likely to 
be influenced by a combination of differences in social exposure and innate cognitive 
ability. Since conflicting findings have also been put forward by other researchers in the 
field, however, who have proposed that introverted individuals are more accurate at 
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detecting deceit (O’Sullivan, 2005; Peace et al, 2011), further work is required to 
disentangle the particular circumstances in which certain personality characteristics may 
be advantageous in detecting deceit.   
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CHAPTER 6 
General Discussion 
The present thesis had two main aims. Firstly, to examine the additional cognitive 
processes involved in telling a lie compared to telling the truth and secondly, to examine 
the factors that impact on the ability of others to accurately detect deception. In relation to 
the first aim, our experiments support the general supposition that lying is more 
cognitively demanding than telling the truth due to the additional processes involved 
(Christ et al, 2009; Spence et al, 2001; Vendemia et al, 2009; Walczyk et al, 2003). We 
found these additional processes to include: the suppression of competing responses, 
including both truthful and false information; choosing between alternative lie 
possibilities; and switching between truth and lie task-sets. In relation to the second aim, 
the increased cognitive load that liars experience when telling unprepared lies did not 
result in the accurate identification of deception by human observers. Overall, human 
ability to detect lies was shown to be poor. However, variability in both accuracy levels 
and truth bias was found to be related to individual and cultural difference factors.  
Experimental summary: Cognitive processes and deception 
Experiments 1 and 2 specifically examined the decision to lie and demonstrated that 
the response time difference between lying and telling the truth was smaller when 
participants chose whether to lie or tell the truth compared to when they were directed to 
do so. In particular, participants were slower to respond with the truth when they chose 
the response compared to when they were directed to do so, whereas lying was much less 
affected by the choice manipulation. 
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Experiments 3, 4 and 5 examined lie response choice and demonstrated longer 
response times for lies when there is a choice of multiple lie response options compared 
to having only one lie possibility. The number of lie possibilities did not interfere with 
response time when participants told the truth. Furthermore, the findings of Experiment 5 
also suggest that when choosing a lie response, implausible lies are inhibited prior to any 
decision process. 
Experiment 6 examined whether switching between telling a lie and telling the truth 
incurs a response time cost compared to consistently responding in one manner. It was 
found that switching between these two processes does increase response time compared 
to trials where no switch is required, indicating that the two response types involve the 
use of different task-sets. This difference was greater when participants switched from 
telling a lie to telling the truth rather than vice versa, suggesting that telling the truth is a 
more dominant cognitive task than telling a lie (i.e., Allport et al, 1994). 
Experiments 7 and 8 examined the influence of priming techniques on lie 
construction processes. On certain trials, participants were primed with a potential lie 
response. The results of Experiment 7 demonstrated that participants do not use these 
primes as their lie response any more than would be expected by chance. When the 
number of potential lie response options was increased however (Experiment 8), this 
resulted in participants using the same response as the prime to a greater degree, 
suggesting that the correct prime influences the lie response chosen in certain situations.  
 Cognitive processes when telling lies 
We previously discussed a number of research studies that have suggested that 
telling a lie involves additional processes compared to telling the truth (Christ et al, 2009; 
Spence et al, 2001; Vendemia et al, 2005; Walczyk et al, 2003). This additional cognitive 
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load results in discernible behavioural differences between liars and truth tellers, 
including differential brain activity patterns (Christ et al, 2009), increased speech 
hesitations (Vrij et al, 2008) and longer response times to questions (Walczyk et al, 2003; 
2005; 2009). Although researchers have suggested potential explanations for such 
processing differences, including the necessity to suppress the truthful response (Spence 
et al, 2001) and the decision of when to lie and when to tell the truth (Walczyk et al, 
2003), we were interested in disentangling the potential processes that may contribute to 
the cognitive difficulty associated with lying. In accordance with the current literature, we 
organised our experiments around three main factors: suppressing the truthful response; 
the decision to lie; and the construction of a lie.  
 Suppression of the alternative response 
The nature of our experimental design meant that, in all of our response time 
experiments, participants were required to tell a simple lie regarding the colour of a 
square. It was not necessary for participants to construct a sophisticated lie response, and 
their lie response options were minimal (in Experiments 1 and 2, only one possible lie 
response was available). In all but Experiments 1 and 2, the decision process was also 
absent. Despite this reduction in the necessary processes required to lie, we still 
consistently demonstrated longer response times when individuals lied compared to when 
they told the truth. According to models such as the ADCM Revised (Walczyk et al, 
2009), the only process left to explain longer lie response times is that the truthful 
response needs to be suppressed. Our experiments therefore provide direct evidence that 
suppression of the truthful response is a contributing factor to longer lie response times. 
Although suppression processes have been traditionally associated with truthful 
information, it is also possible that such processes are required to suppress alternative 
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responses in general, regardless of the honesty of information. Since uttering the truth has 
been suggested to be our default communicative stance (Gilbert, 1991), it is intuitive that 
when telling a lie, truthful information will have to be suppressed. If we are placed in a 
context where the relative strength of a truthful response is reduced through an increased 
necessity to lie, however, then the reverse may also be required, i.e., suppression of the 
lie response. In Experiment 6, we demonstrated that switching between telling a lie and 
telling the truth incurred a response time cost, and that this cost was greatest when 
participants switched from telling a lie to telling the truth. In accordance with task 
switching theorists (Allport et al, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), this greater cost is 
likely due to the increased cognitive effort required to reinstate the task-set associated 
with telling the truth. In addition to such processes, potential lie responses are also likely 
to require suppression. If individuals have previously lied to a question, then this task-set 
will remain active when faced with a second response requirement, potentially resulting 
in the automatic activation of possible lie responses. When individuals must then revert to 
responding truthfully, it will be necessary to take time to suppress this lie response, a task 
that will increase cognitive demand when telling the truth. 
The decision to lie 
Telling a spontaneous lie requires two overarching decisions: choosing to lie rather 
than to tell the truth, and choosing how to lie. If telling the truth is our default 
communicative stance, then deciding to lie in response to a question represents a 
departure from the normal communicative state. This departure will invoke additional 
processes, since an active choice to lie would be required, whereas no such choice should 
be required when telling the truth (Walczyk et al, 2003). In Experiments 1 and 2, we 
compared response times in trials in which participants chose to lie with trials in which 
CHAPTER 6 
General Discussion 
 
 
 
208 
they were directed to lie. While we found effects of deciding to lie, we discovered that 
there was a much greater cost to deciding to tell the truth than deciding to lie, relative to 
the cost of being directed in the response. Thus, the decision process does not singularly 
impact on lie response times. We consider therefore that it is not deciding to lie per se 
that incurs a response time cost, but instead choosing to depart from the norm for that 
context and the resultant suppression of the alternative response. Individuals who engage 
in deception and lying on a more regular basis, such as pathological liars (Yang, Raine, 
Lencz, Bihrle, Lacasse & Colletti, 2005), may not invoke a decision process when 
responding deceptively to a question. Instead, it may take them longer to respond to a 
question truthfully, since any natural propensity to lie must be overcome.  
Our work suggests that the effect of choosing how to respond also impacts on 
necessary suppression processes. We found a greater response time difference between 
directed and choice trials when participants told the truth compared to when they lied 
(Experiments 1 and 2). This suggests that there is a greater processing difference between 
being directed to tell the truth and choosing to tell the truth, than being directed to lie and 
choosing to lie.  This greater difference can be considered in relation to suppression 
processes. When participants are directed to lie, they must suppress the truthful response 
and produce an alternative, whereas when participants are directed to tell the truth, only 
truthful information should be activated and thus, no suppression of alternative responses 
should be required. In contrast, when participants choose to tell the truth, the evaluation 
of how to respond may diminish the relative strength of the default truthful state. This 
may lead to both potential lie responses and truth responses becoming active, with the lie 
response then requiring suppression. This evaluation process will have less effect on lie 
trials, since participants are already suppressing the alternative response type when they 
are directed to lie. Thus, choosing whether to lie or tell the truth was found to enhance the 
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cognitive processes required to tell the truth, thereby diminishing the processing 
difference between truths and lies.  
The construction of a lie  
In 1997, McCornack highlighted a number of myths of deception research, one of 
which included the assumption that constructing a lie response is more difficult, and 
requires more active processing, than constructing a truthful response. Indeed, although it 
has been suggested that constructing a plausible and consistent lie is more cognitively 
demanding than telling the truth (Zuckerman et al, 1981), a comprehensive understanding 
regarding why, or even whether, this is the case is considerably lacking.  
Lie construction processes involve the consideration of how to respond to any 
question, i.e., how to lie. When telling the truth, we have particular knowledge which 
represents our consideration of an accurate and honest response to a question. Although 
we can vary how we present this truthful information to others, such as the amount of 
detail we provide, an honest response should have basic, factual elements that remain 
constant with our own prior knowledge and recollection. This will provide the basis 
against which we will construct an honest response. When we tell a lie, however, we have 
more variability in the information that we can provide, with the only constraint for 
success being that our response is plausible to others, even if we know it to be false 
ourselves. This will inevitably lead to a greater choice of response options when lying 
than when telling the truth.    
We found in Experiments 3 and 4 that having to make a choice regarding which lie 
to use from many, arbitrary possibilities is difficult and incurs a response time cost. When 
participants had a choice of multiple lie response options, compared to only one lie 
possibility, they took longer to respond and demonstrated a greater difference between 
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response times for lies and truths. Even after hundreds of trials, and with only two 
choices, participants experienced difficulty in making an arbitrary choice when they were 
forced to lie. Therefore, when choosing between lie possibilities that are equally 
plausible, deciding which false response to use contributes to the additional processing 
required when telling a lie. Although it could be considered that we are often constrained 
by the information we use when lying, since we have to ensure that our stories remain 
plausible and hence go undetected, the consideration of plausibility may not be a major 
contributor to longer response times for lies. When we introduced a constraint on the 
particular lie response that participants could use, we found that lie response times were 
faster than when no constraint was provided and hence a decision between plausible lie 
responses required. This suggests that responses known to be implausible are not 
considered in the response decision process, but are suppressed prior to this. 
The process of choosing a lie response is considered by the ADCM. In this model, 
possible lie responses are activated in long-term memory and implausible answers are 
inhibited. It is the most active lie following this process that is used in response to the 
question. Our experiments support the idea that implausible lies are inhibited prior to any 
response decision processes between plausible possibilities. How participants then choose 
between plausible responses, however, is unclear, with the ADCM claiming that the most 
active lie following the truth is ultimately used in response. This appears to suggest that 
an active consideration of potential alternatives is not undertaken. This possibility 
contrasts with our findings that lie response times increase when participants are provided 
with multiple responses to choose between compared to having only one response 
alternative, since if this were the case, we would expect no response time difference 
between these two conditions. Our work also shows that enhancing the relative activation 
level of a particular lie response does not decrease the cognitive processes involved in lie-
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telling (Experiments 7 and 8), since participants do not necessarily use the lie response 
prime as their answer even though it should be the most active response following the 
truth.  
Limitations and future directions 
The paradigm that we used appears quite different to the usual methods of 
investigating how people lie (e.g., Abe et al, 2007; Vrij et al, 2008). For example, 
participants were not asked to lie about personal information, nor was there an 
interlocutor present asking questions. The method we employed is a powerful technique 
without which we would not have been able to address the detailed processing questions 
discussed above. It is important, however, to consider the relationship between our task 
and lying outside of the laboratory.  
Similar to many cognitive experiments (Johnson et al, 2005; Mameli et al, 2010; 
Spence et al, 2008; Vendemia et al, 2005), our paradigm did not require participants to 
engage in the direct deception of another individual. They were producing verbal 
responses recorded by a computer, and there was no human “addressee” to fool. While 
this procedure means that participants may have felt that the task was different to lying in 
everyday life, they were performing operations that must necessarily be present in even 
the most simple of lies independently of both the intention and motivation to deceive. 
What is important is that participants in our study intentionally and knowingly produced 
falsehoods. While there are situations in which a person can knowingly produce 
falsehoods without lying (e.g., when both parties are aware of the falsehood) there are 
very few situations when lies are produced without falsehoods (see Meibauer, 2005, for a 
discussion). Clearly, however, it is possible that the effects found in our experiments may 
interact or be overshadowed by the affective components of lying, such as guilt, stress or 
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negative emotions in general. Future studies may be able to test these interactions by, for 
example, inducing negative moods in participants in the laboratory (e.g., Kirschbaum, 
Pirke & Hellhammer, 1993; Philippot, 1993). 
Atypically for research in deception, participants in the current study had to lie 
when a representation of the truth was in front of them. For example, participants had to 
lie, “red” when the truth, a yellow square, was present on the screen (compare this with a 
study such as Fullam et al, 2009, in which participants are asked to lie about having 
performed an everyday act). One likely effect of having the visual stimulus on the screen 
would be to make it more difficult to suppress the truthful response when lying. This 
design, therefore, maximised the suppression effect so we could manipulate particular 
components of the lie process. Despite the likelihood of larger effects, however, there is 
no reason why the overall difficulty should have interacted with any of the differences 
found in our experiments. Both lying about a visual stimulus and lying about the content 
of memory involve suppression of the truthful response and the experiments reported here 
investigated this suppression. Furthermore, participants were not being presented with the 
colour name, i.e., a possible response, only a coloured square. This meant that the truthful 
response still needed to be recalled from memory, just as if we had asked them what they 
were up to the night before last. 
 Human ability to detect deception 
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, we supported previous findings that telling unrehearsed lies 
is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth. Even simple lies regarding the 
colour of a square require additional processing, such as the suppression of alternative 
responses and choosing how to lie. This increased difficulty was evidenced in observable 
behavioural differences of longer response times to questions. Previous work has 
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suggested that this increased cognitive load is also reflected in a wider range of 
behavioural differences, including increased blink rate (Vrij et al, 2008) and increased 
speech disturbances (DePaulo et al, 2003). Accordingly, such behavioural differences 
between lies and truths may aid in the accurate detection of deception. Although human 
observers have been shown to identify that liars appear to be thinking harder when 
producing their messages (Caso et al, 2005; Vrij et al, 2010), human ability to detect 
deception is generally poor and thus, the second aim of this thesis was to examine 
whether such difficulty can be detected by human observers, and the potential factors that 
may affect this.  
Experiments 9 and 10 examined the relationship between lie detection ability, truth 
bias and personality characteristics when judging individuals from the same vs. a 
different cultural background to the judge. Our judges demonstrated both poor 
discrimination accuracy between truths and lies (approximately 55%) and a truth bias, 
findings which are in accordance with previous deception detection research (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2008). Our finding that both truth bias and accuracy levels decrease when 
judging individuals from a different cultural background to our own (South East Asian), 
has only been shown in a limited number of studies examining international deception 
detection (Bond & DePaulo, 2000; Bond et al, 1990). Where our work surpasses previous 
research is in the analysis of individual differences in both the degree of truth bias 
demonstrated, and the relative accuracy shown, when judging individuals from different 
cultural groups. 
Individual differences and deception detection 
We have previously highlighted that the potential existence of individual 
differences in the ability to detect deception is an issue of contention (Aamodt & Custer, 
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2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Bond & Uysal, 2007). While some researchers have 
demonstrated findings that support the supposition that some people are intrinsically 
better lie-detectors than others (Bond, 2008), the majority argue against such conclusions 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2008). A lack of research examining potential individual differences, 
especially the effect that they may have on wider factors relating to deception detection 
such as response bias, has made it difficult to draw any firm conclusions regarding this 
area. We found that individual differences in deception judgements exist, and that these 
relate to both accuracy and truth bias, when judging the statements of individuals from 
the same compared to a different cultural background.  
In relation to the ability to detect deception, both extraversion and autism spectrum 
characteristics were found to be related to the discrimination of truths and lies in 
Experiment 9, with extraversion positively related, and autism spectrum traits negatively 
related, to discrimination accuracy. As discussed in Chapter 5, the decreased judgement 
ability of individuals high in autism spectrum characteristics may result from 
impairments in theory of mind capability, since such deficits impact on an individual’s 
ability to determine the intentions of others (Baker, 2003; Baron-Cohen, 1992; Baron-
Cohen et al, 1985). Since theory of mind deficits may negatively affect the formation of 
successful social relationships, through difficulties in understanding social reciprocity or 
the impact of behaviour on others (Baker, 2003), it may also lead to a reduction in general 
social experience. This reduced social experience contrasts with individuals who score 
highly in extraversion traits, since they traditionally seek out and more readily engage in 
social situations (Nettle, 2007). This enhanced social experience may explain the 
increased discrimination accuracy shown by those high in extraversion. These findings 
should be considered with caution however, since they failed to replicate in Experiment 
10. 
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Individual differences and truth bias 
The propensity that an individual has to consider incoming information as truthful, 
termed a truth bias, has also been shown to contribute to deception detection accuracy 
(Levine et al, 2006). The extent that people differ in this propensity has not been 
examined according to specific individual differences when judging deception. We found 
that particular individual characteristics are related to the degree of truth bias that people 
experience when judging potentially deceptive messages. In Experiment 9, we found a 
positive relationship between both emotional intelligence and extraversion, and the 
degree of truth bias. Although the correlation between emotional intelligence and truth 
bias was not replicated in Experiment 10, we were able to replicate our finding of an 
enhanced truth bias for those high in extraversion. Of particular interest was the fact that 
the enhanced truth bias shown by extraverts effectively disappeared when judging 
individuals from a different cultural background to their own.  
If the truth bias is due to the use of intrinsic heuristic processes when judging 
deception (Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), it may be that such 
heuristics are only relied upon when dealing with individuals with whom we have more 
social experience. When judging individuals from a different cultural background to our 
own with whom we are less familiar, the heuristics that usually guide our credibility 
judgements may be overridden by more deliberate processes. Alternatively, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, our findings could be explained by factors relating to a generic suspicion of 
individuals from different cultural groups to our own, which reduces our propensity to 
consider them as honest. Since the typical behaviour demonstrated by South East Asian 
cultures, such as increased gaze aversion (Okazaki et al, 2002), reflects behaviours that 
people traditionally associate with deception (Global Deception Team, 2006), it may also 
be that our judges identified such behavioural differences and used them to guide their 
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judgements. If this were the case, however, we would expect that not only would the 
relative truth bias be reduced, but that our judges would actually demonstrate a lie-bias.  
Limitations and future directions 
A number of further questions remain to be addressed following this study. Firstly, 
the further exploration of the mechanisms behind the truth bias, and the particular 
situations and populations in which it occurs. For example, it is important to investigate 
whether the relative differences in truth bias that were shown by extraverts in Experiment 
10 would also be found in populations that have been found to be lie-biased, such as 
prisoners (Bond, Malloy, Arias, Nunn, & Thompson, 2005) and police officers (Garrido, 
Masip & Herrero, 2004). Indeed, if the lie bias generally shown by police officers is 
further enhanced when dealing with individuals from a different cultural background, 
then it is important to address such biases in future training programmes.   
Secondly, since we only used one cultural group for our sender comparison (South 
East Asian), it would be pertinent to include a wider range of cultural backgrounds in 
future work. For example, judgement biases and accuracy may be influenced by current 
social stereotypes regarding particular cultural groups. Such work would not only provide 
further information regarding the mechanisms involved in credibility judgement biases 
overall, but is also of practical importance. The global nature of current society means 
that we interact with a large variety of cultural groups, and it is important to identify any 
differences that may be present in how we evaluate and judge the credibility of 
individuals from these different groups in both security, and wider social, settings.  
Lastly, in Experiment 10 we only examined individual differences in the 
judgements of UK participants. To understand the effects of individual differences more 
fully, particularly in relation to cross-cultural judgements, it would be useful to examine 
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the judgements of individuals from other cultural groups. Since individuals from different 
cultural groups have been shown to view the acceptability and motivations behind 
deception differently (Aune & Waters, 1994; Lewis & George, 2008; Mealy et al, 2007; 
Park & Ahn, 2007; Seiter et al, 2002), the mechanisms involved in the actual 
identification and judgement of deception may differ accordingly and would therefore be 
a worthy target of future research work.    
Conclusions 
Despite the wealth of research investigating lying in general, such as lie detection 
(e.g., Vrij et al, 2007), the social psychology of lying (e.g., Cole, 2001; DePaulo & 
Kashy, 1998) and the linguistics and philosophy of lying (e.g., Meibauer, 2005), very 
little work has been conducted on how we lie. The present thesis has tried to address the 
imbalance by investigating why people take longer to lie than to tell the truth. We come 
to three conclusions. First, lying involves suppressing information, primarily the truth, 
and suppressing or rejecting a default response will increase response time. Second, there 
can be costs associated with choosing to tell the truth, just as there can be with choosing 
to lie. We therefore maintain that the decision to depart from the normal type of 
communication can be costly, and while this will often be a cost associated with a 
decision to lie, it is not an obligatory component of lying. Lastly, lying often requires 
more choice in generating a response than telling the truth. There is typically only one 
truth but there are many possible lie options. Choosing between these additional options 
is a difficult job and contributes directly to the longer time needed to tell a lie.  
In accordance with the difficulty that people experience when telling a lie, the 
present thesis has also tried to examine possible factors that impact on human ability to 
accurately detect this deception. From our work, we conclude that variation in deception 
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judgements exist and that these relate to measurable individual difference characteristics, 
specifically extraversion, emotional intelligence and autism spectrum traits. Such 
variation is not restricted solely to discrimination accuracy, but also relates to the degree 
of truth bias that an individual experiences. Individual differences in credibility 
judgements were further shown to interact with wider factors, namely the cultural 
background of the sender. From this, we suggest that further consideration is therefore 
necessary regarding the interaction between personal and situational factors on accurate 
deception detection. 
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